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Thesis Summary 
 
 
This thesis takes as its starting point a number of significant recent criticisms of the way in 
which the International Court of Justice (the Court) deals with facts.  After examining the 
Court’s substantial fact-finding powers as set out in its Statute and Rules, it is noted that the 
Court has not made significant use of the fact-finding powers that it possesses, instead 
preferring to take a reactive approach to fact-finding.  It is this reactive approach, largely 
relying on the parties to put evidence before the Court, which is the subject of recent 
criticisms both from within the Court itself and from international legal scholarship.  Having 
assessed the merits of these arguments, the thesis takes the position that such criticisms are 
indeed warranted and that the Court’s reactive approach to fact-finding falls short of adequacy 
both in cases involving abundant, particularly complex or technical facts and in those cases 
involving a scarcity of evidence, such as cases of non-appearance. 
 
Subsequently, the thesis undertakes a comparative exercise in order to examine how other 
relevant inter-state tribunals conduct fact-finding.  Drawing on the practice of other tribunals, 
namely the adjudicative bodies of the World Trade Organization and a number of recent inter-
state arbitrations, the thesis then makes a number of select proposals for reform which, it is 
argued, will enable the Court to address some of the current weaknesses in its approach to 
fact-finding and better ensure factual determinations that are as accurate as they can possibly 
be within the judicial process.  Such proposals include (but are not limited to) the 
development of a power to compel the disclosure of information, greater use of provisional 
measures and a clear strategy for the use of expert evidence.  
  6 
  
  7 
Abstract 
 
The thesis takes as its starting point a number of significant recent criticisms of the way in 
which the International Court of Justice deals with facts.  Drawing on an extensive survey of 
other relevant inter-state tribunals the thesis makes a select number of proposals for reform 
which could realistically be made through orders or practice directions to remedy some of the 
defects of the Court’s current reactive approach to fact-finding, crucially without amendment 
of the Court’s Statute.  
 
The thesis first notes that the Court is regularly faced with cases of such a complex or 
technical nature so as to be beyond what any judge could be reasonably expected to 
comprehend.  Next, Chapter 1 shows that despite possessing far-reaching fact-finding powers 
the Court has never utilised them to any meaningful extent.  Instead, the Court’s approach to 
fact-finding is in many respects reactive – the onus being placed squarely on the parties to 
place before the Court the information necessary for the establishment of a sound factual basis 
upon which the case can be decided.  That the Court operates in this manner is the product of 
a number of interrelated factors including resource constraints and, most significantly, a 
deferential attitude to states in light of their sovereign nature – an attitude that has permeated 
the operation of the Court since the days of the Permanent Court of International Justice 
(PCIJ).   
 
Chapter 2 explores a number of criticisms that have been made of the way in which the Court 
operates.  These criticisms of the Court’s reactive approach have emanated both from 
international legal scholarship and from within the Court itself.  Whilst the merits of the 
Court’s current approach are acknowledged, it is argued that the Court’s reactive approach 
falls short of adequacy both (i) where the facts are abundant or particularly complex or 
technical, since the Court struggles to effectively assess the evidence presented, and (ii) where 
there is a paucity of facts, since the Court struggles to fulfil its Article 53(2) ICJ Statute 
obligation to satisfy itself that the case is sound in fact and in law. 
 
It might be said that this much is uncontroversial.  As such, the thesis seeks to take the next 
step and explore whether we can envisage an approach that would allow the Court to more 
effectively conduct fact-finding.  In doing so, the thesis takes advantage of the much-
discussed proliferation of international courts and tribunals and draws upon the substantial 
body of practice in this area.  A survey of this body of practice in Chapter 3 reveals that a 
number of other international courts and tribunals, such as the WTO adjudicative bodies and 
inter-state arbitrations generally take a more proactive approach to fact-finding.  The thesis 
then asks whether the adoption of a similarly proactive approach by the ICJ could potentially 
help to remedy some of the fact-finding deficiencies for which the Court has been criticised in 
recent times.   
 
Drawing on the practice of the other international courts identified, Chapter 4 suggests that 
there are a number of avenues open to the Court with potential to address some of its current 
weaknesses, should it choose to do so: 
 
1. The first relates to the possibility of making greater use of the fact-finding powers that 
the Court already possesses.  Chapter 4 explores the possibility of the Court taking a 
teleological approach to its Statute and Rules and the so-called duty of collaboration in 
asking whether the Court could potentially construe its fact-finding powers to compel 
the production of evidence, as opposed to merely requesting it.   
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2. Secondly, the possibility of better utilising the Court’s power to order provisional 
measures under Article 41 of its Statute is examined. 
3. Thirdly, relating to both the fact-finding and fact-assessment process, the thesis 
explores the possibility of increased use of experts, the refinement of the current 
procedure for the presentation of expert evidence and greater use of cross-examination 
as a way of aiding the Court’s effective assessment of the facts put before it by the 
parties. 
 
Finally, Chapter 5 examines the merits of a more proactive approach to fact-finding, 
facilitated in the manner set out in the previous chapter.  However, before the relative merits 
of a more proactive approach can be assessed, Chapter 5 first of all addresses the 
fundamentally important question of whether the Court has completely unconstrained 
discretion to take a more proactive approach to fact-finding or whether its discretion is 
somehow fettered by factual determinations made by other UN organs (in particular the 
Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter).  Ultimately it is argued that there is 
nothing in either the Court’s constitutive instruments or practice which would fetter the 
Court’s discretion and that accordingly the Court, as an independent international tribunal, is 
competent to adopt a more proactive approach to fact-finding. 
 
In moving to consider the merits of a more proactive approach, Chapter 5 next illustrates in 
practical terms what the more proactive approach set out in Chapter 4 would look like.  
Whilst a case is made for such reforms, Chapter 5 considers the limitations of the Court’s 
fact-finding powers and ruminates on the merits of the Court’s current reactive approach to 
fact-finding.  Subsequently, after the limitations of the Court’s powers have been established, 
it is argued that taking a more proactive approach to fact-finding is no panacea for the current 
problems that the Court faces.  Nevertheless, it is maintained that implementation of any of 
the proposals set out in Chapter 4 would ultimately leave the Court better placed to make 
accurate factual determinations upon which the law could be decided. 
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Introduction 
(i) Factually Complex Cases: the Court’s Bread and Butter 
 
In 1958 Neill Alford Jr. stated that the likelihood of a dispute as to the facts in any case before 
the International Court of Justice was fairly remote.
1
  He argued that this was so due to the 
fact that generally neither state party to a case before the Court had sufficient evidence to 
question the factual assertions made by the other party.
2
  However, a number of developments 
in the intervening fifty or so years including the greater flow of information brought about by 
the internet and the involvement of Non-Governmental Organisations and International 
Organisations in human rights monitoring have proved Alford wrong as increasingly the 
Court has had to deal with cases in which the outcome of the case has turned not just on legal 
questions but also on factual determinations.
3
  As Mosk has stated: 
 
‘…there have been dramatic changes in the availability, ascertainment and importance 
of facts.  The technological age has produced more facts and more facts that can and 
must be ascertained…it is no longer necessary to wade through a warehouse full of 
documents to find critical evidence…It also may not be necessary to travel thousands 
of miles to find documents and interview witnesses.  New methods of storing 
documents and of communicating have drastically affected means of investigating and 
ascertaining facts’.4 
 
Crucially, such cases requiring a heavy focus on the facts have challenged the Court’s 
traditional approach to the facts.  In the past the Court was often able to decide the outcome of 
a case through reliance on undisputed facts, meaning that it was not so much the facts that 
were dispute but rather the legal conclusions that were to be drawn from them.
5
  It has been 
                                                 
1
  N.H. Alford Jr, ‘Fact Finding by the World Court’ 4 Vill L Rev 37, 57 
2
  ibid 
3
  S. Halink, ‘All Things Considered: How the International Court of Justice Delegated its Fact-Assessment to 
the United Nations in the Armed Activities Case’ 40 NYUJ Int'l L & Pol 13, 13 KJ Keith, ‘The International 
Court of Justice and Criminal Justice’ 59 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 895, 904 R. Teitelbaum, 
‘Recent Fact-Finding Developments at the International Court of Justice’(2007)’ 6 The Law and Practice of 
International Courts and Tribunals 184, 125 
4
  R. Mosk, ‘The Role of Facts in International Dispute Resolution’ (2003) 203 Receuil des Cours - Collected 
Courses at the Hague Academy 11, 19 
5
 Indeed, cases before the PCIJ primarily concerned the application of treaties and as such the Court ‘was in a 
position to establish and rely on facts that were not in dispute between the parties, obviating, in most cases, 
the need for detailed rules of evidence’, see E. Valencia-Ospina, ‘Evidence before the International Court of 
Justice’ (1999) 1 International Law Forum du droit international 202, 202; see also Rosalyn Judge Higgins, 
Speech by H. E. Judge Rosalynn Higgins, President of the International Court of Justice (At the 58th Session 
of the International Law Commission, 2006) such as Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua 
and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v Honduras), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, p 659 120; 
Shabtai Rosenne and Yaël Ronen, The law and practice of the International Court, 1920-2005 (4th edn, 
Martinus Nijhoff 2006) 1040; with regard to the ICJ, As Judge Yusuf stated in the Pulp Mills case, ‘on many 
occasions in the past the Court was able to resolve complex and contested factual issues without resorting to 
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remarked that ‘[i]n times past, courts and arbitrators dealt with situations that were not as 
complex as those today…’6  Whether or not this is so (for cases such as Corfu Channel and 
Nicaragua could hardly be described as straightforward in terms of the facts
7
), what is certain 
is that the Court is increasingly deprived of the possibility of basing its decisions on 
undisputed facts.   
 
In addition to the disputes coming before the Court being consistently complicated, these 
complex facts are being increasingly contested.  By this it is meant that states themselves 
have demonstrated a willingness to use ‘ever more sophisticated forms of evidence to 
substantiate their claims’.8  Such developments have led to criticism of the way the Court 
handles factually complex cases that come before it (as we will see in greater detail in the 
following chapters)
9
 and have been one of the driving forces behind calls to move away from 
the Court’s current approach to the facts.10 
 
That is not to say that no such disputes where the facts are uncontroversial come before the 
Court today- even now the Court will occasionally be asked to deal with a case that almost 
exclusively turns on legal issues alone.  For instance, in the Arrest Warrant case the Court 
only had to consider the legal issue of whether the arrest warrant issued by Belgium violated 
                                                                                                                                                        
Article 50 of the Statute’ or utilising its other fact-finding powers; Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), ICJ Judgment (20 April 2010) <http://wwwicj-
cijorg/docket/files/135/15877pdf>, Declaration of Judge Yusuf at 6 
6
   Mosk 23 
7
    See Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4; Military and Paramilitary Activities in 
and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p 14 
8
  Anna Riddell and Brendan Plant, Evidence before the International Court of Justice (British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law 2009) 5; Teitelbaum 152; Jean D'Aspremont and Makane M. Mbengue, 
‘Strategies of Engagement with Scientific Fact-Finding in International Adjudication’ Amsterdam Law 
School Research Paper No 2013-20  stating that ‘[i]t is commonplace that the role of science and 
technologies is growingly infusing all the layers of the international legal system as a whole’; Anna Riddell, 
‘Scientific Evidence in the International Court of Justice - Problems and Possibilities ’ (2009) 20 Finnish 
Yearbook of International Law 229, 229 
9
  S. Mathias and others, The International Court of Justice at 60: Performance and Prospects (JSTOR 2006) 
398 Teitelbaum 120;  Stephen M. Schwebel, Three Cases of Fact-Finding by the International Court of 
Justice in International Law (Cambridge University Press 1994) 2; Thomas Franck, ‘Fact-finding in the 
I.C.J.’ in R.B. Lillich (ed), Fact-finding before international tribunals: Eleventh Sokol Colloquium 
(Transnational Publishers 1992) 21; John Crook, ‘The Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of 
the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda) and its Implications for the Rules on the Use of Force’ 
(American Society of International Law Briefing at Tillar House) 
10
   Christian J Tams, ‘Article 49’ in A. Zimmermann (ed), The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A 
Commentary (Oxford University Press 2006) 1107.  As Tams has stated, ‘[g]iven the increasing number of 
cases brought before the Court, and the considerable length of proceedings, it s not surprising that the Court’s 
cautious approach just described has come under strain.  Especially in recent years, there has been talk about 
the need to “modernize the conduct of the Court’s business”’; see also Caroline E. Foster, ‘New Clothes for 
the Emperor? Consultation of Experts by the International Court of Justice’ Journal of International Dispute 
Settlement, 2 
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its international obligations to respect the immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the 
incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Congo.
11
 
 
However, there is no doubt that today disputes in which the resolution of factual 
determinations is critical to the resolution of the legal issues in the dispute are 
commonplace.
12
  Domestic courts with procedures for discovery or explicit powers to compel 
the production of evidence often have to guard against so-called ‘fishing expeditions’ 
whereby one party submits often speculative requests for the disclosure of information in the 
possession of the other party.  However this is not a problem the ICJ has ever faced.  Indeed, 
its reactive approach to the facts results in the ‘opposite extreme’– namely the danger that the 
parties flood and overwhelm the Court with thousands of pages of written submissions, 
annexes and reports.  Whether this practice has arisen as a result of the fact the parties are 
unclear what kind of information the Court will find probative or not, the end result is that the 
Court struggles to deal with the vast amounts of evidence.
13
  The fear of ‘documentary 
overload’14 prompted the Court to adopt its Practice Directions II and III, urging the parties to 
only submit documentary evidence that was absolutely necessary to support the case.
15
  
 
Despite these Practice Directions the Court itself has referred in recent times to ‘mass[es] of 
                                                 
11
  Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, 
p 3 
12
 Rosalyn Judge Higgins, ‘Speech by H.E. Judge Rosalyn Higgins, President of the International Court of 
Justice to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly’ (Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, 2 
November 2007); Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, ‘Introduction: Courts and Tribunals and the Treatment 
of Scientific Issues’ 3 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 479; Similarly Highet stated that since the 
mid-1980s the Court has been ‘increasingly exposed to situations involving disputed facts’; K. Highet, 
‘Evidence, the Court, and the Nicaragua Case’ 81 The American Journal of International Law 1, 10 
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 Teitelbaum suggests that the Court is partly to blame for this: ‘…the Court’s failure to give some guidance to 
the parties in terms of the burden of poof required, prior to the rendering of its decision, may contribute to 
the excessive annexes and lack of focus in the written pleadings on the part of counsel’ see; Teitelbaum 123 
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 Berman has referred to documentary overload being ‘a real and growing problem.  The urge to be complete is 
understandable and laudable, but it leads to the essential becoming swamped by the peripheral’; see; Frank 
Berman, ‘Remarks by Frank Berman’ [American Society of International Law] 106 Proceedings of the 
Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 162 
15
   To provide some illustration, in the Permanent Court’s first case the documents submitted included only a 
handful of letters, memoranda and one telegram; see Nomination of the Netherlands Workers' Delegate to the 
Third Session of the International Labour Conference, 1922 PCIJ, ser B, No 1 (Advisory Opinion of July 31).  
By the time of the German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia case however, just a few years later, the Court 
was already dealing with substantial documentary evidence, more than two hundred documentary annexes 
being submitted at one stage or another in the course of these proceedings; see Certain German Interests in 
Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v Poland) (Merits) 1926 PCIJ, Ser A, No 7, Judgment of May 25, at 11-13; 
see Hudson Reports at 116; Highet 16.  In Corfu Channel, the first case to come before the ICJ, 188 
documents were submitted in total and by 1950 and the South West Africa advisory opinion the submission of 
documentary evidence ‘had reached truly epic dimensions’ – with over 27 pages required simply to list the 
over three hundred documents submitted; ibid; see International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory 
Opinion: ICJ Reports, 1950, p 128 
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scientific and technological information’,16 ‘vast amounts of factual and scientific material 
containing data and analysis’17 ‘complex scientific’18 or ‘highly complex and controversial 
technological, strategic and scientific information’19 and simply ‘vast masses of factual 
material’.20  The Court is not just referring here to the sheer quantity of information put before 
the Court but also to the complexity of the evidentiary issues at the heart of such cases.
21
 
 
For instance, in the Armed Activities case the Court had to deal with a myriad of (often 
extremely complex) factual issues related to the Democratic Republic of Congo’s claims that 
Uganda had violated the prohibition on the use of force, supported irregular Ugandan forces 
and occupied part of its territory as well as violated international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law amongst other claims.
22
  Similarly, in the Bosnian Genocide 
case the Court had to make numerous factual determinations in order to establish whether 
Serbia had committed the atrocities alleged by Bosnia-Herzegovina and to establish whether it 
had the specific intent to commit genocide.
23
  Most recently, in the Whaling in the Antarctic 
case, in the course of assessing whether the taking, killing and treating of whales could be 
classified as being done ‘for purposes of scientific research’, the Court went to considerable 
lengths in examining such complex issues as the reasonableness of the use of lethal methods 
and the very design and (to some extent) implementation of Japan’s JARPA II whaling 
programme.
24
  
 
A further example is the Pulp Mills case which was described by two judges of the Court 
itself as being one of the ‘exceptionally fact-intensive’ cases that have become commonplace 
                                                 
16
 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, 1CJ Reports 1997, p 7, para 2 (25 September) 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Skubiszewski; Judge Schwebel has also described the more than 5,000 pages of 
pleadings and documentary annexes as having placed a ‘considerable burden on the Court’s tiny translation 
services and on its budget’; see Stephen M. Schwebel, ‘Speech of the President of the International Court of 
Justice to the General Assembly, A/52/PV.36, 27 October 1997’ 
17
 Pulp Mills Case, para 229 
18
 Ibid, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Al-Khasawneh and Simma, para 11 
19
 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p 
66, para 15 
20
 Ibid, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, 451 
21
 Please note that the terms ‘evidentiary’ and ‘evidential’ are used interchangeably throughout the thesis, owing 
to their synonymous nature and reflecting the common use of both terms in practice.  ‘Evidential’ is 
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Bentham in his ‘Elements of the Art of Packing…’ in 1821 or J. Mill in his ‘History of British India, Volume 
III’ according to the Oxford English Dictionary) being used more often in American English 
22
  Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda), Judgment, 
ICJ Reports 2005, p 168, 239, 116, para 24 
23
  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), Judgement, ICJ Reports 2007, p 43, 91 
24
 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan: New Zealand intervening), Judgment, 31 March 2014, at para 67 
  19 
in recent times.
25
  The factually complicated nature of the Pulp Mills case was summed up 
well in the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade who stated that:  
 
‘…by and large, conflicting evidence seems to make the paradise of lawyers and 
practitioners, at national and international levels.  It seems to make, likewise, the 
purgatory of judges and fact-finders, at national and international levels…’ 
 
However Judge Cançado Trindade went on to say that ‘…[c]onsideration of this issue cannot 
be avoided…’26 and there is no doubt that this is so.  Whilst the factually complex nature of 
cases regularly coming before the Court might be akin to purgatory for it, it is clear that such 
issues can no longer be avoided.  In fact, if current trends are to continue, as former President 
of the Court Judge Rosalyn Higgins stated in her address to the Sixth Committee of the 
General Assembly in 2007, such ‘fact-heavy’ cases are likely to be a constant feature of the 
Court’s work in the future.27    
 
Accordingly, it is argued that it is a feature of modern international adjudication that complex 
factual issues are commonplace and that the handling of these issues is an integral part of the 
international judicial function.
28
  It will be argued that the Court’s approach to the facts ought 
to reflect this.  However, before we turn our attention to the Court’s current approach to fact-
finding (and recent criticisms of this approach) it is necessary to first consider just why 
factual determinations matter in international adjudication. 
 
(ii) The Importance of ‘Taking Facts Seriously’ 
It can be anticipated that the consistently factually complex nature of contemporary 
international litigation will not be universally accepted as presenting any meaningful 
                                                 
25
   Pulp Mills Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma at para 3 
26
   ibid, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade at para 148 
27
 Judge Higgins stated that ‘[t]he judicial determination of relevant facts will be an ever more important task for 
the Court’ and cited the Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straights of 
Johor (Malaysia v Singapore) Provisional Measures, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Order of 
8 October 2003, in which 4,000 pages of annexes were put before the Court; see Higgins, ‘Speech by H.E. 
Judge Rosalyn Higgins, President of the International Court of Justice to the Sixth Committee of the General 
Assembly’ 
28
  In the words of Rosenne; ‘There is no question that modern international relations, and hence modern 
diplomacy and modern international litigation is daily becoming increasingly concerned with scientific and 
technological facts’, see 'Fact-Finding Before the International Court of Justice' in S. Rosenne, Essays on 
International Law and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2007) Makane Moïse Mbengue, ‘Scientific 
Fact-finding by International Courts and Tribunals’ 3 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 509, 512; 
Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, p 457, para 30 
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challenges for the Court and for international law as a whole.  For instance, it is likely to be 
contended that the establishment of the facts is a secondary concern in inter-state adjudication 
where the primary task of the tribunal is to settle the dispute before it.
29
  As one commentator 
has stated, ‘it can be argued that the ultimate purpose of international adjudication is not 
establishing the facts, or truths, even, The Truth, but rather to settle the dispute’.30  This is a 
position that has carried great weight over the years and is one which is supported by the 
historical preference of the Court to decide cases on questions of law rather than the facts. 
 
In the past it has been argued that well-reasoned judgments based in the law rather than 
decided on technical issues of fact have traditionally been perceived as being of a higher 
prestige and consequently somehow less offensive to the state party on the wrong end of the 
judgment.
31
  This argument in some way ties in with the deference shown to states as a result 
of their sovereign nature (a point to be examined in greater detail in section 1.3.3. below) and 
that fact that in international litigation, with often so much at stake, the perception that 
‘technicalities are taboo’.32  In addition, international judges, educated in one particular legal 
system, often hail from domestic appellate courts which in general do not deal with complex 
factual issues, these having been determined by the lower trial courts.
33
  As such it is 
suggested that this attitude towards facts, that having already been dealt with by lower courts 
they require no further attention, is potentially carried over to the International Court (even if 
only subconsciously).
34
   
                                                 
29
 The situation being somewhat different in relation to international criminal law, see N.A. Combs, Fact-finding 
Without Facts: The Uncertain Evidentiary Foundations of International Criminal Convictions (Cambridge 
University Press 2010); R. Mackenzie and others, The Manual on International Courts and Tribunals (2nd 
edn, OUP); Tim Kelsall, Culture Under Cross-examination: International Justice and the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (Cambridge University Press 2009) 
30
 C. Romano, ‘The Role of Experts in International Adjudication’ [2009] Société Française Pour le droit 
International 
31
 A number of reasons have been cited as potential explanations for the Court’s traditional predilection for 
questions of law over questions of fact such as a reluctance or inability to conduct independent fact-finding 
and the domestic judicial experience of the judges of the Court.; R.R. Bilder, ‘The Fact/Law Distinction in 
International Adjudication’ Richard Bonnot Lillich (ed), Fact-finding before International Tribunals 95, 97; 
Foster 28 
32
 D.V. Sandifer, Evidence before international tribunals, vol 13 (University Press of Virginia 1975) 22; it could 
be argued that technical or more nuanced judgments allow both sides to claim a victory of sorts, as in the 
case of the Bosnian Genocide case; see http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/26/world/europe/26cnd-hague.html 
33
  On this issue see; Daniel Terris, Cesare PR Romano and Leigh Swigart, The International Judge: An 
Introduction to the Men and Women who Decide the World's Cases (Oxford University Press 2007) 20; who 
note that out of 215 judges in their study, approximately one third (70) came from national domestic courts, 
one third from academia (85) and one third (60) from civil service both national and international 
34
 This argument has been made by Lauterpacht who in the context of the influence on the law of evidence of the 
majority of judges coming from what he terms ‘the Roman law systems of law’ has argued that ‘…the 
probability is that they would tend to apply the rules of evidence obtaining in their own legal systems and 
disregard those applied by Common Law courts.’ See; H. Lauterpacht, ‘So-Called Anglo-American and 
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However, such arguments founder in the face of the consistent practice of the ICJ since its 
inception.  More specifically, it is argued that the submissions of the parties and the practice 
of the Court in every case of insisting on establishing the factual basis of the case before it 
necessarily shows that the Court views its own function as making judgments that are not 
merely legal abstractions but that in reality accord with the facts.  
 
To elaborate, Article 49 of the Rules of the Court stipulates that states are required to submit a 
Memorial to the Court
35
 that shall contain ‘a statement of the relevant facts’ and that the 
resulting Counter-Memorial must contain an admission or denial of these facts.
36
  This 
ensures, in the words of Rosenne, ‘the presentation and airing of the facts and of any 
arguments on them throughout the written proceedings in every contentious case’.37  Similarly, 
if a case is brought before the Court on the basis of a unilateral application, it must contain a 
succinct statement of the facts, and the subsequent pleadings require the systematic 
developments of each party’s statement of the facts.38  In short, this provision explicitly 
confirms that facts will play a part in any case that comes before the Court in one way or 
another.   
 
In addition, Article 36(2)(c) of the Court’s Statute gives the Court jurisdiction over disputes 
concerning ‘the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an 
international obligation’.  Although this provisions deals specifically with cases brought under 
the optional clause it also gives a good indication of what would be considered a ‘legal 
dispute’ under Article 36(1) of the Statute, establishing the Court’s jurisdiction.39  Such 
provisions, at the heart of the operation of the Court since 1920, highlight the centrality of 
facts in the Court’s work.  The Court cannot change the general procedural rules set out in its 
Statute pertaining to evidence.  As the Court stated in the Nicaragua case, it is ‘bound by the 
relevant provisions of its Statute and Rules relating to the system of evidence, provisions 
devised to guarantee the sound administration of justice, while respecting the equality of the 
parties’.40  Alternatively, in the words of Georg Schwarzenberger, ‘individual parties to cases 
                                                                                                                                                        
Continental Schools of Thought in International Law, The’ 12 Brit YB Int'l L 31, 37 
35
  Under Article 43 of the Statute and 45 of the Rules of the Court 
36
  Article 49 (1) and (2) of the Rules of the Court 
37
 Rosenne 235 
38
 Article 38(1) Rules of the Court 
39
 Highet 5 
40
 See; Nicaragua Case, p. 39 at 59 ; I. Scobbie, ‘Discontinuance in the International Court: The Enigma of the 
  22 
before the Court have but a limited choice: they may take the Statute as they find it or leave 
it’.41 
 
Whilst a former President of the Court once remarked that international lawyers tend to think 
a lot about the law and perhaps too little about procedure and the finding of facts, there is no 
doubt that the Court itself considers the establishment of a sound factual basis as an essential 
part of the judicial function.
42
  Ensuring that the Court’s decisions are ‘founded on a sure 
foundation of fact’43 has been very much a central part of the international judicial function 
and this can be evidenced by the time and effort dedicated to this process in each and every 
case before the Court.
44
  The Court itself has stated that it sees the establishment of the facts 
as a prerequisite in any case that comes before it: 
 
‘[the Court] will first make its own determination of the facts and then apply the 
relevant rules of international law to the facts which it has found to have existed’.45 
 
The Court is one of both first and last instance meaning that unlike certain domestic 
Constitutional Courts, the establishment of the facts is an essential part of the Court’s 
function.
46
  As the Court stated in Pulp Mills: 
 
‘…it is the responsibility of the Court, after having given careful consideration to all 
the evidence placed before it by the Parties, to determine which facts must be 
considered relevant, to assess their probative value, and to draw conclusions from 
them as appropriate…the Court will make its own determination of the facts, on the 
basis of the evidence presented to it, and then it will apply the relevant rules of 
international law to those facts which it has found to have existed’.47 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Nuclear Tests Cases’ 41 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 808, 810; Scobbie states that the Court 
is bound by its rules of procedure for a good reason – to provide an element of predictability for States before 
the Court and to prevent ad hoc or arbitrary modifications that deny any guarantee of consistency; ibid, 
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The International Court of Justice (Hart 2013) 942 
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Sons 1968) 413 
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 Rosalyn Higgins, ‘Introductory Remarks by Rosalyn Higgins’ [American Society of International Law] 106 
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Respondents [1983] 2 W.L.R. 494, A.L. Marriott, ‘Evidence in International Arbitration’ 5 Arb Int'l 280, 281 
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 See Armed Activities Case, 200, para 57;  
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 Pulp Mills Case, paras 162; see also paras 163 and 168 
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And it would appear that the same goes for advisory opinions.  The Court has in the past 
addressed arguments such as that of South Africa in the Namibia case in which it was argued 
that since advisory opinions could only be given on legal questions, the Court ought to refuse 
to give an advisory opinion where doing so would entail a factual determination.
48
  However, 
the Court in this case (and in subsequent cases) rejected this argument outright.
49
 
 
As such, it is clear that the Court considers the determination of the facts as an essentially 
important part of the judicial function.  This can be seen in the substantial amount of time 
dedicated to pleadings on the facts in cases that come before the Court, and as a result it is 
submitted that the issue of how the Court deals with facts and the current deficiencies of its 
current approach to be considered in subsequent chapters, are issues deserving of our 
attention.
50
   
 
Additionally, with a number of high profile cases currently before the Court such as 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Croatia v. Serbia),
51
 Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River and 
most recently the proceedings instituted by Nicaragua against Columbia on 16 September 
2013 regarding delimitation of the continental shelf between these two states,
52
 it would 
appear that the need for consideration of such issues is more pressing than ever.
53
 
 
(iii) Rules of Evidence in International Litigation: Generality, Liberality & Scarcity  
 
Different domestic legal systems employ broadly different approaches to the key issues of the 
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 Pleadings, Namibia Advisory Opinion, Volume 1, p. 143, para 45 
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law of evidence.
54
  For instance, in proceedings before a court in a common law jurisdiction 
‘the truth is presumed to lie somewhere between the opposing positions of the two parties’ 
and as such the judge’s role is an adversarial one – that of a disinterested umpire, presiding 
over the enforcement of the rules of evidence and adjudicating on the competing assertions of 
the parties.
55
  On the other hand, in proceedings before a court in a civil law jurisdiction, the 
role of the judge is inquisitorial – traditionally playing a much more active role in establishing 
the facts in any case before it.
56
  One thing that all the major domestic legal systems have in 
common, however, is that they all possess detailed and sophisticated rules of evidence that are 
routinely applied in civil and criminal cases which come before their judicial bodies. 
 
Rules of evidence and procedure in international adjudication, on the other hand, were for a 
long time somewhat of a misnomer.  As one commentator has noted, ‘the typical evidentiary 
regime in international proceedings can be characterized by the generality, liberality and 
scarcity of its provisions’.57  Several important factors explain why detailed rules of evidence 
of the type common to domestic legal systems never developed in international litigation 
including (but not limited to
58
) the influence of the evidentiary regime of international 
arbitration
59
 and the sovereign nature of the parties to international adjudication
60
 which 
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56
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of expert evidence at the International Criminal Court’ 14 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 25, 33 
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  Riddell and Plant 2, M Grando, Evidence, Proof, and Fact-Finding in WTO Dispute Settlement (OUP 2009) 
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ICJ's Genocide Judgment’ 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 889, 899  see also; G. Niyungeko and 
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59
  As Lauterpacht characterised the situation in 1931, ‘…no specific rules as to evidence and proof have so far 
evolved in international arbitration. But there has been a general tendency, sanctioned by a long series of 
arbitral pronouncements, to disregard elaborate restrictions upon the admissibility of evidence and to accept 
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before the American-Mexican Mixed Claims Commission (where the Commissioners expressly refused to be 
  25 
necessitates what has been called ‘an obligation to accommodate as far as possible each 
litigating State’s notion of the most appropriate way of presenting and substantiating its own 
version of events’.61  A further reason for the relative scarcity of rules of evidence in 
international litigation is the nature of the cases brought before it.  Cases routinely centre 
around issues such as national security, sovereignty and other such crucially important matters.  
When dealing with matters of such import in international litigation, ‘technicalities are 
taboo’.62    The rationale is that the outcome of a case based on a technicality relating to the 
law of evidence would be unlikely to aid the desired settlement of the dispute at hand.
63
  As 
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht stated,  ‘the importance of the interests at stake precludes the 
excessive or decisive reliance upon formal and technical rules’.64 
 
But what is the role of the International Court of Justice in establishing the facts in cases 
brought before it and can its evidentiary regime too be characterised as one governed by the 
generality, liberality and scarcity of its provisions?  This question will be addressed in the 
next chapter which seeks to evaluate the evidentiary provisions of the Court’s Statute and 
Rules and the fact-finding powers that the Court possesses and considers the extent to which 
it has utilised those powers in practice.   
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Chapter 1. Rules of Evidence Before the International Court of Justice 
 
This chapter seeks to evaluate the evidentiary provisions of the Court’s Statute and Rules of 
Court and the fact-finding powers that the Court possesses in order to consider the extent to 
which it has utilised those powers in practice.  It will be shown that whilst the Court in fact 
possesses relatively broad fact-finding powers, due to a number of factors it has never made 
use of them to any significant extent.  Instead, the Court operates under extremely broad rules 
of admissibility of evidence that allow almost any piece of evidence to come before the Court 
that the states parties so choose.  That the Court operates in this manner is to a large extent 
necessitated by the principles of state sovereignty and equality that espouse that states should 
be able to choose what evidence they place before the Court.  Further, the Court is shackled 
by resource and time constraints that make independent fact-finding in each and every case 
largely impractical.  As a result of its truncated fact-finding role, the Court's fact-assessment 
role takes on added significance, an issue examined in the second half of the chapter. 
 
(i) The Development of the Rules of Evidence Before the International Court of Justice 
 
Rules of evidence and procedure before international courts and tribunals seek to enable them 
to establish a factual foundation upon which to base legal determinations, even where the 
parties before the tribunal cannot come to an agreement on the facts relating to the dispute.
65
  
The provisions of the Court’s Statute relating to evidence were adopted by the First 
Committee on Draft Statute during the United Nations Conference on International 
Organization (‘UNCIO’), being ‘greatly facilitated’ by the Washington Committee of Jurists 
who had met prior to the San Francisco Conference from 9
th
 to 20
th
 April 1945 to undertake 
an article-by-article revision of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice.
66
  
The draft adopted by First Committee took the report of the Washington Committee of Jurists 
as the basis of its discussions and many articles (‘particularly those relating to procedure’) 
were taken over without substantial amendment.
67
  In fact, the following provisions relating to 
the Court’s fact-finding powers were adopted at the UNCIO without amendment or 
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Justice (2 edn, OUP 2012) 1236 
66
   UN Doc 875 IV/1/74, June 9, 1945 – Committee 1 – ICJ – Draft Report of Rapporteur of Committee IV/1 
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deliberation, as the First Commission ‘unanimously approved without discussion, Articles 39-
64 en bloc of draft Statute of the Committee of Jurists’.68  It should be noted that the Court’s 
powers are also supplemented by those contained within the Rules of the Court, most recently 
updated in 1978.  The following section sets out to briefly examine the fact-finding powers 
that the Court possesses before we turn our attention to the extent to which the Court has 
made use of these powers in the subsequent subsections of this chapter.  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
68
   UN Doc. 264 IV/1/18, May 12, 1945, Committee 1, ICJ 
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1.1. The Fact-Finding Powers of the International Court of Justice 
 
 
The Statute of the International Court of Justice and its Rules of Procedure endow the Court 
with not-inconsiderable fact-finding powers.
 
 Although the fact-finding powers set out in the 
Court’s Statute and Rules are broad enough to allow the Court substantial autonomy and 
flexibility in terms of its evidentiary procedure, the provisions themselves are not particularly 
detailed.
69
  This lack of specificity is most probably due to the influence of the PCIJ whose 
statute contained similarly sparse evidentiary provisions and the fact that, having primarily 
dealt with cases involving the application of treaties, the PCIJ ‘was in a position to establish 
and rely on facts that were not in dispute between the parties, obviating, in most cases, the 
need for detailed rules of evidence.’70  That having been said, the Court is endowed with a 
number of significant fact-finding powers which now fall to be considered in greater detail. 
 
1.1.1. The Power to Make Orders 
 
Article 48 of the Court’s Statute is a general provision that represents a central pillar of the 
Court’s statutory fact-finding powers, providing that the Court ‘shall make orders for the 
conduct of the case, shall decide the form and time in which each party must conclude its 
arguments, and make all arrangements connected with the taking of evidence.’   In utilising its 
statutory powers to obtain evidentiary information through site visits, requesting evidence 
from the parties, establishing a commission of inquiry or seeking an expert opinion, by 
putting questions to the parties, or by requesting a public international organization to bring 
information before it,
71
 (all considered below) the Court must necessarily make use of orders 
under Article 48.  Article 48 has been described as both ‘a guarantee for the orderly taking of 
evidence’ and the ‘general provision governing arrangement concerning the taking of 
evidence’72 although it need not be explicitly referred to by the Court when making orders.73  
                                                 
69
 E. Valencia-Ospina, Evidence before the International Court of Justice’(1999) 1  202; Sir Arthur Watts, 
‘Burden of Proof and Evidence before the ICJ’ in F. Weiss (ed), Improving WTO Dispute Settlement 
Procedures: Issues and Lessons from the Practice of Other International Courts and Tribunals (Cameron 
May 2000) 300 
70
 Valencia-Ospina, Evidence before the International Court of Justice’(1999) 1 202 
71
 Articles 44(2), 49, 50, 51 and 34 of the Statute respectively 
72
 S.T Bernárdez, ‘Article 48’ in A. Zimmermann (ed), The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A 
Commentary (Oxford University Press 2006) 1097 
73
 Examples include the commissions of inquiry established in the Corfu Channel Case and Delimitation of the 
Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Judgment, 1CJ Reports 1984, p 246 and the site visit in the 
Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Case 
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Having considered this important general provision it is necessary to take a closer look at the 
Court’s specific fact-finding powers as set out in its Statute and Rules of Procedure. 
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1.1.2. The Power to Make Site Visits 
 
The Court has the power to take steps to proactively ‘procure evidence on the spot’.  Article 
44, paragraph 2 of the Court’s Statute makes specific provision for the possibility of such site 
visits.
74
  Such visits are limited to those undertaken by the full bench of the Court
75
 as a result 
of a decision of the Court and must be distinguished from unofficial visits to the site and visits 
by experts which cannot be considered as falling under this provision.
76
  The practice of the 
Court in this regard has meant that the importance of Article 44 is somewhat limited.
77
  The 
rare example of a site visit in the practice of the Court is the visit made in the Gabčikovo case 
during which the agent of Slovakia invited the Court to ‘visit the locality to which the case 
relates and there to exercise its functions with regards to the obtaining of evidence, in 
accordance with Article 66 of the Rules of the Court’.78  The Court subsequently visited 
various sites along the river Danube that were at the heart of the dispute between Slovakia and 
Hungary and ‘took note of the technical explanations given by the representatives who had 
been designated for the purpose by the Parties’.79  Despite the fact that Judge Schwebel 
described the site visit in this case as providing the Court with ‘a new dimension of insight 
into the case and what it meant to the Parties much more than could have been gleaned 
confining the proceedings to The Hague…’80 the site visit in Gabčikovo remains the 
exceptional case in the practice of the Court.
81
 
 
Importantly, whilst such site visits can technically be ordered by the Court without the 
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 Article 44, paragraph 1 of the Court’s Statute underlines that the Court cannot summon witnesses and experts 
directly but must instead act through national institutions and ‘as such depends on the application of the 
municipal law of the State concerned’ 
75
 It is thought that a delegation or committee of judges, such as was the suggestion of Judge Schwebel in the 
Nicaragua Case (see Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel at para 132) would be contrary to ‘general 
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Christian Walter, ‘Article 44’ in A. Zimmermann (ed), The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A 
Commentary (Oxford University Press 2006) 1043, M. Bedjaoui, ‘La “Descente sur les lieux” dans la 
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 Such as in the Corfu Channel Case, Decision of the Court dated 17 January 1949,  in which the commission 
of experts was asked by the Court to visit the area to clarify certain aspects of the case, which would fall 
under Articles 48 and 50, see Walter 1042 
77
 Walter 1041 
78
 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Case, para 10, although the Permanent Court did also do so in Diversion of Water from 
the Meuse (Netherlands/Belgium), Order of 13 May 1937, PCIJ, Series C, No 81, pp 53; see Higgins, 
‘Speech by H.E. Judge Rosalyn Higgins, President of the International Court of Justice to the Sixth 
Committee of the General Assembly’ 
79
 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Case, para 10 
80
 Schwebel 
81
 Ibid; stating that ‘one can imagine only some contentious cases where the situation on the ground may lend 
itself to carrying out a site visit’ 
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consent of the parties proprio motu,
82
 in practice such a visit without the consent of the state 
to whose territory the Court will ‘descend’ will in all likelihood not be practicable (although 
the Court has never stated lack of consent as a reason for not ordering such a site visit
83
).  
These visits appear to have an ‘illustrative function’ in helping the Court to ‘understand better 
the localities in question’, their main advantage being in cases in which technical or scientific 
facts are disputed between the parties, the visit may provide a helpful background to the 
complex facts.
84
  To date this illustrative function of site visits has ‘prevailed over any type of 
evidence gathering and evaluation, which one might also envisage.’85  In light of factually 
complex cases coming before the Court, whilst it is possible to imagine that more use could 
be made of this provision in terms of gathering evidence, the utility of a bench of judges who 
are not necessarily experts in the particular area under investigation visiting the site could be 
said to be limited when compared to the establishment of a commission of experts, for 
example.  Perhaps this could explain why this provision has not been often mentioned in 
relation to making greater use of the Court’s statutory fact-finding powers. 
 
1.1.3. The Power to Intervene in and Direct Proceedings and Ask Questions 
 
Either prior to or during proceedings the Court under Article 61 of the Rules may indicate 
what points or issues it would like the parties to address specifically or on which issues it 
considers there has been sufficient argument.   Articles 61(2) and (3) provide that any judge 
may at any time during the oral proceedings put questions to ‘agents, counsel and advocates’ 
and ask for explanations, which may be answered immediately but usually will be answered 
in accordance with the timeframes set by the President.
86
  In practice the Court has generally 
limited itself to individual judges occasionally asking questions from the bench during the 
oral proceedings.
87
  As we will see in Chapter 3, practice before the ICJ differs substantially 
from that before the WTO adjudicative bodies which regularly put longer questions to the 
parties.  Foster has argued the WTO panels are able for example ‘to pursue the development 
of a thorough understanding of all aspects of the case by means of specific, direct questions to 
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 Walter 1043, Bedjaoui 7 
83
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84
 Ibid 
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 Ibid 
86
 See Article 61(4) Rules of the Court; C.E. Foster, Science and the Precautionary Principle in International 
Courts and Tribunals: Expert Evidence, Burden of Proof and Finality (Cambridge University Press 2011) 87 
quoting Rosenne and Ronen 1299; Riddell and Plant 312 
87
 Riddell and Plant 88; see for instance Pulp Mills Case 
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the parties after each of the oral hearings, or substantive meetings with the parties’.88  The 
issue of whether the Court ought to develop a similar practice will be examined in greater 
detail in Chapter 4 (at section 4.3.2.). 
 
1.1.4. The Power to Request Information from the Parties 
 
 
Relatedly, Article 49 of the Court’s Statute contains what has been called the ‘central 
prerogative’ of any international court or tribunal89 to participate in hearings before it.90  It 
must be read in conjunction with Article 62(1) of the Court’s Rules which states that ‘[t]he 
Court may at any time call upon the parties to produce evidence or to give such explanations 
as the Court may consider to be necessary for the elucidation of any aspect of the matters in 
issue, or may itself seek other information for this purpose’.91  In practical terms, Article 49 
confers on the Court the ability to become actively involved in proceedings before it by 
conferring two distinct powers.  Article 49 firstly, together with Article 50, regulates the 
obtaining of evidence by the Court itself (as opposed to the evidence submitted by the parties 
as part of their pleadings) by calling upon the parties ‘to produce any document or to supply 
any explanations’ on a small number of occasions.92  In other words, Article 49 sets out a 
general power of the Court to request further documents.
93
  Secondly, Article 49 provides the 
Court with the power to request further explanation or clarification from the parties, such as 
information on questions of law or fact.   
 
As such, the scope of Article 49 is considerable, covering requests for fresh evidence and 
clarification of existing evidence, both documentary and testimonial evidence even before the 
hearing has commenced.
94
  Crucially, Article 49 is silent on the issue of whether states are 
under a legal obligation to disclose information – an issue discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 4 at section 4.1.  In relation to refusal to comply with the Court’s request for 
                                                 
88
 Foster 88; See for instance Brazil – Measures Affecting Import of Retreated Tyres, Complaint by the European 
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information, under Article 49, ‘formal note shall be taken of any refusal’.95  However, the 
Court has not done so in practice this far and whether it would choose to do so would very 
much depend on the circumstances of each case.
96
 The merits of more regularly drawing 
adverse inferences as is the practice before other international courts and tribunals will also be 
considered in section 4.2.6. 
 
1.1.5. The Power to Establish an Inquiry or seek Expert Evidence 
 
Article 50 of the Court’s Statute gives the Court the power to call upon individuals or 
institutions to provide expert advice or institute an inquiry.
97
  The Court has never called a 
witness proprio motu and as such this issue will not be addressed in the following section 
although Higgins has stated that calling witnesses proprio motu ‘is a possibility that is 
constantly in its view’.98  The following section will first assess the Court’s power to call 
upon individual experts under Article 50 before considering the related power to establish 
commissions of inquiry. 
 
1.1.5. (i) Court-Appointed Experts  
 
The Court under Article 50 of its Statute, as elaborated in Article 62(2) of its Rules, has the 
power to appoint an expert to advise it on the case at hand.
99
  The Court has not made use of 
this power to date except in the Gulf of Maine case in which Canada and the United States 
specifically requested the Chamber to appoint experts to assist in determining the maritime 
boundary and other technical matters.
100
  The Chamber appointed Commander P.B. Beazley 
to assist it in technical matters regarding the maritime boundary and the expert’s report was 
annexed to the judgment (see section 1.1.5 (ii) regarding Article 50 experts appointed by the 
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Court).
101
  The usefulness of Commander Beazley’s assistance is disputed.102 
 
Interestingly, in the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali) Article 
IV(3) of the 1983 Special Agreement in which the parties agreed to submit their frontier 
dispute to a Chamber of the Court requests the Chamber ‘to nominate, in its Judgment, three 
experts to assist them in the demarcation operation’.103  The Chamber accepted this request in 
the order nominating the experts to assist in the implementation of the Chamber’s judgment, 
however the Chamber did not refer to Article 50 of the Statute but to Article 48 (its power to 
make orders) in stating that its belief was that the parties had not asked the Chamber to utilise 
its Article 50 powers (the purpose of which would have been to assist the Court, and would 
have been paid for by the Court) but rather to exercise a power specifically conferred upon the 
Court by the Special Agreement.
104
   
 
Similarly, after delivering its judgment in the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina 
Faso v. Niger) the Court in an Order of 12 July 2013 the Court, specifically referring again to 
Article 48 of its Statute, under Article 7(4) of the Special Agreement between Burkina Faso 
and Niger of 24 February 2009 asked the Court to ‘to nominate, in its Judgment, three experts 
to assist them as necessary in the demarcation’.105  The Court, specifically referring to the 
previous Burkina Faso frontier case, and taking advice from the parties as to what tasks the 
experts could be expected to undertake, agreed to nominate experts to assist in the 
implementation of the Court’s judgment, all the while stressing that it was not utilising its 
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Article 50 Statute powers in doing so,
106
 but again was exercising ‘a power, conferred on it by 
Special Agreement’.107  Just why the Court has been so hesitant to be seen to be using its 
Article 50 powers is unclear. 
 
The distinction between Court-appointed and party-appointed experts remains significant 
since the procedure for the examination of a Court-appointed expert and a party-appointed 
expert differ.
108
  For instance, the appointment of experts by the Court is made by an order
109
 
and with Court-appointed experts ‘the Court is free to define the subject-matter of the 
testimony…’110  It is unclear whether the Court could compel parties to cooperate with the 
Court-appointed expert and provide them with the information required.  Whilst this issue is 
discussed further in section 4.3.2., it would appear that the utility of the Court-appointed 
expert will at least to some extent depend on voluntary cooperation from the parties.
111
  A 
further crucial distinction is Article 67 of the Rules which refers to the rights of the parties in 
relation to experts appointed by the Court – providing that ‘every report or record of an 
enquiry, and every expert opinion shall be communicated to the parties, which shall be given 
the opportunity of commenting upon it.’  However, this provision does not include any right 
of the parties to examine the Court-appointed expert – a potentially crucial distinction which 
we will examine in greater detail in Chapter 4.
112
 
 
1.1.5. (ii) Commissions of Inquiry 
 
The second fact-finding power conferred on the Court by Article 50 of the Court’s Statute is 
the power to entrust an independent body or commission with the ‘task of carrying out an 
enquiry or giving an expert opinion’.113  Article 50 is a potentially useful provision since, as 
one commentator has stated ‘[g]iven the complexity of many of the disputes submitted to 
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adjudication, it is highly desirable that the Court be in a position to receive independent 
advice’.114   
 
Article 50 Commissions of Inquiry should be distinguished from site-visits discussed above 
made by the Court as set out in Article 44(2) of the Statute of the Court.  As one commentator 
has stated ‘[w]hile a site visit will usually help to ascertain the facts of a case (and may thus 
constitute a specific form of inquiry), Art. 50 only covers inquiries that the Court entrusts to 
other bodies or institutions.’115  Evidence sought under Article 50 is not considered ex parte 
evidence: ‘evidence sought under Article 50 will usually be preferred over ex parte evidence, 
which is often seen as biased simply because it has been introduced by one party’.116 
 
The Court has only twice made use of its powers under Article 50– once in the Chorzów 
Factory case before the PCIJ to, amongst other things, ‘enable the Court to fix, with a full 
knowledge of the facts...the amount of the indemnity to be paid by the Polish Government to 
the German Government…’117 and twice in the Corfu Channel case before the ICJ, once to 
examine several factual issues including determining the visibility of the mine-laying 
activities in the Channel from the Albanian coast, which the Court described as a crucial 
factor in the case
118
 and a second expert commission to determine the damages to be paid by 
Albania to the United Kingdom.
119
  The Commission ultimately concluded that it was 
‘indisputable’ that, all things being equal, the operation would have been visible from the 
coastline – and the Court subsequently praised the Commission, stating that it could not fail 
‘to give great weight to the opinion of the experts who examined the locality in a manner 
giving every guarantee of correct and impartial information’.120 
 
It should be noted that parties do not have a right under Article 50 to have the Court appoint a 
commission of inquiry or expert in the same way that they have the right to appoint their own 
expert under Article 43 – the establishment of such a commission is completely at the 
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discretion of the Court.
121
  And indeed there have been no such inquiries in the last few 
decades.
122
  Instead, the Court has ‘more often than not’ refused requests by one of the parties 
to appoint an inquiry or expert or held that it would find such action unnecessary.
123
  In the 
past the Court has refused to appoint an expert to shed light on the delimitation of the 
boundary between Tunisia and Libya, noting that its 1982 judgment had left the issue to the 
parties’ experts,124 refused a request to send an inquiry to a disputed region on the basis that 
such an inquiry was not necessary in order to reach a decision on the case at hand
125
 and 
perhaps most famously, rejected Judge Schewbel’s suggestion that a fact-finding inquiry be 
set up in the Nicaragua case to gather facts in Nicaragua, the US, El Savador, Honduras, 
Costa Rica, Guatemala and Cuba on the same basis.
126
  Judge Schwebel later remarked that 
the Court at the time had refused the request on the basis that the inquiry, in properly carrying 
out its function, would have in all likelihood found it necessary to go not only to Nicaragua 
but also neighbouring states and even the United States, which of course, was not cooperating 
with the Court.
127
 
 
Unlike provisions in other international courts, the matter on which an expert opinion is 
sought need not be one of a technical or scientific issue but could deal with more general 
matters such as an issue of linguistics.
128
  It should be noted that Article 50 can only be used 
where states are willing to cooperate with the Court and as such, Tams concludes that ‘Art. 50 
is likely to remain what it has been to date: a helpful, but rarely used, means of obtaining 
information about the facts of a case’.129  However, this provision was given explicit backing 
by a number of judges of the Court as one that could be more readily made use of by the 
Court to better establish the facts of a case before it – an issue considered in much greater 
detail in Chapter 4. 
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1.1.6. The Power to Request Information from Public International Organizations 
 
Article 34 (2) of the Court’s Statute provides that the Court may request relevant information 
from public international organizations with regard to cases before it.
130
  However, Article 
34(2) of the Court’s Statute was neither utilised nor referred to in the early years of the 
Court’s operation.131  The first use came when the Secretary-General informed the Council of 
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) that a case pending before the Court 
potentially affected its interests, namely the Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 case.
132
  The same 
organisation was later informed of proceedings under Article 34(3) potentially affecting its 
interests, this time by the President of the Court, in the ICAO Council case
133
 although the 
ICAO Council subsequently did not file any observations on the case.
134
  In the following 
years scarce reference was made to the provision, the only other example being the Border 
and Transborder Armed Actions case in which the Court informed the OAS of the case, but 
once more the organisation chose not to take any action.
135
 
 
More recently the Court’s Registrar communicated to the Secretary-General, as depository, 
that the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide would form 
the basis of the Bosnian Genocide case.
136
  This was the first time in which the Court had 
utilised Article 34(3) in relation to an organ of the UN itself.
137
  Perhaps the reason that 
greater use of this provision has not been used to inform UN organs is due to the fact that 
Article 40 of the ICJ Statute already provides that the Secretary-General be informed of all 
cases that come before the Court, and Article 69(2) of the Rules give the Secretary-General 
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the right to submit information to the Court.  Dupuy has made reference to ‘the striking fact 
that on the whole, inter-governmental organizations do not seem to be particularly interested 
in taking the initiative, on the basis of Art. 34, para. 2, of requesting the Court to receive 
information which they would consider as relevant to a case pending before it’.138  The 
possibility of making greater use of this power to coordinate the Court’s fact-finding efforts 
with those of international commissions of inquiry is also critically examined in Chapter 5. 
 
1.1.7.  Amicus Curiae Briefs 
 
Another means by which information and expert opinion not submitted by the parties could 
come before the Court is through amicus curiae briefs.  The issue of amicus curiae briefs is 
one which has attracted much attention in recent years, although usually in relation to 
international courts and tribunals other than the ICJ.
139
 
 
The practice of the Court, unlike other international courts and tribunals, to date has been 
extremely limited.  In 1950 the Court in the South-West Africa allowed an amicus curiae brief 
to be submitted by the International League for the Rights of Man case which had requested 
to submit a written statement under Article 66(2) of the ICJ Statute.
140
  However when the 
same organisation requested to submit an amicus curiae brief in the contentious Asylum case, 
the Court refused on the basis that that organisation could not be considered an international 
organization as required in Article 34 of the Court’s Statute.141  And indeed since this case the 
Court has not agreed to any amicus curiae briefs being submitted, even in advisory 
proceedings.
142
 
 
The Court set out its procedure in relation to the participation of non-governmental 
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organisations in its Practice Direction XII of July 2004, in which it clarified that briefs 
submitted to the Court without the request of the Court would not be considered part of the 
case file but would rather be treated as publications readily available under Article 56(4) of 
the Rules of the Court.
143
  As such, Benzing concludes that ‘at present, information presented 
to the Court by non-governmental organizations will only be admissible in advisory cases, 
whereas individuals may not act as amici curiae at all.’144  As stated previously, this approach 
stands in contrast with other international courts and tribunals, as we shall see in Chapter 3. 
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1.2. Da Mihi Factum, Dabo Tibi Jus – The Court’s Reactive Approach to Fact-Finding 
 
Consequently, it can be said that the Court possesses ‘powerful tools for collecting evidence, 
ones that could be used at any time’ in the proceedings145 the cumulative effect of which arm 
the Court with both the power to request evidence itself and direct the parties in their fact-
finding efforts.
146
    
 
Crucially, however, despite possessing such relatively broad fact-finding powers, the Court 
has rarely made significant use of them.
147
  As we will see, a survey of the Court’s practice in 
the previous section demonstrates this point and, it is argued, is perfectly summarised by 
former Judge Schwebel who has stated that ultimately the ‘role of the full Court, in my 
experience, has tended to be predominantly passive’.148  Before the ICJ, the general tendency 
has been to ‘ask the parties to produce the evidence and operate with rules concerning burden 
of proof, rather than to have investigations into facts led by the Court itself’.149  Taken 
together, this practice constitutes what can be termed the Court’s ‘reactive approach’ to fact-
finding. 
 
1.2.1. A Reluctance to Engage With Complex Factual Situations? 
 
A number of commentators have argued that the Court has traditionally employed a number 
of different tactics in order to avoid engaging with complex factual and scientific 
determinations, what might be termed ‘avoidance techniques’.150  Such commentators have 
argued that the Court has shown a tendency to focus on legal reasoning and to use ‘legal 
rationality to shield itself from scientific [or factual] controversies’.151 
 
One such commentator was Thomas Franck who argued that the Court has in the past 
deliberately sought to shift the focus of the case to legal rather than factual issues, stating 
‘…in different questions of fact, the Court tends to make a complicated task of fact-finding 
unimportant or unnecessary by devising a rule which downgrades the importance of the 
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elusive facts.’152  One example given by Franck is the Temple at Preah Vihear case in which 
the Court held that whilst the map drawn up by the Mixed French-Siamese Commission in 
1907 alleging to demonstrate title over the disputed area was not determinative in itself, 
Thailand’s failure to object to it and subsequent behaviour was seen by the Court to be 
equitable estoppel.
153   The Court stated that ‘[g]iven the grounds on which the Court bases its 
decision, it becomes unnecessary to consider whether, at Preah Vihear, the line as mapped 
does in fact correspond to the true watershed line in this vicinity...or, if not, how the 
watershed in fact runs’.154  The reasoning of the Court to this end led Franck to argue that ‘[a] 
procedural or evidentiary rule thus saved the Court from having to duplicate the voyage along 
the Dangrek Escarpment for purposes of locating the disputed watershed line’.155  
 
Rosenne has similarly criticised the apparent unwillingness of the Court to conduct its own 
fact-finding and implied that the Court has placed considerable emphasis on the legal issues 
in order to circumvent a number of factual issues.
156
  Rosenne has in particular cited the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and Fisheries Jurisdiction cases in which he characterises the 
behaviour of the Court as relying ‘only on the facts as stated by the applicants in their written 
and oral pleadings’ whilst making no attempt to challenge or verify those facts itself.157   
 
The Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion is another case cited in 
this regard given the fact that substantial amounts of information were submitted to the Court 
in the course of proceedings, and the Court did not consider it necessary to ‘study various 
types of nuclear weapons and to evaluate highly complex and controversial technological, 
strategic and scientific information’.158  However, in this case it is difficult to definitively 
argue that the Court was consciously trying to avoid making factual determinations.  Instead, 
the Court stated that it would ‘simply address the issues arising in all their aspects by 
applying the legal rules relevant to the situation.’159   
 
It is argued that the accusation that the Court employs avoidance techniques in order to avoid 
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dealing with the facts is rather difficult to definitively substantiate.  In fact, having not been in 
the Court’s position, in such cases it is often difficult to imagine how one could prove that the 
decision taken by the Court to focus on legal issues and not conduct further fact-finding was 
the wrong decision.   It may be that the Court had sound reasons for not conducting its own 
fact-finding such as considerations of judicial economy or due to the fact that resolution of 
those factual issues was not central to the resolution of the dispute at hand.  
 
Taking up this point, it is necessary to emphasise that there are undoubtedly positive aspects 
of the Court’s reactive approach to fact-finding.  Whilst there are a number of serious 
problems with this approach as set out in Chapter 2 it should be made clear that the reactive 
approach is not without its benefits.  For instance, there are a number of practical reasons why 
it is sensible for the Court to place the emphasis on the parties in terms of fact-finding.  This 
is the case since the Court is often significantly removed from the facts of the dispute, both in 
terms of distance and time.  As such, it arguably more prudent for the parties themselves, who 
are generally closer to the facts, to put such evidence before the Court, than it is for the Court 
to embark on a fact-finding expedition from The Hague.   
 
Staying with the nature of the cases that come before the Court, the sheer breadth of legal and 
factual issues, number of potential witnesses and territory may in some way justify the 
Court’s reactive position.  For instance, in cases such as Armed Activities, Bosnian Genocide 
and Croatian Genocide, the disputes in question involved a dizzying array of factual and legal 
issues as well as having taken place over many years and often over many different states.
160
  
Similarly, the highly political nature of cases before the Court mean that it may take many 
years for the proceedings to get under way.
161
  Furthermore, as stated above, many states see 
it as part of their privilege as a sovereign state to choose which pieces of evidence they put 
before the Court.  Accordingly it would appear to make little sense for the Court to duplicate 
the fact-finding efforts of the parties.  As such, the Court’s decision to accept the evidence put 
before it by the parties and to concentrate on the points of contention as defined by the parties 
seems like the only viable option. 
 
And indeed the thesis does not argue that the Court should completely disregard all evidence 
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submitted by the parties and to undertake wide-ranging fact-finding on its own accord.  Rather, 
the thesis argues that there are a number of deficiencies regarding the way the Court currently 
operates and that the practice of other international courts and tribunals in some way provides 
a helpful blueprint for reform in order to ensure that the Court makes factual determinations 
that are as accurate as they can be. 
 
As such, it is argued that rather than talking in terms of the Court using ‘avoidance techniques’ 
in order to negate the need to engage with the facts, the most that can be said is that the Court, 
since the days of the PCIJ,
162
 has very clearly displayed a number of tendencies which, taken 
together, demonstrate a consistently reactive approach to the facts in cases that have come 
before it.  It is these tendencies and their contribution to the Court’s reactive approach to fact-
finding which is the subject of the following section. 
 
1.3. The Court’s Reactive Approach to Fact-Finding: Contributing Factors 
 
Such tendencies evident in the Court’s jurisprudence include the predominance of, and 
apparent preference for reliance on, documentary evidence before the Court; extremely broad 
rules of admissibility; the sovereign nature of the parties to cases before the Court and the so-
called ‘classical’ approach to the judicial process – each will be assessed in turn in the 
following subsections.   
 
1.3.1. Predominance of Documentary Evidence 
 
The first and perhaps most prominent tendency of the Court which contributes to the Court’s 
reactive approach to evidence is the clear preponderance of documentary evidence before the 
Court.
163
  In keeping with the Court’s liberal evidentiary regime, documentary proof is 
                                                 
162
 The great American Judge Manley Hudson in 1943 said of the PCIJ that ‘[i]ssues of fact are seldom tried 
before the Court, and where a question of fact arises the Court must usually base its finding on statements 
made on behalf of the parties either in the documents of the written proceedings or in the course or oral 
proceedings’. This description of the practice of the PCIJ suggests that the Court’s current reactive approach 
has been passed down genetically from its predecessor; see M. Hudson, The Permanent Court of 
International Justice 1920-1942 (MacMillan 1943) 565 and Therese O'Donnell, ‘Judicialising History or 
Historicising Law: Reflections on Irving v Penguin Books and Lipstadt’ 62 N Ir Legal Q 291, 300 
163
 Valencia-Ospina, Evidence before the International Court of Justice’(1999) 1 204; this preference is 
demonstrated before other international courts and tribunals also; see Charles Nelson Brower and Jason D 
Brueschke, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1998) 186 and has existed 
from the birth of international criminal law at Nuremberg, see; Robert H. Jackson, The Nurnberg Case, (1947, 
New York, Alfred A Knopf) at viii ‘ 
  46 
preferred to oral testimony before the Court,
164
 being ‘by far the most common and certainly 
the most important type of evidence in litigation before the ICJ.’165  This preference has been 
credited to the influence of civil law systems ‘given that there are striking similarities – 
especially in their emphasis on written means of proof…’166   
 
Whilst there has been limited use of oral testimony and cross-examination, generally, ‘the use 
of evidence in written form is the rule...in cases before the ICJ’.167  The consequence of the 
Court’s clear preference for written documentary evidence is that the Court has much greater 
experience in dealing with this type of evidence and as such has had many opportunities to 
develop a number of rough guiding principles to guide it in its evaluation of such documents, 
as we will see in Section 1.4.   
 
The Court’s preference for relying on historical documentary evidence can be clearly seen in 
myriad cases throughout the history of the Court’s operation.  For instance, in Continental 
Shelf case between Tunisia and Libya the Court was asked to set out the applicable principles 
for the delimitation of the continental shelf between these two states, and furthermore to 
‘specify precisely the practical way the aforesaid principles and rules apply in this particular 
situation so as to enable the experts of the two counties to delimit these areas without any 
difficulties’.168  Although Libya called one expert, Dr A. Fabricus, a professor of Geology, 
who was examined and then cross-examined by Professors Bowett and Virally, the Court was 
able to resolve the legal issues in the case solely through reliance on maps and other 
documentary evidence placed before it by the parties without having to conduct any of its 
own fact-finding.
169
  Although this case has been cited as one in which the Court employed 
one of its ‘avoidance techniques’ in order to avoid conducting its own fact-finding, it is again 
difficult to conclusively argue that doing so would have produced a result more satisfactory to 
the parties in this particular case.  What can clearly be seen, however, is the Court’s 
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preference for, and adeptness at, using historical documentary evidence to resolve legal issues 
in cases before it. 
 
This approach can be seen again in the other maritime delimitation case involving Libya’s 
continental shelf during the negotiations on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) – namely the case involving Libya and Malta.170  This case was inevitably 
influenced not only by the earlier case involving Libya and Tunisia but also by the UNCLOS 
negotiations which were ongoing at that time.  However it should be noted that this influence 
was mutual, with the Court’s decisions on such issues being influential during the negotiation 
of the UNCLOS.
171
  At the start of the 1980s Libya and Malta eventually ratified the special 
agreement to bring their case before the Court.  Again the Court was able to resolve the legal 
issues asked of it by the parties through reliance on documentary, geographical, information 
put before it by the parties themselves.
172
 
 
In keeping with the trend of resolving land and maritime delimitation cases solely on 
documentary and historical evidence placed before it by the parties rather than appointing 
experts of its own or conducting other forms of fact-finding, the Chamber established by the 
parties in the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute again resolved the legal issues 
asked of it in this way.  Illustrative of the Chamber’s approach was its refusal of El Salvador’s 
request to conduct a site visit, owing to the fact it had experienced serious difficulties in 
providing evidence for various reasons beyond its control including the fact that information 
was not stored in any central archives.
173
  The Chamber refused El Salvador’s request to visit 
the site to procure the evidence of effectivités, stating simply that it ‘did not consider it 
necessary to exercise its power to obtain evidence, nor to accede to El Salvador’s request that 
it should arrange for an inquiry or expert opinion under Article 50 of the Statute’.174  The 
Chamber provided no further explanation of this decision, before relying on the other 
documentary evidence that had been placed before it in carrying out the delimitation. 
 
Further, in the Nicaragua case,
175
 one of the cases of non-appearance that we shall discuss in 
the following chapter, despite being ‘not as fully informed as it would wish to be’ the Court 
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took no steps to more proactively procure evidence that may have shed some light on the 
case.
176
  The US Judge Schwebel drafted a lengthy dissent from the majority in the Nicaragua 
case, arguing that the Court was wrong to not make greater use of its fact-finding powers to 
call for additional evidence or establish a commission of inquiry in light of the US’s 
withdrawal from the case.
177
  For example, in relation to the issue of whether El Salvador had 
ever requested the help of the US in self-defence, the Court merely stated that there was ‘no 
evidence’ to suggest so, but never invited El Salvador to submit its further evidence, nor took 
any steps of its own to procure further evidence – the Court remained passive.178   
 
Similarly, in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case in 1997 the Court, the parties put before the 
Court a myriad of scientific expert reports by independent experts,
179
 national and 
international non-governmental bodies
180
 and a number of EC expert studies
181
 on a broad 
range of issues including hydrology, seismology, ecology and hydrobiology.   However, even 
with this voluminous factual and scientific information before the Court,
 182
 (described by the 
Court as ‘an impressive amount of scientific material aimed at reinforcing their respective 
arguments’183) the Court held that it was ‘not necessary in order to respond to the questions 
put to it in the Special Agreement for it to determine which of those points of view is 
scientifically better founded.’ 184  Instead, the Court based its judgment in treaty law, state 
responsibility and on the respective legal obligations of the parties before it, relying on the 
whole on the documentary evidence placed before it by the parties.
185
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The Court’s reticence with regards to the appointment of experts in this case has been 
criticised by commentators and the dissenting opinion of one judge in particular who have 
argued it was unclear how the Court felt it was able to make a legal determination as to 
whether ‘the immediacy and gravity of the environmental peril without taking into account 
the scientific data submitted by the parties intending to prove just that’.186   
 
However, one must be careful when considering such issues because it is extremely difficult 
to argue that the Court should have engaged more intimately with particularly complex 
factual or scientific issues, and further that any such engagement would have made any 
particular difference to the outcome of the case.  That having been said, what we can assess is 
the means and methods employed by the Court and confidently state that the Court has 
displayed, and continues to display, tendencies for relying on documentary evidence and 
demonstrated clear reluctance to conduct its own fact-finding.  
 
The Court’s unwillingness or inability to utilise its fact-finding powers is compounded by the 
fact that the Court employs remarkably broad rules of admissibility.  The onus placed on the 
states to bring evidence before the Court as a result of the Court’s reactive approach to fact-
finding necessitates that some consideration be given to the limitations that are placed on 
exactly what evidence can come before Court, or in other words the Court’s rules on 
admissibility. 
 
1.3.2. Admissibility 
 
Consistent with the theme of scarce rules of evidence in international litigation, the 
admissibility of evidence before the Court is similarly unconstrained by detailed evidentiary 
rules and procedures.  Unlike international criminal tribunals established subsequently, the 
ICJ has no explicit rules of evidence regarding admissibility.
187
  In fact, it has been said that 
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there exists a general rule of liberté de la prevue or ‘the free admissibility of evidence before 
the Court’188 (with only a small number of exceptions.) 
 
Former President of the Court Rosalyn Higgins has summed up the Court’s approach to the 
admissibility of evidence in stating that ‘[t]he parties are entitled to expect that we will 
examine every single thing that they put before us, and we do’.189  Again, the explanation 
offered for this approach is familiar, as Brower asserts: ‘[f]or obvious diplomatic reasons 
international tribunals are reluctant to spurn anything proffered by a sovereign.’190   Unlike 
domestic courts where there generally exist numerous and sophisticated evidentiary 
constraints regarding the admissibility of evidence, it has been said that they ‘have no place in 
international adjudication, where the relevance of facts and the value of evidence tending to 
establish facts are left to the appreciation of the court.’191  As a general rule it can be said that 
any evidence put forward by a state party in a case before the Court will be accepted by the 
Court unless it is challenged by the other party and is subsequently proved to fall foul of one 
of the limited exceptions to the principle of free admissibility.
192
 
 
One possible explanation offered to explain the Court’s flexible approach to evidence and 
broad powers to determine the evidentiary weight of any piece of evidence that comes before 
it is that ‘[u]nlike a common-law lay jury, this highly-qualified and experienced international 
bench is not considered to need “protection” from potentially unreliable evidence.’193  The 
Court has however imposed a limited number of restrictions on the principle of free 
admissibility, ostensibly in order to ensure good judicial order.
194
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The first of these limitations is evidence originating from negotiations between parties 
seeking a resolution of a particular dispute.  This has been described as ‘[p]erhaps the only 
clear-cut example of evidence being considered inadmissible by the Court’.195  The consistent 
practice of negotiation between two states seeking to resolve a particular dispute has led to the 
development of a general rule that the Court will not ‘consider evidence consisting of 
statements...made in the course of those negotiations, so that the information or documents 
generated can not then be used against the parties in any pending or future litigation’.196 
 
A clear example of this limitation can be seen in the Chorzów Factory case in which the PCIJ 
said it would not take into account ‘declarations, admissions or proposals which the Parties 
may have made during direct negotiations between themselves, when such negotiations have 
not led to a complete agreement’.197 The Court subsequently followed this reasoning in the 
Burkina Faso/Mali case.
198
  Crucially, however, the Court provided a slight nuance in finding 
that whilst evidence originating from negotiations between the parties was inadmissible, 
evidence of the circumstances surrounding the agreement may in fact be admissible.  This has 
led commentators to conclude that ‘[e]ven this clear rule as to inadmissibility has been closely 
proscribed’.199 
 
A second, and more complex, limitation is that relating to illegally obtained evidence.  
Although the Court has never specifically rejected illegally obtained evidence, there has been 
academic debate on the issue centring around the Corfu Channel and Tehran Hostages 
cases.
200
  Despite arguments to the contrary,
201
 it would seem that the Court in fact has no rule 
prohibiting the admission of illegal evidence, as Highet has stated ‘[t]he likely result in the 
future...is that – without specifically ruling on the matter – the Court will consider any such 
evidence on its own footing and weigh it accordingly, but will not exclude it from 
consideration on the ground of “illegality” alone’.202   President Spender in South West Africa 
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stated the position of the Court: 
 
‘The evidence will remain on the record; the Court is quite able to evaluate evidence, 
and if there is no value in the evidence, then there will be no value given to this part of 
the evidence...This Court is not bound by the strict rules of evidence applicable in 
municipal courts and if the evidence established by the witness does not sufficiently 
convey that the evidence is reliable in point of fact, then the Court, of course, deals 
with it accordingly when it comes to its deliberation’.203   
 
This underlines how far the liberal approach to evidence extends and the subsequent 
importance of the weighing of evidence (the fact-assessment stage),
204
 to which we will later 
return.   It is interesting to note that among the myriad arguments made as to how to reform 
the Court’s fact-finding procedure, arguments in favour of the introduction of stricter rules of 
admissibility are rarely made.  This is perhaps due to the fact that there are a number of 
obvious positive aspects of the Court’s policy of liberté de la prevue.  To briefly mention one 
by way of example, the Court has avoided the difficulties which beset the United States 
Supreme Court when it attempted to move away from its traditional Frye test for admissibility 
to the more stringent Daubert test which cast the Supreme Court as the gatekeeper in terms of 
the admission of scientific evidence.
205
  This move proved troublesome as the Supreme Court 
struggled to define purely ‘scientific’ evidence and ultimately in the Kumho Tyre case was 
forced to expand the test to cover ‘technical’ and ‘other specialized’ [sic] forms of 
knowledge.
206
 The ICJ’s approach to date has allowed the Court to avoid becoming embroiled 
in such technical disputes which could have needlessly consumed much of the Court’s time 
and effort. 
 
1.3.3. Més que un Court – the Continuing Influence of the Sovereign Nature of the Parties 
 
A further facilitating factor is the sovereign nature of parties in cases before the Court which 
continues to influence the operation of the Court to this day.  To elaborate, owing to the fact 
that the Court deals exclusively with states, there remains an extent to which the Court must 
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take into account issues beyond the purely legal.  This being the case, the ICJ is much more 
than a Court, both symbolically and functionally it is concerned with more than the narrow 
adjudication of the legal issues raised in the case that has come before it.  The Court, despite 
(or perhaps because of) the proliferation of international courts and tribunals in recent times, 
remains unrivalled in terms of the informal influence and authority of its legal 
pronouncements.
207
 
 
Indeed, a recurring theme of this thesis is the influence (waning or otherwise) of the principle 
of sovereign equality on the fact-finding and assessment processes of the Court.  The 
significance of the principle of sovereign equality cannot be ignored and is a key factor in 
terms of explaining the current reactive approach of the Court to fact-finding in two distinct 
but related senses.  
 
First of all, it is argued that the Court has traditionally felt compelled to accommodate 
sovereign states’ notions of the most appropriate way of presenting and substantiating its own 
version of events.
208
  For instance, the Court in the Nicaragua case addressed the issue of 
sovereign equality and cited its influence as a key factor for explaining the Court’s approach 
to the production of evidence: 
 
‘The provisions of the Statute and the Rules of the Court concerning the presentation 
of pleadings and evidence are designed to secure a proper administration of justice, 
and a fair and equal opportunity for each party to comment on its opponent’s 
contention’.209 
 
 
The sovereign equality of states is part of the genetic makeup of international adjudication 
and the ensuing deference to the wishes of states in terms of fact-finding would appear to be a 
corollary.
210
  This position is echoed in international legal scholarship by commentators who 
argue that when the parties before an international Court such as the ICJ are sovereign states 
‘… it is perhaps only logical for them to have the main initiative and responsibility in regard 
                                                 
207
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to the production of evidence.’211  And indeed, it has even been argued that the failure to 
accurately establish the facts in an inter-state case can have more far-reaching consequences 
than a similar failure in a trial before a domestic court.
212
  For instance, Sandifer has argued 
that this is the case, citing the fact that the not only are the ‘vital interests of states’ at stake in 
a case before the Court that could potentially affect the lives of thousands of people, the 
functioning of the international community and friendly relations between states could turn on 
the procedural establishment of the facts.
213
  Similarly, Franck has made the link between the 
principle of sovereign equality and the next explanatory factor to be examined, that of 
compelled disclosure, which Franck argues is absolutely ‘…inconsistent with the nature of 
sovereignty’.214   
 
Secondly it is argued that the sovereign nature of the parties before the Court affects its 
approach to fact-finding in that the Court’s jurisdiction is ultimately consensual.  In other 
words, since the parties before the Court could in theory revoke their consent to appear before 
the Court at any time, the Court is forced to adopt a ‘softly-softly’ approach to evidence 
gathering in order to avoid states feeling as if their right to a fair hearing is being hindered by 
the Court’s procedural approach to fact-finding.215  As such, in order to ensure that states are 
not discouraged from consenting to the Court’s jurisdiction it is felt that the Court must avoid 
narrow procedural technicalities.
216
  In addition to the sovereign nature of the parties the 
Court’s reactive approach to fact-finding is facilitated by a number of other factors.  One of 
the most significant of these factors is the Court’s apparent inability to compel the parties 
before it to produce evidence.
217
 
 
1.3.4. Inability to Compel the Production of Evidence 
 
Whilst it will be argued in Chapter 4 that the Court can in fact be more proactive in terms of 
guiding the production of evidence, for now it can be said that the fact the Court does not 
possess an explicit power to compel the production of evidence has contributed to the 
mainstream belief that it is not competent to do so.   
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Neither the Court’s Statute nor Rules provide any concrete guidance on when the Court 
should call upon states to produce evidence
218
 and as a result it has only ever asked a state 
party to produce evidence on a few occasions (and has never drawn negative inferences from 
a state’s failure to do so).219  The Court’s reluctance to draw negative conclusions from a 
refusal to produce requested evidence is symptomatic of the Court’s general reluctance to take 
a proactive role in the fact-finding process.
220
  Consequently, the onus falls very much on the 
state parties before the Court to do so.
221
  As such, contributing to the Court’s reactive 
approach to fact-finding, cases are generally defined by the evidence the parties seek to rely 
upon and by the facts they decide to contest.
222
 
 
1.3.5. ‘Classical’ Approach to the International Judicial Function 
 
A further factor that arguably could have contributed to the Court’s current reactive approach 
to evidence is the so-called ‘classical’ account of the international judicial function.  This 
account sees the process of judicial reasoning from the perspective of the ‘judge in isolation, 
detached from his institutional surrounding and function in a juristic vacuum, freed from the 
restraints imposed by the requirements of evidence and procedure’. 223  As a result of this 
traditional conception of adjudication, it is suggested that the Court has in the past played 
down the significance of the procedural side of international adjudication.  For example, the 
Court stated in the Mavrommatis case that ‘[t]he Court, whose jurisdiction is international, is 
not bound to attach to matters of form the same degree of importance which they possess in 
municipal law’.224  This sentiment has been echoed again by the Court through the years in 
cases such as Aegean Sea Continental Shelf in which the Court stated that: 
 
‘[n]either the Statute nor the Rules of Court contain any rule regarding the procedure 
to be followed in the event of an objection being taken in limine litis to the Court’s 
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jurisdiction.  The Court therefore is at liberty to adopt the principle which it considers 
best calculated to ensure the administration of justice, most suited to procedure before 
an international tribunal and most in conformity with the fundamental principles of 
international law’.225 
 
A similar sentiment was expressed by Vice-President Wellington Koo in the preliminary 
objections phase of the Barcelona Traction case: 
 
‘…international law…attaches less importance to form and appearance than municipal 
law…International law, being primarily based upon the general principles of law and 
justice, is unfettered by technicalities and formalistic consideration which are often 
given importance in municipal law’.226 
 
The so-called ‘Mavrommatis view’ that matters of form and procedure can be discounted is 
one which places the judge at the centre of the judicial process, and sees the procedural and 
institutional framework of the Court as secondary to the will of the judge (who, as we have 
seen, is generally deferential to the sovereign nature of the state parties before the Court) 
ruling on the case at hand.  This is a position that has come in for some criticism,
227
 but for 
our purposes it should be noted that the traditional view of matters of procedure as a 
subsidiary concern is a possible reason for the current reactive approach of the Court to fact-
finding.
 228
  
 
It should also be noted that the Court has never taken the position that complex factual or 
scientific issues are non-justiciable, as has occasionally been argued before adjudicative 
bodies in the past.
229
  Such arguments have not been often made and have never been 
explicitly endorsed by an international tribunal.
230
  Nevertheless, Mbengue has argued that 
                                                 
225
 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978, p 3at para 42 (see also paras. 41-47) 
226
 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 
1964, p 6, paras 15, 32; to this end see also Article 19 of the Nuremberg Charter which states that ‘[t]he 
Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence.  It shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible 
extent expeditious and non-technical procedure, and shall admit any evidence which it deems to have 
probative value’ 
227
 For example; Scobbie argues that greater emphasis must be placed on the institutional context of judicial 
decision making – and highlights recent theoretical analysis of judicial activity and the restraints placed on 
judicial discretion by judges themselves as the main driving factor for this shift in emphasis.  Scobbie 809; In 
terms of the theoretical analysis, see R. Alexy, R. Adler and N. MacCormick, A Theory of Legal 
Argumentation. The Theory of Rational Discourse as a Theory of Legal Justification (Oxford 1989), N. 
MacCormick, Legal reasoning and legal theory (Clarendon Press Oxford 1978) 
228
 Watts 289 
229
 For instance, in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case Japan argued that ‘questions of scientific judgment ... are not 
justiciable.; ’ See Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand. v. Japan, Australia. v. Japan), 23 R.I.A.A. 2000, 1, at 
40(a); On justiciability see Ian Brownlie, ‘Justiciability of Disputes and Issues in International Relations, The’ 
42 Brit YB Int'l L 123 
230
 D'Aspremont and Mbengue 11 
  57 
international adjudicators including judges of the ICJ are put off conducting fact-finding into 
issues that are scientifically controversial since science is ‘irresolutely oriented towards the 
unknown – ie the ‘not known yet’: the uncertain.’231  As a result there is a conflict between 
the objectives that scientists and judges are trying to achieve: international adjudicators aim to 
‘freeze’ the ‘facts’ and talk of ‘findings’ and ‘veracities’ whilst scientific fact-finding talks of 
‘probabilities’. 232  As such, this reluctance to engage in fact-finding in relation to complex 
scientific situation is one of the main reasons that international courts and tribunals have 
displayed a preference for relying on settled and uncontroversial facts. 
 
And indeed various international courts and tribunals have at different times described their 
modus operandi as being to ‘establish which relevant facts [they] regard as having been 
convincingly established by the evidence’,233 to rely on facts ‘not suggesting the slightest 
doubt’234 or ‘clear and compelling evidence’235 in order to determine the ‘established facts’.236  
By the same token they have been reluctant to engage in claims based on unconvincing 
evidence
237
 and have refused to ‘weigh intangible and elusive points of proof’.238 
 
As such, the argument goes that since international adjudicators have shown a preference for 
relying on ‘those facts which they have found to have existed’,239 they are somewhat stumped 
‘in situations in which the facts in question are so uncertain that they have not been “found to 
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exist”’240 which in turn results in judicial caution.241 
 
Undoubtedly there are a number of aspects of this argument that ring true.  However this 
argument is not entirely convincing since judges are regularly asked to engage in similar 
‘probabilistic’ assessments when dealing with complex economic or public policy issues in 
cases that come before them.  Similarly, as in science, standards and burdens of proof vary 
from case to case and court to court in international law.  As such, in the words of Alvarez 
‘[d]eciding on the basis of uncertainty is what international and domestic courts do every 
day’.242 
 
In addition, the extent to which Mbengue’s criticisms of international courts relate only to 
scientific fact-finding is unclear. The main question in this regard becomes; what exactly is 
‘scientific’ evidence?  It is difficult to justify why ‘scientific’ evidence per se is the only form 
of evidence which poses problems for the Court as a result of its complexity.  For instance, 
extremely complex ICSID awards dealing with injury to investors, or WTO cases dealing 
with countervailing duties or zeroing may be just as complex factual issues as any 
controversial scientific issues.
243
  The example of the US Supreme Court is a cautionary tale 
in this regard.  As mentioned above in section 1.3.2., the US Supreme Court in recent years 
has faced major difficulties in seeking to define purely ‘scientific’ knowledge in 
implementing the famous Daubert test for the admissibility of scientific evidence before US 
Courts.
244
  Ultimately the US Supreme Court in the Kumho Tyre case was forced to expand 
the test to cover ‘technical’ and ‘other specialized’ [sic] forms of knowledge.245  In this case 
Judge Breyer conceded that;  
 
‘[I]t would prove difficult, if not impossible, for judges to administer evidentiary rules 
under which a gatekeeping obligation depended upon a distinction between “scientific” 
knowledge and “technical” or “other specialized” knowledge. There is no clear line 
that divides the one from the others. Disciplines such as engineering rest upon 
scientific knowledge. Pure scientific theory itself may depend for its development 
upon observation and properly engineered machines. And conceptual efforts to 
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distinguish the two are unlikely to produce clear legal lines capable of application in 
particular cases.’246 
 
Consequently, the focus in the following chapters will be on how the ICJ and other inter-state 
tribunals deal with ‘factually-complex’ cases which, as Alvarez has stated, necessarily require 
the assistance of experts who have specific skills that can help to shed light on these issues 
which are beyond the comprehension of the average judge, learned as they are.
247
  As such, 
the thesis does not refer to the narrow term of ‘scientific evidence’ or ‘scientific fact-finding’ 
but rather refers to the broader category of factually complex evidence for the reasons just 
explained.   
 
The preceding subsections have sought to outline that the Court has very clearly displayed a 
number of tendencies which, taken together, demonstrate a consistently reactive approach to 
the facts in cases that have come before it.  Such tendencies evident in the Court’s 
jurisprudence include the predominance of, and apparent preference for reliance on, 
documentary evidence before the Court; extremely broad rules of admissibility; the sovereign 
nature of the parties to cases before the Court and the so-called ‘classical’ approach to the 
judicial process amongst a number of others.  This reactive approach necessarily has a knock-
on effect on the Court’s fact-assessment practice which is the subject to which we now turn 
our attention in the following subsections. 
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1.4. A Natural Counterpart – Fact-Assessment & the Weighing of Evidence 
 
The preceding sections have illustrated that the Court plays a limited role in regulating the 
evidence that comes before it.  As such, the Court is obliged to pay particularly close attention 
to the evaluation of this evidence (in particular if it is the basis for a legal pronouncement).  
As Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht stated ‘[a] substantial part of the task of judicial tribunals 
consists in the examination and the weighing of the relevant facts…’248 and that ‘[n]othing a 
court does affects the public perception of its fairness so clearly’ as weighing of the facts.249 
 
The weighing of the facts is here termed the Court’s ‘fact-assessment’ role and is the central 
focus of the following sections.  It is first necessary to more clearly differentiate the Court’s 
fact-finding and fact-assessment roles by considering what exactly we mean when we talk 
about fact-assessment.  As we have seen, evidence before the court is not filtered in 
accordance with (detailed) rules of admissibility at the start of a case as it is in domestic law.   
Further, there are no provisions in the Court’s Statute or Rules which specifically address the 
probative weight that the Court should give to evidence submitted to it.  In this regard the 
Court has substantial discretion in assessing and attributing weight to the evidence put before 
it.
250
  As Judge Keith has stated; ‘[w]hat are issues of admissibility of evidence in some legal 
systems are often dealt with internationally as matters of weight or evaluation.’251   As such, 
some forms of evidence considered inadmissible before national courts can come before the 
Court.
252
   
 
The Court’s own evaluation of the evidence in which it attributes weight to different forms of 
evidence, the ‘discretionary power to assess the evidence’, is described as the ‘natural 
counterpart’ of the principle of free admissibility253 and one of singular importance.254   This 
process of weighing the probative value of the evidence put before it, the fact-assessment 
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process in other words, is not only important in the abstract but in practical terms too since 
traditionally the material admissibility of evidence has ‘rarely been disputed on formal 
grounds, with parties instead focussing on challenging the weight of evidence relied upon by 
the other side’255 or ‘probative value’.256   
 
The Court itself has stated that it in assessing the weight of evidence before it, its task is to 
categorise evidence under different headings then allocate ‘probative value to them 
accordingly’257 or in other words to ‘identify the documents relied on and make its own clear 
assessment of their weight, reliability and value’.258   
 
The Court is the final arbiter in the assessment of the evidence that comes before it.
259
  As 
Franck has stated, the Court must ‘strive mightily to resolve cases on the facts - credible 
finings of fact - and avoid to the greatest degree possible the temptation to mitigate shortages 
of factual evidence, or lack of fact-analysis, by recourse to doctrines of law intended, 
wittingly or not, to bypass recourses to facts’.260  However, just because the Court is the final 
arbiter, this does not mean that the Court acts in an arbitrary manner, as we will see in the 
following section. 
 
1.4.1. Assessment of Evidence – Guiding Principles 
 
In recent times a number of commentators have argued that there are a number of discernible 
principles which the Court has developed (admittedly in a piecemeal fashion and in a manner 
that is far from explicit
261
) in cases before it over the last thirty years which guide the Court in 
determining the weight, reliability and value that the Court will accord to evidence before it 
and vary from case to case.
262   
It has been suggested that the trend towards a clearer 
articulation of the principles which guide the Court in its assessment of the evidence, which 
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has gained pace in the recent jurisprudence of the Court,
263
 has its roots in the Nicaragua 
case,
264
 to which we now turn. 
 
1.4.2. Practice of the Court 
 
The non-appearance of the United States before the Court in the Nicaragua case meant that 
the Court was forced to ‘articulate its scrutiny of the evidence in more detail than ever 
before’.265  The Court acknowledged that a situation in which one party had refused to appear 
before the Court (a situation which the Court has faced in the past on more than eight 
occasions
266
) was a challenge to its traditional approach to fact-assessment in that it could not 
assume that the truth lay somewhere between the competing assertions of the parties before it.  
Despite the absence of one party, however, the Court stated that Article 53 of its Statute 
nevertheless obliged it to ‘employ whatever means and resources may enable it to satisfy it 
whether the submissions of the Applicant State are well founded in fact and law’.267  The 
Court noted that its role in such circumstances is modified somewhat, and necessitates that the 
Court does not play a passive role, but instead utilises its ‘freedom in estimating the value of 
the various elements of evidence...’ (a topic that will be explored in more detail in Chapter 2 
at 2.2.)
268
 
 
The Court gave careful consideration to how the facts put before the Court by Nicaragua were 
weighed and evaluated, in particular giving particular guidance on certain issues.  Importantly, 
the Court explicitly indicated a preference for certain types of evidence in its fact-assessment 
capacity, making reference to the general practice of Courts and remarking that there were 
forms of testimony which were to be regarded as being of ‘prima facie superior credibility’.269  
The forms of evidence referred to by the Court include the evidence of a disinterested witness, 
defined as ‘one who is not party to the proceedings and stands to gain or lose nothing from its 
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outcome’,270 and the evidence of a party ‘as is against its own interest’.271  The Court held that 
such statements against the interest of the state made by ‘high-ranking official political 
figures’ are to be seen of particular probative value since they can be construed as a form of 
admission.
272
   
 
Furthermore, in the absence of the United States, the Court was forced to evaluate facts which 
were ‘for the most part, matters of public of knowledge which have received extensive 
coverage in the world press...’ - an issue that the Court had previously had to consider in the 
Tehran Hostages case.
273
  It was in this context that the Court expressed clear suspicion of 
what was termed ‘evidence emanating from a single source’.274  Instead, the Court indicated a 
strong preference for contemporaneous evidence from those with direct knowledge of the 
situation
275 
stating that any evidence emanating from a single source had 'no greater value as 
evidence than the original source'.
276  
 
 
In stating that such forms of evidence are of superior credibility in the eyes of the Court in the 
process of its fact-assessment, the Court made explicit for the first time the type of 
consideration it takes into account when assessing evidence before it.
277
  Whilst the Court 
only went as far as saying that such evidence was of prima facie credibility, such guidance 
was significant in elucidating the Court’s reasoning in fact-assessment and would 
subsequently be relied on and developed in later cases such as the Armed Activities case.
278
 
 
In the Armed Activities case the Court gave what has been called ‘[t]he clearest statement of 
the Court’s general approach to the assessment of evidence’ to date, developing the position it 
had taken in earlier cases such as Nicaragua.
279   
In this case the Court stated that its role in 
fact-assessment was to  ‘identify the documents relied on and make its own clear assessment 
of their weight, reliability and value’ and crucially went on to explain what items it had 
eliminated from its consideration.
280  
This was the first time that the Court had expressly 
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stated what pieces of evidence it had excluded due to their limited evidentiary value.
281
 
 
The Court proceeded to elaborate on the forms of evidence that it considered to be of superior 
credibility, very much following the Nicaragua dicta, stating that it would treat with caution 
any evidence put before it which had been specifically prepared for the case at hand
282 
and 
would treat with similar caution any evidentiary materials ‘emanating from a single 
source’.283  In giving further guidance, the Court stated that it would instead give preference to 
evidence from persons with direct knowledge and would give ‘particular attention to reliable 
evidence acknowledging facts or conduct unfavourable to the State represented by the by the 
person making them’ – making direct reference to the Nicaragua case in this regard.284   
 
The Court went on to provide that it would give weight to evidence that has not been 
challenged ‘by impartial persons for the correctness of what it contains’ and that special 
attention was to be given to evidence obtained by examination of persons directly involved, 
and who were subsequently cross-examined ‘by judges skilled in examination and 
experienced in assessing large amounts of factual information’ (an issue to which we shall 
return).
285
  The Court subsequently confirmed this dicta in the Bosnian Genocide case in 
relation to this issue, stating that the Court 'should in principle accept as highly persuasive 
findings of fact made by [the ICTY] at trial, unless of course they have been upset on 
appeal'.
286
   
 
In the Pulp Mills case the Court explicitly laid out its task in evaluating the evidence brought 
before it, stating that; 
 
“it is the responsibility of the Court, after having given careful consideration to all the 
evidence placed before it by the Parties, to determine which facts must be considered 
relevant, to assess their probative value, and to draw conclusions from them as 
appropriate.”287 
 
As Judge Keith echoed, the task of the Court is to ‘decide disputes of fact which have to be 
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resolved in determining whether a party to the proceedings has breached its legal 
obligations.’288  Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma further argued that ‘the task of a court of 
justice is not to give a scientific assessment of what has happened, but to evaluate the claims 
of parties before it and whether such claims are sufficiently well-founded so as to constitute 
evidence of breach of a legal obligation’.289 
 
Interestingly, in the recent Georgia v. Russia case, the Court seemed to develop what has been 
termed the ‘legal significance’ guiding principle. 290  In this case the Court set aside a large 
amount of evidence that had been brought before it by the parties, essentially conferring legal 
significance on ‘only two exchanges’ between Georgia and Russia in arriving at the 
conclusion that the crucial dispute arose between 9 and 12 August 2008.
291
  In doing so the 
Court categorised all evidence dated earlier than 9 August 2008 as not being ‘legally 
significant’ for the purposes of showing the existence of a dispute through finding specific 
faults or defects with each individual piece of documentary evidence.  The faults or defects 
with the evidence can be categorized as; (i) formal defects, where, for example, circulation of 
documents to the United Nations under agenda heading items other than the crucial ‘racial 
discrimination’,292 (ii) defects relating to authorship, such as where, for example, a document 
is not authored or endorsed by one or other of the parties,
293
 (iii) defects due to inaction, 
where, for example, the judgment stated that the Georgian military did not act after complains 
against Russian peacekeepers,
294
 (iv) defects relating to attribution where, for example, 
documents did not show a clear attribution of violations to the Russian Federation,
295
 and (v) 
and defects relating to matters of notice where, for example, there appeared to be a lack of 
notice or proof that Russia received allegations of misconduct.
296
  
 
Taken as a whole, the statements of the Court in the cases examined demonstrate that whilst 
the Court is happy to delegate its fact-finding function to the parties, there are some general 
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principles upon which the Court can draw when weighing evidence brought before the Court.  
Riddell and Plant in their study on this issue (as cited by Judge Simma in his Separate 
Opinion in the Georgia v. Russia case) have suggested that the Court takes into account seven 
factors which can be summarised as including the following:  
 
1. Source; whether the source of the evidence is independent from the parties and 
whether it has been corroborated,  
2. Interest: whether the fact-finding in question has been carried out by a disinterested 
party;  
3. Relation to events: whether the fact-finding is a direct observation of the events by 
someone who was present at the time or whether it is secondary information (or 
hearsay);  
4. Method: whether the fact-finding was carried out in a methodologically sound manner,  
5. Verification: whether the evidence has been previously cross-examined or 
corroborated;  
6. Contemporaneity: less weight will be given to evidence not prepared at the time when 
the facts occurred due to the Court's wariness of documents provided specifically for 
the case before the Court; and; 
7. Procedure: whether the evidence has come before the Court in accordance with its 
rules of procedure.
297
 
 
To these seven principles it is suggested that a further two could be included.  The first is that 
of the principle of legal significance, as relied upon by the Court in the Georgia v. Russia case 
through which, as we have seen above, a number of formal defects can deprive a piece of 
evidence of its evidentiary worth.  The second is the principle of executive-administrative 
finality, a principle which grants greater weight to evidence origination from within the 
United Nations or similar organisation - a guiding principle discussed in detail in the 
following chapter at 2.2.4.   
 
However, the main aim of this section has merely been to briefly explore the Court’s current 
fact-assessment practice and to elucidate more clearly those guiding principles the Court has 
indicated it takes into consideration in cases that come before it.  Having done so, considering 
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the Court’s reluctance to utilise those fact-finding powers that it possesses and preference for 
developing guiding principles for fact-assessment, a picture begins to emerge of the Court’s 
reactive approach to fact-finding.  Whilst some commentators have praised the Court’s 
evaluation of evidence brought before it and its recent pronouncements setting out more 
clearly the factors it considers when assessing the facts, it is not the aim of this thesis to make 
a judgement in this regard.
298
  Rather, these principles are articulated here only in order to 
reinforce the point made in this chapter: the practice of the Court is to eschew its considerable 
fact-finding powers in favour of assessing the evidence put before it by the parties themselves.  
The following chapter seeks to critically examine this reactive approach in order to determine 
whether it is fit for purpose in contemporary international dispute settlement. 
 
1.5. Chapter 1 Summary – The Court’s Reactive Approach to Fact-Finding 
 
This chapter sought to evaluate the evidentiary provisions of the Court’s Statute and Rules 
and the fact-finding powers that the Court possesses in order to consider the extent to which it 
has utilised those powers in practice.  It was shown that whilst the Court in fact possesses 
relatively broad fact-finding powers in its Statute and Rules of Procedure due to a number of 
factors it has never made use of them to any significant extent.  Instead, the Court operates 
under extremely broad rules of admissibility of evidence that allow almost any piece of 
evidence to come before the Court that the states parties so choose.   
 
These factors taken together; the apparent reluctance to conduct fact-finding, the broad rules 
of admissibility, and the emphasis on fact-assessment amount to what it is argued can 
accurately be described as the Court’s reactive approach to evidence.  This is an approach that, 
as shown above, was developed for a number of reasons including the sovereign nature of the 
parties before the Court, the Court’s inability to compel evidence and what could be termed 
the ‘classical’ approach to judicial reasoning.  However, in recent times, the reasons 
underpinning this reactive approach have begun to be questioned and the approach as a whole 
has come in for criticism.  These criticisms of the current reactive approach to fact-finding 
form the basis of the following chapter. 
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Chapter 2. Criticisms of the Court’s Current Reactive Approach to Fact-Finding 
 
(i) Introduction – is the ICJ Factually Challenged?299 
 
Chapter 1 assessed the Court’s traditional reactive approach to fact-finding.  It was argued 
that the Court’s approach has been influenced by a number of factors including its status as an 
international judicial body with no compulsory jurisdiction and by the sovereign nature of the 
states party to cases that come before it.  However, in recent times there has been considerable 
criticism of the Court’s reactive approach to fact-finding.  Whilst it is acknowledged that there 
are a number of reasons that explain why the Court has historically taken this reactive 
approach to fact-finding, and that in some situations the Court’s reactive approach is 
justifiable, it is these recent criticisms that Chapter 2 sets out to assess.  It is argued that the 
criticisms explored in this chapter at the very least merit a re-examination of the Court’s 
approach to the facts.  To what extent these deficiencies can be overcome is a topic to which 
we will return in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
It is argued that recent criticisms can be divided into two main groups: (i) those relating to 
abundant or particularly complex or technical facts before the Court and (ii) those relating to a 
lack of evidence before the Court.  The first group of criticisms are diverse and relate to the 
Court’s difficulties in dealing with copious, complex or scientific evidence that are 
increasingly prevalent in international adjudication.  Criticisms of the Court’s reactive 
approach when faced with this kind of evidence will be considered in the first half of this 
chapter. 
 
The second group of criticisms, concerning the lack of evidence before the Court, includes 
(but is not limited to) the non-appearance of states before the Court and is the issue to which 
we will turn our attention presently.  It is argued that in cases where a party fails to appear 
before the Court, its reactive approach to fact-finding is found wanting due to the fact it only 
has the evidence of one party upon which to make its findings of fact.  Without conducting its 
own investigations into the factual background of the case at hand the Court’s reactive 
approach, which makes the court dependent on states to submit the facts to it, is a handicap 
for the Court.  In such cases the Court is forced to cast its net wider to obtain facts from fact-
finding commissions or to rely on public knowledge in order to attempt to fill the void in the 
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evidentiary record left by the non-appearing party.    
  71 
2.1. Group 1 – Problems Relating to Abundant, Particularly Complex or Technical Facts 
 
The first group of criticisms are diverse and relate to the Court’s difficulties in dealing with 
cases involving abundant, particularly complex or technical facts that are increasingly 
prevalent in international adjudication.  In other words, the issues explored in the following 
section do not arise out of a lack of facts before the Court, but rather result from the difficulty 
of assessing those facts.
300
 
 
It has been suggested that the Court’s current reactive approach to fact-finding in placing the 
emphasis on the parties to put relevant information before the Court to meet the burden of 
proof to satisfy their case could incentivise the parties to conduct new research and seek out 
existing information in support of their position.
301
  And indeed there is some evidence of 
such research being carried out in the recent practice of the Court.
302
  However, it is argued 
that the validity of this argument is called into question by the fact that the Court has 
explicitly stated that it will accord less probative value to inquiries or studies carried out 
specifically for the purposes of the case at hand (see Chapter 1 at 1.4.1).
303
  As such, and for 
the myriad reasons set out below, it is argued that the disadvantages of the Court’s current 
reactive approach to fact-finding outweigh the advantages. 
 
Criticisms of the Court’s reactive approach when faced with this kind of evidence relate to: (i) 
the problematic practice of experts appearing as counsel, (ii) the Court’s unwillingness to 
appoint its own experts or request necessary information and (iii) problematic reliance on 
international commissions of inquiry.  Each of these issues is discussed in turn in the 
following sections. 
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2.1.1. Blurred Lines - The Practice of Experts Appearing as Counsel 
 
The present subsection examines the problematic consistent practice of the Court to date 
regarding a blurring of the distinction between counsel and experts.
304
   As we have seen, the 
practice of the Court is essentially reactive with the onus being very much placed on the 
parties to put whatever information they so choose before the Court.  However, instead of 
putting forward their own experts under Article 43(5) of the Court’s Statute, states in the past 
have tended to include experts as counsel or have their counsel present complex factual and 
scientific evidence to the Court themselves.
305
 
 
This practice can be seen consistently throughout the jurisprudence of the Court, even in 
technical cases such as Botswana/Namibia.
306
  In this case experts appeared as counsel to give 
evidence as to whether the northern channel of the River Chobe around the Kasikili/Sedudu 
Island ought to be considered its main channel (and ultimately which state had sovereignty 
over the island).
307
  Similarly, in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case scientific experts for 
Hungary appeared as counsel rather than as experts (for instance Slovakia’s scientists were 
listed as ‘counsel and experts’;308 whereas in Pulp Mills both parties listed members of their 
delegation as ‘scientific advisors and experts’) – speaking as advocates rather than experts 
stricto sensu.
309
  Given the somewhat unclear position of individuals appearing before the 
Court in the past, it is necessary to more carefully examine the distinction between witnesses, 
experts and counsel.   
 
What guidance can be gleaned from the Statute of the Court?  Given the traditional focus on 
documentary evidence before the Court (see section 1.3.1.), it is perhaps not surprising that 
the provisions of the Court’s Statute relating to the hearing of witnesses and experts have been 
described as rudimentary.
310
  This is especially the case in relation to individuals put forward 
by the parties in support of their case with the Statute providing very little guidance in this 
respect.
311
  That having been said, taking into account the few provisions in the Court’s 
Statute, the Rules of the Court and the practice of the Court into account something 
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meaningful can be said about the position of witnesses and experts before the Court.  First of 
all, Article 42(1) and (2) of the Statute states that parties ‘shall be represented by agents’ and 
‘may have the assistance of counsel or advocates before the Court’.  In addition, Article 43(5) 
states that proceedings before the Court will consist of a written and an oral part and that ‘the 
oral proceedings shall consist of the hearing by the Court of witnesses, experts, agents, 
counsel, and advocates’.312  Whilst stipulating that witnesses and experts must take different 
oaths before appearing before the Court,
313
 somewhat unhelpfully neither the Court’s Statute 
nor its Rules define any of these positions - leaving it open for the common understanding of 
these terms to be inferred.
314
   
 
The approach of the Court to date has been to simply accept that any individual put forward 
by the parties as counsel, advocate, expert or witness appear as such.
315
  The Court’s approach 
in this respect is similar to the procedure before civil law systems where it is entirely within 
the discretion of the court to determine who can be qualified as an expert’.316  The Court’s 
‘relaxed view of the matter’ is illustrated well by the fact the Court has not insisted that 
‘counsel’ be members of the bar of their domestic state, or indeed that persons who appear as 
counsel be a qualified lawyers at all. 
 
Consequently, the task of the witnesses has been interpreted as being to speak to facts that 
they experienced first hand.
317
  In contrast, the task of experts is to speak to their own 
specialised knowledge, training or skill.
318
  Whilst a witness’s testimony must be limited to 
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issues they witnessed first hand, experts can give opinions on the issues in question and 
present conclusions on the basis of their expertise.
 319
 
 
In practice parties have put forward experts in support of their case for examination before the 
Court in a number of cases.
320
  In the course of the oral pleadings during the South West 
Africa case, one of the grounds on which Mr Gross for Liberia and Ethiopia sought to 
challenge the evidence given by Mr P. J. Cillie, editor of the newspaper Die Burger, put 
forward by South Africa as a ‘witness and expert’, was that he was speaking to issues on 
which he had no formal qualifications.
321
  However, President Spender rejected this position, 
stating that the issue is often the weight to be given to the opinion presented rather than the 
qualification of the individual: 
 
‘Experts may qualify in other fields than that which is their normal qualification, if 
they reveal a special knowledge which is far in excess of that which is normally held 
by a lay person and, where a witness so qualifies, it is a question of the weight to be 
accorded to his opinion, not a question of the admissibility of the expert view which is 
expressed’322 
 
 
In addition, the practice of the Court reveals that parties have put forward so-called ‘expert 
witnesses’ - in other words an individual who is both an expert and someone who has 
witnessed the relevant event personally.
323
  Expert witnesses have troubled the ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals in the past, but the main point to bear in mind for our purposes 
is that expert witnesses can be examined before the Court not only on events that they have 
witnessed first hand but their expertise and prior statements relating to their area of expertise 
can also be questioned (in the same way that an ordinary expert can).
324
  The practice of 
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presenting such witnesses, arguably blurring the distinction between witnesses and experts, is 
not inherently problematic since the expert witness will be examined in open Court where 
both testimony as to events witnessed first hand and opinion given on the basis of the 
witness’s expertise can be tested by the parties.   
 
However, leaving the issue of expert witnesses aside, it is argued that the failure to properly 
maintain the distinction between counsel and experts appearing before the Court is 
problematic.  Indeed the blurring of the distinction between experts and counsel has presented 
the Court with a number of difficulties in relation to fact-finding in practice.  The most 
significant of these difficulties relates to the fact that experts appearing as counsel, despite 
presenting ex parte evidence, due to their status as counsel and not as experts cannot be cross-
examined by the other party in the course of oral proceedings.
325
  Only those experts put 
forward by the parties under Article 43(5) of the Court’s Statute (as opposed to Court-
appointed experts or experts appearing as counsel
326
) come within the scope of Articles 57, 58, 
63 and 64 of the Rules of the Court
 
.
327
  In practical terms this means that only those 
individuals put forward as experts under Article 43(5) of the Statute are required to make a 
solemn declaration under Article 64(b) of the Rules of the Court, and only they
 
can present 
statements that may be treated as evidence and crucially, can be cross-examined.
328
  
 
As Boyle and Harrison have pointed out, denying the opposing party the opportunity to cross-
examine witnesses prevents the achievement of the main goal of cross-examination: to test the 
credibility of the expert or witness.
329
  Cross-examination is a crucial tool in testing the 
credibility of witnesses or experts, providing real scrutiny of the ‘professional aura’ 
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surrounding experts that might not otherwise be questioned.
330
  Providing a concrete example 
of the problems this practice creates, Judge Simma has criticised the proceedings in the Pulp 
Mills case, stating that the evidence given by the party-appointed experts was diminished by 
the fact the experts appeared as counsel and not experts, meaning that they were not subject to 
examination by their own party and cross-examination by the other party.  As such, the 
experts, their professional aura intact, simply ‘merrily contradicted each other’ leaving the 
Court none the wiser.
331
  
 
As such, when experts appear as counsel their credibility will potentially escape scrutiny.  The 
issue of cross-examination before the Court and the significant change in practice regarding 
the presentation of experts by parties that has occurred in recent times are considered in 
greater detail in Chapter 4.  However, for our purposes, it should be noted that this practice, in 
circumscribing the examination of experts is potentially problematic and has been criticised as 
such.  In addition to the problematic practice of experts appearing as counsel before the Court, 
the following section argues that the Court has made a number of clear factual errors arguably 
as a result of its current reactive approach to fact-finding. 
 
2.1.2. Factual Inaccuracies Arguably Made as a Result of the Court’s Reactive Approach to 
Fact-Finding 
 
First of all it should be clarified that this section only speaks of a reluctance of the Court to 
make explicit use of the fact-finding powers it possesses in order to assist it in the assessment 
of complex facts.  That we can only talk of explicit reluctance is due to the fact that we know 
that, to some extent, the Court does in fact informally consult experts to assist in in the 
assessment of the facts.  As Sir Robert Jennings openly stated; 
 
‘…the Court has not infrequently employed cartographers, hydrographers, 
geographers or linguists, and even specialised legal experts to assist in the 
understanding of the issues in a case before it; and it has not on the whole felt any 
need to make this public knowledge or even to apprise the parties’.332 
 
It is thought that the Court has chosen to seek expert assistance from so-called experts 
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fantômes informally rather than appointing its own experts under Article 50 of the Statute in 
order to avoid the procedure set out in Article 50 and Articles 67 and 68 of the Rules which 
could be perceived as cumbersome, especially in relation to a minor point on which the Court 
needs some clarification.
333
   
However, in not informing the parties that it is seeking expert assistance and by 
circumventing the procedure set out in its Statute and Rules ‘the Court disregards a 
procedural right of the parties – namely the right to comment on the results of independent 
expert advice envisaged in Art. 67, para. 2 of the Rules.’334  Accordingly, the use of informal 
expert evidence is extremely problematic.  Such criticisms have in recent years been raised by 
members of the Court, with Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma arguing that whilst use of such 
experts may be pardonable if the scientific issue in dispute forms part of the margins of the 
case, the situation is different if the scientific issue forms part of the crux of the case.
335
  As 
such, it has been argued that the use of informal expert evidence is extremely problematic and 
that in the interests of the proper administration of justice the practice of the Court in seeking 
informal advice from experts should be restricted.
336
  
 
In addition to the problematic use of experts fantômes, Anna Riddell has written of fact-
finding errors made by the Court in a number of cases.  One example cited by Riddell is that 
of Qatar v Bahrain in which the Court was called upon to determine whether there had been a 
channel navigable even at low tide between the islands of Fasht al Azm and Sitrah Island.
337
  
Neither party was able to produce evidence relating to the state of the channel before 1982 
and the party-appointed experts produced conflicting evidence.
338
  As such, aware that unless 
the Court were to utilise its own fact-finding powers in order to shed more light on the issue it 
would be extremely difficult for it to make a factual finding on this issue, ‘…in the end the 
Court chose to base its decision on other matters without coming to a conclusion as to the 
existence of the channel’.339  The Court’s decision not to conduct its own fact-finding or to 
choose to favour one expert over the other could arguably have been overlooked had the 
Court not subsequently, in drafting the maritime boundary, drawn the boundary over dry land 
that belonged to both parties – an aberration which, Riddell has argued, could ‘have been 
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avoided if experts had been recruited to help with the task’.340 
 
Similarly, Riddell cites the factual errors made by the Court in its judgment in the Cameroon v. 
Nigeria case.  In this case the Court drew a land and maritime boundary that could not be 
applied due to errors in the drafting and delimitation ‘because of the Court’s apparent failure 
to understand that latitudes and longitudes cannot be applied without defining the geodetic 
datum on which they are based.
341
  Riddell has suggested that the errors made by the Court in 
its delimitation of the land boundary can be attributed to an erroneous use of the ‘Minna 
Datum’ – a particular model of the earth used in this part of the world used for topographical 
or, as in the this case, delimitation purposes.  However, even if the Minna Datum is taken into 
account ‘the boundary line as described by the Court is still difficult to demarcate because of 
further errors made in the coordinates’.342  For example, the Judgment states that the Court 
was convinced by Cameroon’s argument regarding the position of the River but confusingly 
gave the coordinates of the source of the river being at 13º 44’ 24’ longitude east and 10º 59’ 
09’ latitude north343 –the coordinates submitted by Nigeria.344  In addition, the Court’s sketch 
map shows the source of the river as around 1.5 km from where the coordinates in the 
Judgment site it as being.
345
   
 
Riddell’s work clearly highlights the uncertain factual foundations upon which the Court’s 
judgment was based, and indeed there were a number of additional substantial errors in the 
judgment.  For instance, Paragraph 102 of the Judgment describes the boundary between 
Cameroon and Nigeria joins the Kohom to River Bogaza rising on Mount Ngosi by a straight 
line ‘until it reaches the peak…of 861m’.346  However, in actual fact, the height of 861m 
refers to a point on the River Bogaza and not to the ‘peak’ and, crucially, the map drawn by 
the Court does not correspond with the coordinates given in the judgment – the location 
‘annotated on the sketch map roughly 3 km away from the point the Court clearly intended to 
describe’.347 
                                                 
340
 Riddell 243; see Tim Daniel ‘Expert Evidence before the ICJ’ – Paper presented at the Third Bi-Annual 
Conference of ABLOS (2003) at 5 
341
 Ibid 
342
 Ibid 
343
 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea 
intervening) Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, p 303, 303, para 102 
344
 Riddell 246 
345
 Ibid 
346
 Land and Maritine Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria case, 303, para 102 
347
 Riddell 247; see also Riddell and Plant, at 348 
  79 
 
In relation to the maritime boundary the Court based its delimitation on the ‘largest scale 
chart available to it’, namely British Admiralty Chart 3433, demarcating the median line and 
‘basepoints’ from this chart alone (without geographical coordinates) which mean that it was 
impossible to demarcate the boundary with any precision.
348
  Riddell has noted that in doing 
so the Court did not comply with Articles 16(1), 75(1) and 84(1) UNCLOS which explicitly 
required geodetic datum to be specified where geographic coordinates regarding boundary 
lines.
349
  The Court made a further error in the location of so-called Point X – which it said 
should be equidistant between two specified basepoints, West Point and East Point, at 8º 21’ 
20’ longitude east and 4º 17’ 00’ latitude north.350  However in actual fact the position of Point 
X in the judgment is around 330 meters to the west of the equidistant point between the given 
basepoints.
351
   
 
As such the Court drew a line that it did not intend to ‘straight through a Nigeria-operated oil 
field which is not, it is thought, the result that the Court intended’.352  As Riddell concludes in 
her extremely important work on this topic whilst some errors are understandable in relation 
to extremely complicated subject matter before it, simple factual errors that are not the result 
of a lack of evidence and could have been prevented by greater reliance on experts are less 
forgivable.
353
  It is indeed concerning that the Court made so many factual errors in its 
Judgment and one must seriously question whether had the maps been prepared (or at the very 
least fact-checked
354) ‘by someone who could combine a sufficient knowledge of cartography 
with an ability to understand and comment on the geographical aspects of the judgment’ there 
would have been so many errors.
355
 
 
It is argued that the errors in the judgment contributed materially to the substantial difficulties 
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that the two states have encountered in implementing the judgment.  In fact, after the Court’s 
judgment was handed down in 2002 the UN Secretary-General, at the request of the parties, 
established the Cameroon/Nigeria Mixed Commission to implement the judgment.  However 
more than ten years and thirteen meetings later the Commission has still to complete the 
delimitation of the boundary (although the parties agreed on the maritime boundary in 2007).  
The parties recently agreed to appoint a Joint Technical Team of surveyors and experts in 
2013 in attempts to expedite the troubled process.
356
  Riddell has stated that ‘[t]he fact that 
such a lengthy and detailed procedure has to be carried out in order to render the judgment of 
the ICJ of any practical effect is rather telling of the suitability of the Court at present to deal 
with such technically complex cases.’357  Indeed this much seems clear, any judgment of the 
Court’s containing numerous factual errors and requiring the establishment of a further Mixed 
Commission to implement its flawed judgment, entailing additional expense (in this case 
incurred by the UN) and delays speaks to a less than optimal handling of the factual issues in 
the case.   
 
However, such blatant factual errors are not the only manifestation of the problems generated 
by the Court’s approach to fact-finding – it is not always possible to point to a factual 
determination and determine it to be erroneous.  Rather, many other problematic aspects of 
the Court’s approach to fact-finding are harder to quantify, although this does not mean that 
they are any less real as we will see in the following subsections. 
 
2.1.3. Other Problems Arising out of the Court’s Reactive Approach to Fact-Finding 
 
A further example of the problems that may arise from the Court’s current reactive approach 
to fact-finding can be found in the recent controversy surrounding the Court’s failure to utilise 
its fact-finding powers to pursue items of redacted evidence presented by Serbia to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Bosnian Genocide 
case before the Court.
358
  Bosnia and Herzegovina did not have access to these documents due 
to the fact they had been protected by a confidentiality order at the ICTY under the terms of 
an agreement signed between Serbia and the Prosecutor of the ICTY.
359
  Consequently Bosnia 
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and Herzegovina requested that the Court utilise its Article 49 ICJ Statute powers to request 
that Serbia disclose a number of redacted documents.
360
  It has been subsequently argued that 
the Court’s decision to rule on the merits of the case (and specifically on whether Serbia had 
incurred state responsibility for its role in relation to the genocide at Srebrenica) without 
seeking access to a considerable amount of redacted evidence put before the ICTY by Serbia 
is a critical weakness in the Court’s judgment and represents a clear failure of the Court’s 
judicial fact-finding responsibility.
361
   
 
The Court described these documents as ‘the “redacted” sections of documents of the 
Supreme Defence Council of the Respondent, i.e. sections in which parts of the text had been 
blacked out so as to be illegible’.362  Serbia had claimed that these documents were redacted 
‘by decision of the Council as a military secret, and by a confidential decision of the Council 
of Ministers of Serbia and Montenegro as a matter of national security interest’.363  However, 
the Court refused to call on Serbia to produce these documents,
364
 merely stating that Bosnia 
and Herzegovina had ‘extensive documentation and other evidence available to it, especially 
from readily accessible ICTY records’ and noted the use already made by Bosnia and 
Herzegovina of such evidence and the testimony of one of its witnesses, General Sir Richard 
Dannatt who gave evidence on the relationship between the authorities in the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and those in the Republika Srpska.
365
   
 
In addition, the Court refused to draw adverse inferences from Serbia’s failure to put the 
redacted documents before the Court.  Bosnia and Herzegovina had, whilst accepting that as 
the applicants they principally carried the burden of proof, argued that in relation to ‘the 
attributability of alleged acts of genocide to the Respondent’ the burden should be reversed 
‘given the refusal of the Respondent to produce the full text of certain documents’.366  The 
Court, however, rejected this argument, somewhat elliptically concluding its statement on this 
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matter by stating that: 
 
‘Although the Court has not agreed to either of the Applicant’s requests to be provided 
with unedited copies of these documents, it has not failed to note the Applicant’s 
suggestion that the Court may be free to draw its own conclusions’367 
 
Just what the Court meant by this statement is unclear.  It would appear that whilst the Court, 
reluctant to draw explicit adverse inferences, is suggesting that the significance of these 
documents not being produced is not lost on it.  However, it is suggested that this is a 
needlessly complicated and convoluted way of dealing with the situation and a number of 
commentators have criticised the failure of the Court to request the documents in this regard.  
For instance, Goldstone and Hamilton argue that this line of argument is ‘hardly persuasive, 
given that Bosnia and Herzegovina’s reason for requesting unredacted versions of these 
documents was that it believed these documents would provide evidence on the issue of 
attribution that was not clear from the documentation it already had available to it.’368 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina had, during the oral pleadings, argued that the documents would 
show orders given by the FYR, and records of payments made, to Bosnian Serb forces which 
would have been potentially crucial to proving the state responsibility for the commission of, 
or at least complicity in, genocide.
369
  Diane Orentlicher seconded this position, stating that 
‘the fact that they [the documents in question] were blacked out clearly implies these passages 
would have made a difference’. 370  A number of lawyers, under strict conditions of anonymity, 
confirmed that the redacted documents shed light on key issues such as the extent of Serbian 
influence over the Bosnian Serb forces.
371
  In fact, this is a position echoed from within the 
Court itself.  The dissenting opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh stated that ‘it is a reasonable 
expectation that those documents would have shed light on the central questions’ and 
criticised not only the Court’s failure to act, but also its elliptical reasoning which he 
described as ‘worse than its failure to act’.372  Similarly, the dissenting opinion of Judge 
Mahiou argued that the reasons given for the Court for not pursuing the evidence more 
thoroughly were not convincing and attributed its failure to act to a desire to avoid 
encroaching on Serbia’s sovereignty and to avoid potential embarrassment were Serbia to 
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refuse to comply with the Court’s request.373  Ultimately, Goldstone and Hamilton describe 
the Court’s refusal to even request the documents as ‘a sad legacy to leave following 14 years 
of litigation on this case.’374   
 
It should be emphasised that the significance of this affair lies not in the particular facts of the 
Bosnian and Croatian Genocide cases.
375
  Indeed, it may even be the case that, contrary to the 
views of those mentioned above, the Defence Council minutes are revealed to be relatively 
unimportant in terms of the legal issues in the two genocide cases.  Rather, the significance of 
this affair for our purposes is the fact that, apparently deprived of crucially significant 
information requested by one of the parties, the Court seemed unwilling to take any steps 
towards acquiring this information through use of its fact-finding powers in order to 
determine their significance for itself.
376
  Such high profile criticism of the Court’s handling 
of the evidence, and the Court’s behaviour in these circumstances, act as a cautionary tale for 
similar cases that may arise in the future and beg the question as to whether a more proactive 
approach to fact-finding could avoid future incidents. 
 
As we have already seen, the Court has also encountered significant criticism in relation to its 
use of evidence and experts in the Pulp Mills case.  In particular the Court’s approach to 
evaluation of the complex and scientific evidence put before it by the parties was heavily 
criticised by Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma in their Joint Dissenting Opinion as being 
‘flawed methodologically’.377  The main thrust of the judges’ criticism of the Court was that 
the Court ‘omitted to resort to possibilities provided by its Statute’ leading to a constricted 
approach to the evaluation of the disputed scientific facts.
378
  In not fully utilising its statutory 
fact-finding powers, the Court’s approach has been criticised for failing to do what was 
‘…necessary in order to arrive at a basis for the application of the law to the facts as 
                                                 
373
 Ibid, dissenting opinion of Judge Mahiou at 59 
374
 Goldstone and Hamilton 110 
375 Relatedly, in the recent preliminary objections phase of the Croatian Genocide case, the Court refused a 
similar request made by Croatia, stating that it was ‘not satisfied that the production of the requested 
documents was necessary for the purpose of ruling on preliminary objections’; Croatian Genocide 
Preliminary Objections, 416, p. 13-15 
376
 Alternatively there is the possibility that the Court did indeed have access to, or information about, these 
documents that it did not disclose to the parties on the basis of which the decision was taken that the 
information would not play a decisive role in proceedings.  If this were the case, however, this would be 
equally concerning, violating the principles of transparency and due process 
377
 Pulp Mills Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma at para 2 
378
 Ibid, Dissenting Opinion of Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma at para 2 
  84 
scientifically certain in possible in a judicial proceeding’.379 
 
Despite huge amounts of conflicting scientific evidence placed before the Court by the parties, 
again the Court maintained its reactive approach, examining and weighing the scientific 
evidence in relation to the impact of discharges of dangerous chemicals from the mills on the 
environment itself without utilising its own powers to appoint experts or a commission of 
inquiry.
380
  The Court’s decision in this regard was questioned by a number of judges such as 
Judge ad hoc Vinuesa who questioned ‘the Court’s ability to make appropriate determinations 
of fact…based on sound scientific findings’381 despite the ‘lack of specialized expert 
knowledge’.382  In particular Judge ad hoc Vinuesa took umbrage with the Court making legal 
determinations whilst clearly being unable to speak in certain terms about the scientific 
issues.
383
   In particular it is the method of the Court that is the object of the judges criticism – 
criticism is voiced particularly of the Court’s practice of hearing the arguments of the parties, 
‘asking a few token questions’ then retiring to deliberate in camera.384  It is for this reason 
that Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma censured the Court for ‘clinging to the habits it has 
traditionally followed in assessing and evaluating evidence’.385 
 
The judges criticise sections of the majority judgement which state that it ‘sees no need’386 
and ‘is not in a position’ to arrive at specific conclusions,387 that ‘there is no [clear] evidence 
to support’ certain claims,388 that ‘certain facts have not been established to the satisfaction of 
the Court’389 or that certain evidence ‘does not substantiate the claims’.390  The judges 
criticised the practice of the Court in obliging Argentina to substantiate certain claims on 
issues that the Court, without specific expert assistance, could not ‘fully comprehend’.  The 
judges rejected the suggestion that scientific expertise ought to only come before the Court 
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through experts acting as counsel on behalf of the parties under Article 43 of the Court’s 
Statute outright.
391
   
 
That the judges went to far as to describe the methodological approach taken by the Court as 
having the potential to ‘increase doubts in the international legal community whether it, as an 
institution, is well-placed to tackle complex scientific questions’ is undoubtedly significant.392  
The judges argued that the Court ought to cease ‘willingly depriving itself of the ability fully 
to consider the facts submitted to it’ – instead advocating that the Court make better use of 
inquiries and experts before the Court in an open and public manner, in contrast to the 
practice of relying on experts fantômes as has been the case in the past.   
 
Such criticisms of the Court’s fact-finding process are often accompanied by a plea to resort 
to more proactive fact-finding procedures in order to ascertain the information needed to 
make sound legal determinations and this was no different in the Pulp Mills case.  For 
instance Judge ad hoc Vinuesa stated that ‘[g]iven the scientific complexity of the case, it is 
my considered belief that the Court should have availed itself of the provisions in its Rules 
aimed at enabling the Court to gain a clearer understanding of technical evidence’, in 
particular commissions of inquiry under Article 50 of the Court’s Statute in this case.393  In 
this vein, Judge Yusuf stated that he believed ‘that the Court should have had recourse to 
expert assistance, as provided in Article 50 of its Statute, to help it gain a more profound 
insight into the scientific and technical intricacies of the evidence submitted by the Parties’.394  
Judge Yusuf advocated a commission of inquiry to assist the Court owing to the voluminous 
amount of evidence put before the Court and due to the fact that the information related to ‘a 
wide range of scientific and technical fields including hydrology, hydro-biology, river 
morphology, water chemistry, soil sciences, ecology and forestry’.395  Complicating matters 
was the fact that this information ‘proved very difficult to compare because they were derived 
from monitoring at different stations, at different depths, and on different dates.
396
  Judge 
Yusuf made a lengthy argument in favour of greater utilisation of Article 50 of the Court’s 
Statute in order to ensure that the Court had ‘necessary assistance and support in acquiring 
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such full knowledge of the facts.’397   
 
The viability of taking a more proactive approach to the facts will be addressed in Chapter 4 
but for now it can be said that it as at the very least striking that judges of the Court would go 
so far in their criticisms of the Court’s fact-finding process.398  Such criticism from within the 
Court illustrates that the current weaknesses of the Court’s approach to fact-finding are known 
to those on the bench and suggests a growing awareness that in cases in which the facts are 
particularly complex the Court’s reluctance to undertake its own fact-finding is an 
increasingly real concern.  Despite the wide range of criticisms made by judges Simma, Al-
Khasawneh, Vinuesa and Yusuf in the Pulp Mills case, there are several problematic aspects 
of the Court’s approach to fact-finding which they did not address.   
 
One such additional problematic aspect is the Court’s reliance on publicly available 
information such as information contained in UN Commissions of Inquiry.  The considerable 
reliance on this type of information by the Court in recent times as well as the facts presented 
by the parties themselves is a corollary of the Court’s reactive approach to fact-finding.  For 
instance, in the Bosnian Genocide case, whilst reluctant to utilise its fact-finding powers to 
request documents held at the ICTY, the Court not only relied on the information put before it 
by Bosnian and Herzegovina and Serbia but also heavily relied on the fact-finding reports of 
the UN Commission of Experts
399
 and the report of the Special Rapporteur of the 
Commission on Human Rights.
400
  For this reason it is necessary to turn our attention to this 
aspect of the Court’s reactive approach to fact-finding. 
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2.1.4. From Our Own Correspondent: The Court’s Deference to UN Fact-Finding 
 
A further weakness brought about by the Court’s current reactive approach to fact-finding is 
its problematic reliance on commissions of inquiry, particularly those conducted under the 
auspices of the UN.
401
  Del Mar’s analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence reveals that the Court 
has always tended to attribute ‘significant weight’ to factual determinations made by UN fact-
finding commissions and to the factual determinations included in the resolutions of the 
General Assembly and Security Council.
402
  It is this issue that is critically examined in the 
following section, starting with consideration of the practice of the Court in the Bosnian 
Genocide case. 
 
2.1.4. (i) Bosnian Genocide 
 
Akin to the Court’s elucidation of the principles which guide it in assessing facts put before it 
generally (see Chapter 1 at 1.4.), the Court has in a number of recent cases addressed the issue 
of how it assesses fact-finding reports from official or independent bodies.  The Court in 
Bosnian Genocide provided explicit guidance on the factors it takes into consideration when 
assessing the facts brought before it that have been gathered by a UN body, stating; 
 
‘Their value depends, among other things, on (1) the source of the item of evidence 
(for instance partisan, or neutral), (2) the process by which it has been generated (for 
instance an anonymous press report or the product of a careful court or court-like 
process), and (3) the quality or character of the item (such as statements against 
interest, and agreed or uncontested facts).’403 
The Court stated that these factors were cumulative, to be taken together to determine the 
weight to be attributed to certain fact-finding reports.  One commentator has praised the 
enunciation of such guiding principles and has argued that if applied consistently they have 
the potential to ‘greatly improve the quality of the Court’s fact-assessment.’404 
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Commentators have pointed out that whilst the Court in Bosnian Genocide explicitly stated 
that it was to make its own determination of the facts,
405
 almost all of the Court’s treatment of 
the facts in the judgment could be termed as ‘second hand’, coming from reports of fact-
finding bodies or decisions of judicial bodies such as the ICTY (a point to which we will 
return in section 2.2.4).
406
 
 
Reliance on factual determinations made in UN fact-finding reports is demonstrated in 
relation to the issue of the weight that ought to be attributed to a UN report disputed by the 
parties before the Court (the Fall of Srebrenica Report).
407
  The Court’s factual determinations 
relied significantly on this report, (a report to the General Assembly by the Secretary-General) 
with the Court in particular highlighting that: 
 
‘…the care taken in preparing the report, its comprehensive sources and the 
independence of those responsible for its preparation all lend considerable authority to 
it.  As will appear later in this Judgment, the Court has gained substantial assistance 
from this report.’408   
 
The Court further demonstrated a preference for findings-of-fact made by UN Reports in 
stating that ‘the authoritative evidentiary status of UN documents is a clear reflection of the 
fact that the UN has, above all other institutions, public or private, the resources and political 
access to produce reports of this calibre.’409  This can be seen in the considerable reliance on 
the UN Commission of Experts
410
 and the report of the Special Rapporteur of the 
Commission on Human Rights.
411
  For example, in relation to the establishment of mass 
killings having taken place in various locations throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina during 
the conflict, and the fact that the majority of those killed in this way were members of a 
protected group but that the specific intent (dolus specialis) required was not present, the 
Court relied almost exclusively on those UN reports mentioned, stating that it believed that it 
had ‘established by conclusive evidence’ the points it needed to in order to make its 
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406
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407
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subsequent legal determinations in relation to the perpetration of genocide.
412
  As we will see 
in section 2.1.5. below, the Court dealt with the particular case of the Massacre at Srebrenica 
in much the same way, although in this case relied to a greater extent on the jurisprudence of 
the ICTY.   
 
The Bosnian Genocide case is not, however, an isolated example of this kind of reliance on 
findings-of-fact made in UN commissions of inquiry, as the Armed Activities case 
demonstrates.  
 
2.1.4. (ii) Armed Activities 
 
In the course of proceedings of the Armed Activities case the Court placed considerable 
reliance on several UN fact-finding reports.  For example, in relation to the issue of whether 
Uganda had breached human rights law and international humanitarian law, the Court based 
its conclusions entirely on the facts as they were set out in reports by the Secretary-General, 
United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and the Special 
Rapporteur of the then Commission on Human Rights.
413
  Similarly, the Court held that there 
was ‘clear evidence of the fact that Uganda established and exercised authority in Ituri as an 
occupying Power’ – relying heavily on the Sixth Report of the Secretary-General on 
MONUC
414
 and that there had been massive human rights violations and grave breaches of 
IHL the Court relying on ‘credible sources’415 including the Third Report of the Secretary-
General on MONUC.
416
 
 
In general terms the Court stated that it had established the facts upon which it based its legal 
determinations on ‘the coincidence of reports from credible sources’417 including UN reports, 
‘to the extent that they are of probative value and are corroborated, if necessary by other 
                                                 
412
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413
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credible sources’.418 The Court gave no further detail on what reports had to be corroborated 
and went on to state that ‘it is not necessary for the Court to make findings of fact with regard 
to each individual incident alleged’419 instead appearing to adopt a cumulative approach to the 
evidence.
420
  This would suggest that the Court does not enquire into the methods of UN fact-
finding or question related issues such as the standard of proof applied.  In addition, 
commentators have criticised the Court’s approach in this regard for obfuscating the 
individual evidentiary significance of each report by simply referring to  ‘reports from 
credible sources’, ‘sufficient evidence of a reliable quality’, ‘persuasive evidence’ making it 
near-impossible to assess the relevance of one report over another.
421
  We will return to such 
criticism of the Court’s use of UN fact-finding in the following sections. 
 
In short, from the guidance given by the Court on individual reports it is clear that the Court 
placed considerable emphasis on the significance on UN Reports.
422
  In fact, the Court was so 
lenient in its review of fact-assessment carried out by other UN bodies that one commentator 
has argued that in such cases as Armed Activities, the Court effectively delegated its fact-
assessment to the United Nations.
423
  Whereas the Court was dismissive of much of the 
secondary evidence presented by the parties,
424
 stating that it did not rely on numerous items 
of evidence proffered by the DRC finding them ‘uncorroborated, based on second-hand 
reports, or not in fact saying what they are alleged to say by the DRC, or even partisan’425 the 
Court found evidence contained within UN reports, in the words of one commentator 
‘virtually conclusive’.426   
 
2.1.4. (iii) The Wall Advisory Opinion 
 
UN Reports are also of considerable value to the Court in advisory proceedings,
 
even if the 
advisory opinion request contains a specific reference to the facts being set out in UN fact-
finding report.
427
  In The Wall advisory opinion the Court stated that it believed its task to be 
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to determine the obligation of the state in question ‘in light of the facts which had been 
reported to the General Assembly at the time’428 but, importantly, also stated that this did not 
mean that it should ‘close its eyes to subsequent events of possible relevance to, or capable of 
throwing light on, that question’.429  Regardless of the fact this is an advisory opinion, as 
opposed to a contentious case, the Court remains under the same obligation to make solid 
factual determinations upon which to make legal judgments.   
 
The Court relied on the factual qualifications made by UN commissions of inquiry and by the 
principal organs.
430
  Arguments were made by states time and time again during the oral 
proceedings that the Court would be justified in relying on UN fact-finding commissions in 
order to make its factual determinations.
431
  The Court’s reliance on UN Documentation (at 
least partly) as a result of Israel’s refusal to participate in the oral proceedings led judge 
Burgenthal to argue that the Court should have refused to offer an advisory opinion on the 
basis that the Court ‘did not have before it the requisite factual bases for its sweeping 
findings.’432   
 
However, Judge Burgenthal was alone in finding so and the rest of the Court had little trouble 
in attributing significant weight to the factual qualifications made by the UN organs.  Judge 
Higgins detailed the information that the Court attributed particular weight to;
433
  ‘[p]articular 
evidentiary weight was attributed to the Report of the Secretary-General, and the Written 
Statement of the UNO submitter therewith, by the Court in making a number of important 
factual findings in its Advisory Opinion’.434  The report of the Secretary-General especially 
was relied upon for example, in providing the basis for the Court's finding that the building of 
the wall ‘led to increasing difficulties for the population concerned regarding access to health 
                                                                                                                                                        
was also the case in Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations 
Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1988, p 12, 22, para 23 in which 
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429
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432
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services, educational establishments and primary sources of water’.435  
 
But what is the significance of the Court’s practice of relying on factual determinations made 
in UN commissions of inquiry?  The emergence of this practice, the advantages to the Court 
of adopting such an approach as well as the problematic aspects of this practice are examined 
in the following sections. 
 
 
2.1.4. (iv) The Resurgence of Executive-Administrative Finality as a Guiding Fact-Assessment 
Principle 
 
In 1959 Neil Alford Jr. highlighted how the Court's unwillingness to undertake independent 
fact-finding of its own resulted in a tendency to regard executive administrative findings-of-
fact as near conclusive.
436
  The notion of executive-administrative finality is one that has its 
roots in both the common and civil law traditions.
437   
However, this notion has not simply 
been carried over into international judicial practice by judges trained in one or other of these 
traditions, there are a number of factors which explain the Court’s preference for this principle.  
Such factors include the Court’s reluctance (or inability, in some cases) to conduct 
independent fact-finding, as discussed above, as well as its inability to compel evidence.
438 
 
 
The notion can be traced as far back as the PCIJ to cases such as Prince of Pless
439
 and 
Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube.
440
  In the latter case, the substance 
of the dispute had been investigated by a special committee of inquiry established by the 
Technical Committee for Communications and Transit of the League of Nations.  In assessing 
the facts put before it, the PCIJ displayed a reluctance to test the veracity of the facts, instead 
                                                 
435
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stating that since the facts had already been investigated by the Special Committee appointed 
by the League of Nations, ‘the Court does not think it proper to make new investigations and 
inquiries’.441  
 
It is argued that the Court’s preference for executive-administrative finality as seen in recent 
cases such as Armed Activities and Bosnian Genocide illustrates that the Court continues to 
lend ‘greater weight to UN reports than to other types of secondary evidence such as press 
reports’ ostensibly due to the presumption that such UN reports are based on solid, objective 
and impartial fact-finding.
442
  The Court’s increasing resort to such bodies was noted by 
Australia in its oral argument before the Court in the Whaling in the Antarctica case,
443
 as 
they dedicated part of their submissions to arguing that there was no such independent body 
that Japan could rely on in this case.
444
  The fact that Australia sought to make this argument 
highlights the extent to which the Court’s preference for relying on such independent reports 
is increasingly being recognised by states. 
 
Relatedly, the Court, demonstrating its preference for findings-of-fact contained within UN 
documents, has gone as far as introducing an edition of the Journal of the United Nations as 
evidence during the Preliminary Objections phrase of the Cameroon v Nigeria case in order to 
determine whether or not Nigeria was aware of Cameroon’s intentions to bring the matter 
before the Court.
445
  Whilst arguably the Court could justify such action through declaring the 
UN report as being ‘public knowledge’, in going one step further by referring proprio motu to 
this UN document the Court departed from the earlier practice of only relying on evidence 
submitted to it by the states party to the case before it.  Judge Koroma made known his 
strenuous objection to this development in practice clear in his Dissenting Opinion in that 
case.
446
   And indeed, in recent times doubt has been cast upon the precise reliability of such 
reports and the Court’s use of fact-finding reports in recent cases that have come before it.447  
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It is argued that whilst reliance on findings-of-fact made in UN commissions of inquiry is not 
problematic per se, a number of significant issues regarding their operation taint their factual 
determinations and should caution the Court against singular reliance on such commissions of 
inquiry.  This point is further explored in the following sections. 
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2.1.4. (v) Are Weaknesses in UN Fact-Finding Undermining the Court’s Factual Findings?   
 
‘Croyez ceux qui cherchent la vérité, doubtez de ceux qui la trouvent’448 
 
The previous section attempted to highlight what has been termed the Court’s preference for 
executive-administrative finality, or in other words, its deference to findings-of-fact made by 
UN bodies.  However, in tandem with increasingly prevalent UN fact-finding activity a 
number of criticisms have begun to be voiced regarding the operation of such bodies.  It is 
argued that fundamental weaknesses in UN fact-finding have the potential to seriously 
undermine the Court’s factual-findings.  
 
UN fact-finding is carried out by a range of bodies for a range of different purposes – at times 
for monitoring, at times for assessing allegations of violations of International Humanitarian 
Law or even for assessing the existence of a threat to international peace and security in the 
case of the Security Council.
449
  A brief summary of the fact-finding activity of the most 
significant UN organs is provided to illustrate the broad range of fact-finding conducted by 
the Organisation.
450
   
 
The General Assembly does not possess any explicit powers of inquiry under the UN Charter 
(‘the Charter’).  However, under Article 22 of the Charter the Assembly is competent to 
‘establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its 
functions’.451  Such authority to establish an investigative body, 452 should it so choose, can be 
implied by virtue of the fact that, as Kelsen has noted, ‘...the General Assembly may not be 
able to perform a function conferred upon it by the Charter without an investigation of the 
matter to which the function refers’.453  However, in contrast to the Security Council (as we 
shall see), the General Assembly would be required to first seek the consent of the state in 
question before it could conduct fact-finding on its territory – a significant impediment to 
                                                 
448
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fact-finding in many cases (as becomes clear in examination of Human Rights Council fact-
finding, below). 
 
Similarly, the Secretary-General has no explicit powers of investigation under the Charter and 
despite possessing implied powers of investigation necessary to the proper execution of the 
that office,
454
 like the General Assembly, the Secretary-General would be required to obtain 
the consent of the state on whose territory they wish to investigate.  In addition, and perhaps 
because of its consent-based constraints, unless explicitly mandated by the Council or General 
Assembly, the Secretary-General is ‘likely to exercise considerable discretion before relying 
on his powers to investigate proprio motu’.455   
 
Despite this, the Secretary-General plays a pivotal role in contemporary fact-finding as a 
result of being regularly mandated to investigate particular situations by the Security Council 
(or, less frequently, by the General Assembly.)
456
  The crucial role of the Secretary-General 
can be seen as a result of the Security Council’s reluctance to set up its own commissions of 
inquiry under Article 34 of the Charter and its preference to mandate the Secretary-General to 
conduct fact-finding on its behalf instead.
457
   
 
Under Article 34 of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council possesses an explicit 
power to investigate ‘any dispute or situation...in order to determine whether the continuance 
of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security’.458  Article 34 equips the Council with a fact-finding competence to assess the 
gravity of the situation at hand to determine whether it ought to take further action to maintain 
or restore international peace and security first of all and, secondly, with the power to gather 
its own facts – in other words, facts other than those put before the Council by states.459 
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In practical terms, the Council’s powers under Article 34 provide the Court with the 
competence to ask for others to provide it with information (or to otherwise assist it),
460 
to 
give an investigative function to a subsidiary organ established under Article 29 UN Charter, 
to request the Secretary-General to investigate a particular situation and provide 
recommendations,
461 
or even to request the Secretary-General to make periodic reports on a 
particular situation.
462 
 
 
However, in practice, much like the Court (see Chapter 1), the Council has rarely relied on its 
explicit statute-based powers of investigation, having only done so in UNSC Resolution 15 
establishing a commission of investigation into the Greek Frontier Question,
463
 and UNSC 
Resolution 39 in relation to the Indo-Pakistan Question.
464
  Aside from this limited number of 
commissions explicitly established under Article 34, the history of establishment of inquiries 
under this provision has been distinctly chequered.
465
 
 
Several factors have been suggested as potential explanations for why the Council has made 
relatively little use of its explicit fact-finding powers.
466   
 In contrast to the Council’s sparse 
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use of its explicit Charter-based fact-finding powers, it has made much greater use of its 
implied powers of investigation.
467
  The Council’s implied power is much broader than the 
specific Article 34 power as a result of not being dependent on the existence of a dispute the 
continuance of which could represent a threat to international peace and security.
468
  Put 
simply, despite relatively far-reaching Charter powers,
469
 the Council has not made explicit 
use of its Charter-based powers to any significant extent.
470
  The Council has, however, been 
notably active in utilising its implied powers of investigation, carrying out fact-finding 
missions into situations including (but not confined to) the Corfu Channel,
471
 Laos,
472
 
Congo,
473
 Cambodia/Vietnam,
474
 Guinea,
475
 Senegal,
476
 Zambia,
477
 Seychelles
478
 and 
Angola.
479
 
 
For instance, in the 1990s the Council, most often through the auspices of the Secretary-
General, made relatively frequent use of its implied powers of investigation to establish 
commissions of experts to assess the situations in Yugoslavia
480
 and Rwanda
481
 and an 
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international commission of inquiry in relation to the situation on the ground in Burundi.
482
 
Similarly, the Security Council mandated the Secretary-General to ‘rapidly establish an 
international commission of inquiry in order to immediately investigate reports of violations 
of international humanitarian law and human rights in Darfur by all parties’.483  Whilst 
Security Council fact-finding is undoubtedly important, it is not the only, or even the most 
active, UN body in terms of fact-finding. 
 
The fact-finding reports of the United Nations human rights bodies are increasingly 
prominent in contemporary international law.  For instance, since its establishment,
484
 the 
Human Rights Council has adopted resolutions which have established fact-finding inquiries 
into situations including the Middle East Conflict,
485
 the Gaza Flotilla incident
486
 and the 
events surrounding the Governmental repression of protestors in Syria.
487
  These reports, it 
will be argued in due course are potentially problematic in a number of ways as a result of 
unclear working methods and a tendency to exceed their mandates.  Having painted a broad-
brush picture of fact-finding under the auspices of the United Nations, we can consider the 
question originally posed; namely, what are the potential positive and negative legal effects of 
the Court’s reliance on findings-of-fact made by UN fact-finding bodies? 
 
2.1.4 (vi) The Consequences of the Court’s Reliance on Findings-of-Fact made by UN Fact-
Finding Bodies 
 
 
There are a number of positive aspects of the Court’s reliance on findings-of-fact made by UN 
fact-finding bodies.
488
  The first relates to the establishment of UN inquiries.  The 
establishment of such bodies is not dependent solely on the individual states involved in the 
                                                 
482
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matter but comes about as a result of a majority decision of a UN body.  These UN inquiries 
are also (in theory) composed of impartial experts with no interest in the outcome of the 
inquiry.  As such, it could be presumed that findings-of-fact made by such bodies have a 
relatively strong claim to credibility and could arguably even be said to ‘represent the views 
of disinterested witnesses in proceedings before the Court’489 – defined as ‘one who is not a 
party to the proceedings and stands to gain or lose nothing from its outcome’. 490  One 
commentator has argued that, on the basis of being considered a disinterested witness, 
findings-of-fact made by UN organs should be considered to have ‘prima facie superior 
credibility’.491  
 
The case for considering UN bodies as disinterested witnesses rests on the argument that these 
bodies are unable to be party to any proceedings before the Court and as such arguably have 
no material interest in the case at hand.  For instance, there can be no parties to advisory 
proceedings and whilst the Secretary-General might participate by submitting a dossier of 
documents and a written statement (and by participating in the oral proceedings), he does so 
not on behalf of the Secretariat or in his personal capacity but under Article 97 of the UN 
Charter as ‘the chief administrative officer of the Organization’.  Further, in contentious cases, 
organs of the UN cannot be parties to the case.  One commentator has argued that whilst an 
individual member of the General Assembly or Security Council may have a vested interest in 
the outcome of an advisory opinion or a contentious case– ‘these organs cannot be said to 
“stand to gain or lose” from the judicial proceedings in the same way as an individual 
state...may gain or lose from the outcome of a case’.492 
 
Secondly, although obvious, it should be noted that ‘[t]here has never been an instance where 
a document generated by the Security Council, the General Assembly or the Secretariat has 
been questioned by the Court on the basis of its authenticity, in contrast to the evidence 
produced by parties to a contentious case.’493  Taking all of the above into account, Del Mar 
                                                 
489
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argues that since states have such a huge influence on the evidence that comes before the 
court otherwise, the factual qualifications made by the principal organs of the UN are even 
more important – ‘[s]uch factual qualifications constitute prima facie credible and reliable 
evidence.’494   
 
However, in recent times doubt has been cast upon the reliability of such reports and the 
suggestion that prima facie credibility be accorded to findings of fact made by UN bodies – 
which leads us to the more troublesome legal implications of their operation.
495
  There are a 
number of deficiencies that deserve highlighting.  Firstly, on a purely procedural level, a 
number of difficulties present themselves.  For instance, it has been pointed out that after fifty 
years of UN fact-finding there is no standard operating procedure regarding organization and 
planning for fact-finding missions,
496
 preventing the development of a consistent standard of 
practice.
497
  The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) which has 
reviewed the practice of UN commission of inquiries does have an internal set of guidelines 
dealing with operational issues but these have not been made public and as such cannot be 
utilised in order to improve the operation of UN commissions of inquiry.
498
 
 
In practice there are a number of ways in which the procedural legitimacy of fact-finding 
inquiries can be adversely affected such as where the particular way in which a mandate has 
been worded suggests a prejudging of certain factual elements of the situation under 
investigation.
499
  Similar factors adversely affecting the procedural legitimacy of fact-finding 
inquiries include allegedly disproportionate focus on some situations (such as the Middle East 
Conflict),
500
 and criticism in the composition of the panel
501
 such as those surrounding the 
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appointment of certain members to the Goldstone Panel which prompted its authors to 
publicly defend their personal impartiality and the impartiality of the report itself.
502
  
 
Secondly, although the consent of states is not required for the initial establishment of a fact-
finding inquiry, it is usually required in order to gain entry to the territory of a state.
503
  The 
dispatch of a fact-finding inquiry could, after all, be seen as an ‘intrusive act’ which ‘may be 
resented as unwarranted interference into events deemed to be within a state’s own domestic 
jurisdiction’.504    And indeed in practice it is not uncommon that consent is denied, meaning 
that reports in such cases have to be compiled based on interviews with victims outside the 
territory itself and information from NGOs without any members of the panel ever having 
travelled to the state in question, as was the case in relation to the Human Rights Council’s 
recent report on Syria.
505
   
 
Furthermore, whilst ostensibly entitled ‘fact-finding’ missions, in reality these inquiries often 
make determinations on points of international law,
506
 such as determining that a certain 
factual situation amounts to a violation of IHL or human rights.
 507
  For example, the 
Goldstone Report established by the Human Rights Council in April 2009 to ‘investigate all 
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violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law’ committed in 
Gaza between 2008 and 2009 has been praised for providing an incisive analysis of the role 
that IHL and IHRL play in the conflict.
508
  Similarly, the Legal Annex of the Palmer Report 
established by the Secretary-General on 2 August 2010 following the Gaza Flotilla Incident 
carefully manages the difficult distinction between IHL and IHRL in relation to whether 
Israeli soldiers had used ‘excessive force’.509   
 
In making findings on legal issues the question arises as to what standard of proof the 
commissions of inquiry, being at most quasi-judicial, ought to apply when making legal 
determinations.
510
 
 
In reality the standard of proof applied is often ambiguous and the judicial 
skills and experience demonstrated by some commissions dubious.
511  
Research shows that in 
the practice the standard of proof applied has varied widely between different commissions of 
inquiry.
512  
To be clear, it is not argued that UN Commissions of Inquiry should apply the 
same rigorous standard of proof as would be expected of a judicial body. Rather it is argued 
that the considerable variation in standards of proof between inquiries threatens the 
development of a consistent standard of practice. Concerted focus on this important issue 
from the outset and throughout is essential for the future operation of such commissions of 
inquiry.  
 
Relatedly, it is suggested that there exists a tendency to provide cursory consideration of the 
relevant legal issues and legal arguments of dubious soundness.  A few examples illustrate 
this potentially problematic practice.  The Goldstone report asserted that, despite ostensibly 
disengaging in 2005, Israel retained effective control over the Gaza strip and that ‘the 
international community continues to regard [Israel] as the occupying Power’.513   In support 
of this position the Goldstone report cited a Security Council Resolution
514
 and a Human 
Rights Council Resolution.
515
  In doing so, the Goldstone Report presented the legal issues as 
straightforward and generally accepted whilst failing to note a significant number of 
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competing legal positions, or considering the precise legal effect of the resolutions relied upon 
by the Report.
516
  The report also stated that ‘non-State actors that exercise government-like 
functions over a territory have a duty to respect human rights’ without providing any state 
practice or opinio juris in support of this position.
517
  
 
Similarly, the Philips Report established by the Human Rights Council following the Gaza 
Flotilla Incident
518
 made the legal determination that Gaza was occupied by Israel relying 
solely on the findings of the Goldstone Report
519
 and that it was under an illegal blockade 
without considering the relationship between Israel’s status as an Occupying Power and the 
legality of the blockade.
520
  This is significant since an Occupying Power need not invoke the 
concept of a naval blockade in international law to justify its barring access to a territory it 
effectively controls.
521
   
 
Another example is the Palmer Report’s straightforward characterisation of the Middle East 
Conflict as an International Armed Conflict
522
 without providing any justification for this 
determination.  The Palmer Report simply states that its determination to this effect was 
‘based on facts as they exist on the ground’523 and that the conflict had ‘all the trappings of an 
international armed conflict’.524  Similarly, both the Palmer and the Philips reports525 
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suggested that Israel had a right to self-defence under the UN Charter in these circumstances 
despite the fact the doctrine of self-defence is traditionally considered a concept of the jus ad 
bellum applicable only in inter-state conflicts.
526
 
 
Similar concerns were raised regarding the Court’s reliance on reports of the ‘Panel of Experts’ 
established by the Security Council in the Armed Activities case (see above at section 
2.1.4.(i)).  The Court’s reliance on these reports to make legal determinations can be seen as 
problematic owing to the fact that the Security Council itself stated that the Panel was not set 
up to gather facts for judicial purposes.
527
  Further, the Panel was criticised for ‘failing even to 
respect the methodology which it claimed to be seeking to apply and, in its first report, 
betraying a degree of bias which provoked criticism from a number of States.’528  Additionally, 
the Security Council in paragraph 15 of Resolution 1457 (24 January 2003) urged all states 
‘to conduct their own investigations, including as appropriate through judicial means, in order 
to clarify credibly the findings of the Panel, taking into account the fact that the Panel, which 
is not a judicial body, does not have the resources to carry out an investigation whereby these 
findings can be considered as established facts.’  As such we can see that the Panel reports 
were not intended to be fact-finding instruments and as such the Court’s reliance on them to 
this end is somewhat problematic.
529
   
 
Crucially, the Court did add an important caveat that whilst UN Reports are of course 
persuasive, ‘it should be borne in mind that the Court’s ultimate assessment of them depended 
on their concordance with other evidentiary sources presented during the proceedings’.530  
Further, the Court found parts of the Secretary-General’s MONUC Report that relied on 
second-hand reports in the passages concerning the issue of whether or not the Congo 
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Liberation movement had been created by Uganda to be unreliable.
531
   And it has been 
argued that the Court’s statement that it would only take into account evidence contained 
within UN Reports ‘to the extent that they are of probative value and are corroborated, if 
necessary, by other credible sources’532 shows that it appreciates that some doubt exists with 
regard to the evidentiary weight to be attributed to them.
533
   
 
However, these qualifications are not enough to spare the Court from criticism.  Indeed, there 
was even some limited criticism from within the Court regarding its over-reliance on UN 
reports such as Judge Kateka’s dissenting opinion in the case which described the UN reports 
methodological approach as so flexible that its findings ‘would be either hearsay, biased or 
pure gossip, all untested’.534  Judge Kateka urged caution in relation to reliance on just one 
source (as has been the practice of the Court consistently over many years) even if that source 
was a UN source.
535
 
 
On this issue, Halink has called into question whether reliance on numerous reports, such as 
those of the Secretary-General and MONUC could truly be said to come from ‘multiple 
sources’.  This commentator argues that since these reports all operate as part of the same 
apparatus doubts surround ‘possible overlap in mandate and potential mutual reliance of 
missions in reporting on overlapping areas, thus creating a false impression of confirmation 
and reliability’.536  And indeed as we have seen already such reports cite each other as 
authority (see section 2.1.4 (vi)). 
 
This makes it all the more surprising that the Court has placed such importance on them in 
recent cases.  In acknowledging that flaws in the reports potentially exist but in not subjecting 
UN reports to the same scrutiny as other items of evidence the Court is open to criticism.
537
  
As Van den Wyngaert has stated; ‘[i]t would be interesting to see what the result...would have 
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been had the ICJ applied the same test to the MONUC report and other documentary evidence 
on which (some of) its holdings were based’.538 
 
The Court has also been criticised for basing so many of its findings on the Porter 
Commission (a domestic judicial fact-finding commission established by Uganda).
 539
  In the 
course of proceedings, the Court stated that it: 
 
‘had already expressed its view with regard to the evidentiary role of the Porter 
Commission materials in general...and considers that both the Porter Commission 
Report, as well as the United Nations Panel reports, to the extent that they have later 
proved to be probative, furnish sufficient and convincing evidence for it to determine 
whether or not Uganda engaged in acts of looting...’540 
 
In its judgment the Court claimed that its considerable reliance on the Porter Commission was 
justified by the fact that it had obtained evidence from people under oath ‘by examination of 
persons directly involved, and who were subsequently cross-examined by judges skilled in 
examination and experienced in assessing large amounts of factual information’ and since 
neither party had challenged the Report’s credibility.541 
 
However, the Court has been criticised for relying on the Commission’s findings ‘in the way 
an appellate body would rely on the fact findings of a trial court’542 since any allegation 
confirmed by a finding of the Porter Commission appeared to be accepted by the Court as 
‘having met a clear and convincing standard of proof’.543  Whilst it could be said that the 
Porter Commission fulfils the criteria for favoured evidence set out in paragraph 214 of the 
Bosnian Genocide judgment, that of being “evidence obtained by examination of persons 
directly involved”, tested by cross-examination, the credibility of which has not been 
challenged subsequently’,544 the Porter Commission itself had admitted that it had serious 
flaws and as such it is surprising that the Court attributed it so much weight.
545
    
 
Furthermore, Uganda criticised the Security Council’s decision to name the Panel as the 
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‘Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of the Natural Resources of the Congo’ which it 
argued clearly pre-empted the outcome of the report.
546
  Uganda argued that whilst the 
Security Council is not a judicial body, such determinations acquire ‘a certain force, even in 
this Court, having been used in the reports of the Security Council’s “Panel of Experts”, as 
well as in the Memorial, Reply and oral argument of the DRC, in which Uganda is accused of 
“illegal” exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources.’ 
 
The evidentiary value of the MONUC report, also heavily relied upon by the Court (see above 
at section 2.1.4. (ii)) was also questioned by Uganda which it described as ‘inappropriate as a 
form of assistance accompanied by judicial rigour’.547  In particular Uganda argued that 
MONUC had not been given an appropriate mandate to investigate facts in a way that they 
could be utilised in future judicial proceedings and that the Panel had encountered significant 
problems accessing the area in question, amongst other arguments.
548
 
 
Potentially troublesome treatment of international law can also be seen more recently in the 
reports of the HRC inquiries which were established to investigate alleged breaches of 
international human rights law and to identify those responsible in relation to the situation in 
Syria in 2012.
549  
For instance, in its February 2012 report, the Commission went further than 
the Goldstone Report in finding that the Free Syrian Army, an armed group opposed to the 
government, was bound to comply with human rights obligations.
550  
The Commission stated 
that ‘at a minimum, human rights obligations constituting peremptory international law (jus 
cogens) bind states, individuals and non-State collective entities, including armed groups.’551
  
In taking such a position on this issue of international law, the report leaves itself open to 
contradiction on the basis that, as stated above, human rights obligations are traditionally only 
thought to apply to States, or non-State entities carrying out the functions of a state or those 
having effective control over territory.
552  
Although armed groups are arguably under a duty 
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not to commit breaches of norms constituting jus cogens at the very least under contemporary 
international law, it is argued that it is unclear whether a fact-finding commission is the ideal 
forum in which to determine whether acts breaching jus cogens norms have been committed, 
or indeed whether such acts could be attributed to the group in question and any subsequent 
responsibility arising out of such a breach being found. 
 
The issue of whether armed groups are bound by certain human rights obligations is currently 
an unsettled issue in international law and one commentator has argued that the 
Commission’s position could be seen as an attempt to progressively develop the law on this 
issue.
553 
 However, doubts surround the prudence of such a course of action.  To elaborate, it 
could be argued that the law is being broadened in order to be applicable to entities it was not 
intended to apply to and that, perhaps more importantly, it is arguably being done so in a 
manner lacking in procedural rigor and legal justification.  To give one example, it has been 
noted that the Commission did not examine a number of potentially important factors such as 
the organisational make up of the Free Syrian Army, the extent to which it controlled territory 
on the ground or any of the non-military functions that the entity was also engaged in.  Whilst 
such omissions from the Commission’s report are perhaps understandable due to the fact it 
was not permitted entry to Syria and as such was forced to rely on accounts of others within 
the country, it is nevertheless argued that in attempting to extend the law to armed groups, it 
is problematic that so little attention was paid to legal argumentation in the Commission’s 
report.  
 
Whilst no position it taken on these legal issues at this stage, it should be pointed out that 
issues such as the occupation of Gaza and the human rights obligations of Palestine or the 
Free Syrian Army are extremely complex legal issues.  In making such broad-brush 
generalisations without proper substantiation, acknowledging different legal positions or 
authority, the reports potentially undermine their legitimacy and makes reliance on them by 
the Court problematic.  However, we should also note that the Court’s reliance on findings-of-
                                                                                                                                                        
A/HRC/17/44 1 June 2011, para 72; and UN Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of 
Experts on   Accountability in Sri Lanka, 31 March 2011, para. 188. For a detailed discussion of this issue 
see Henckaerts, Jean-Marie & Wiesener, Cornelius ‘Human rights obligations of non-state armed groups: a 
possible contribution from customary international law?’ in Robert Kolb and Gloria Gaggioli, Research 
Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Robert Kolb and Gloria Gaggioli eds, Edward Elgar 
Publishing Ltd 2013) 148 
553
 Tilman Rodenhäuser, ‘Progressive Development of International Human Rights Law: The Reports of the 
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’ EJIL: Talk! 
<http://www.ejiltalk.org>  
  110 
fact made by other entities is not just problematic in the context of UN Commissions of 
Inquiry but also raises significant problems in the context of reliance on the jurisprudence of 
other courts and tribunals – an issue which is the subject of the following subsection. 
 
  
  111 
2.1.5. Certain Aspects of the Court’s Reliance on Factual Determinations Made by Other 
International Courts 
 
A further potentially problematic aspect of the Court’s approach to fact-finding is its reliance 
on factual determinations made by other international courts, in particular those established 
under the auspices of the United Nations.  The most prominent example of this to date can be 
found in the Bosnian Genocide case in which reliance on factual determinations made in cases 
before the ICTY is evident throughout the judgment, and to a large extent the Court is 
deferential to findings-of-fact made by the ICTY.
554
  Whilst this practice has not been 
widespread in the jurisprudence of the Court to date, it is clear that there is scope for this issue 
to recur in the future and as such the Court’s problematic handling of facts in this regard it is 
worthy of our attention. 
 
In the course of the Bosnian Genocide case the Court went to some lengths to highlight the 
specific weight it would accord to factual determinations made at different stages of cases 
before the ICTY, for instance stating that it would accord less weight to findings-of-fact made 
in pre-trial decisions since the standard of proof applied in such cases was lower than that the 
Court was applying in the present case.
555
  For example, factual determinations made by the 
ICTY in the Krstić case were central to the determination that the dolus specialis required for 
genocide was not present in any situation apart from Srebrenica.
556
  Crucially, the Trial and 
Appeals Chambers in Krstić did however find that the dolus specialis was present at the 
massacre in Srebrenica and that as such genocide had be perpetrated and this factual 
determination seemed to be deferentially accepted by the Court, pausing only to say that it 
‘sees no reason to disagree with the concordant findings of the Trial Chamber and the Appeals 
Chamber’.557  The Court even made reference to a case pending before the ICTY at the time, 
the Stanišć and Simatović case which it said could shed crucial light on the relationship 
between Serbia and the Bosnian Serb forces.
558
   
 
In addition, it would appear that findings-of-fact made by the ICTY will be similarly 
influential in the Croatian Genocide case with substantial reliance being placed on a number 
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of recent ICTY cases in the oral proceedings by the parties.  As Sir Keir Starmer, counsel for 
Croatia, stated ‘ICTY judgements [sic] are rich in… factual findings that are highly relevant 
to the present proceedings. The Applicant will refer in particular to the judgements in Mrkšić
 
and Martić; and the sentencing remarks in Babić.559 
 
It has been suggested that the Court’s reliance on fact-finding carried out by other bodies in 
the Bosnian Genocide case is not inherently problematic practice since ‘most of the 
allegations made before the Court had already been the subject of lengthy trials before the 
ICTY...’560 Undoubtedly there is some merit to this argument due to the fact that the ICTY is 
an independent and impartial judicial organ.  In actual fact, if the Court had disputed any of 
the factual determinations made by the ICTY it would have to go to great lengths to do so.
561
   
 
Certainly the Court ought to pay the ‘greatest respect’ to any judgments made by international 
judicial bodies such as the ICTY.
562
  It is argued that in general a distinction ought to be 
drawn between facts which had been arrived at after a ‘painstaking adversarial process’ and 
those which have been gathered as part of a UN fact-finding mission (which as we have seen, 
operate under much less strict evidentiary working methods).  Furthermore, it is of course the 
case that ‘it would have been unnecessarily duplicative for the ICJ itself to determine those 
facts which had already been authoritatively established by the ICTY, and especially when 
there is general acceptance regarding the rigour of the ICTY’s own fact-finding process.’563   
 
However, the most that can be said is that factual determinations made in cases before other 
international courts is that they are persuasive, but not that they are determinative.  This is so 
due to the fact that unquestioning reliance on factual findings made before another court, one 
with the goal of trying individual crimes, is potentially problematic; 
 
‘The problem with the Court’s reasoning is that the question before it at that stage 
was whether genocide had occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina, not whether genocide 
was committed by the relative handful of individuals who have to date been 
prosecuted by the ICTY…Furthermore, the ICTY was never judging whether 
genocide occurred at a given location or time, but rather whether an individual before 
                                                 
559
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it was responsible for a particular act of genocide or not.”564 
 
Furthermore, relying on factual determinations made in cases before the ICTY is potentially 
problematic due to the possibility that the Prosecutor may have taken the decision not to 
prosecute a certain crime (the Prosecutor’s decision to ‘not include or to exclude’ a genocide 
charge being specifically cited as significant by the Court in the Bosnian Genocide Case
565
) as 
part of a plea bargain and as such ‘may have nothing at all to do with the absence of evidence 
that genocide was committed in any particular situation.’ 566 
 
Sir Keir Starmer in the Croatian Genocide case also argued that ‘a prosecutorial decision not 
to prosecute should be given little or no probative value in respect of the establishment of 
facts…’567 highlighting a number of additional factors including the inherent link between 
investigative decisions and prosecutorial decisions as well as problems in locating key 
witnesses and also time constraints.
568
   By the same token, Starmer correctly argued that 
decisions to include a charge of genocide:  
‘can be regarded merely as different – negative and positive – outcomes of the 
decision-making process; that is, the decision whether to include a particular charge.   
Neither outcome involves a finding of fact; therefore, no evidential inferences should 
be drawn either way’.569 
 
In sum, it is argued that whilst of course the Court ought to draw upon fact-finding carried out 
by others, it should not do so in a wholesale manner, as the Court was criticised for in the 
present case.
570
  As one commentator has stated, more is demanded of the Court than this.
571
  
The Court ought to ‘actively engage’ with such findings-of-fact, to attempt to carefully assess 
the value and weight of the evidence that it seeks to rely upon and clearly spell out to what 
extent the Court has relied upon it in making its legal determinations.
572
  
 
Moving now to the second group of criticisms of the Court’s current reactive approach to fact-
finding we turn our attention to those cases in which the Court has encountered difficulties 
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due to insufficient evidence. 
 
2.2. Group 2 - Problems Arising from Insufficient Evidence, Specifically Non-Appearance 
 
As stated above, the second group of cases which expose the Court’s current approach to fact-
finding as not fit for purpose are those in which there is insufficient evidence before the Court 
for it to base a decision upon.  A prominent example of a situation that leads to a paucity of 
evidence is non-appearance of one kind or another, be it complete or partial.
573
  Non-
appearance can be defined as the situation in which one party to a case fails to appear before 
the Court, to submit a counter-memorial or withdraws from proceedings at any stage before 
the final judgment is rendered.  Non-appearance is explicitly addressed in Article 53 of the 
Court’s Statute, which states: 
 
1.  Whenever one of the parties does not appear before the Court, or fails to 
defend its case, the other Party may call upon the Court to decide in favour of 
its claim. 
2.  The Court must, before doing so, satisfy itself, not only that it has jurisdiction 
in accordance with Articles 36 and 37, but also that the claim is well founded 
in fact and law. 
 
Article 53 of the Court’s Statute is a near word-for-word reproduction of the corresponding 
provision of the Statute of the PCIJ.
574
  It would appear that the drafters of the PCIJ Statute 
deliberately went further than most domestic legal systems in providing a specific duty for the 
Court to satisfy itself not only that it had jurisdiction but also that the claim was well founded 
in fact and law before handing down a judgment.
575
   Applying this underlying rationale to the 
corresponding provision in the statute of the ICJ, Article 53 of the Statute accordingly seeks 
to protect the due process rights of the non-appearing party,
576
 and at the same time heavily 
implies that there is no duty to appear before the Court beyond the obligation to adhere to the 
Court’s decisions under Articles 59 and 60 of the Statute and Article 94(1) of the Charter.577  
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Nevertheless, Article 53 permits the Court, once it has established that it has jurisdiction, to 
decide the case in the absence of the non-appearing party, the rationale being that non-
appearance by one party should not obstruct the proper administration of justice. 
 
In relation to the Article 53 duty to ensure that the case is well founded in law, the operation 
of the principle jura novit curia provides that the Court is presumed to know the law.  The 
operation of this principle, coupled with the fact that the Court is not confined to only 
consider the arguments made by the parties,
578
 make the duty to ensure the case is well 
founded in law less onerous than the duty to ensure it is well founded in fact.
579   
 
 
The situation is not as straightforward in relation to the facts since Article 53 obliges the 
Court to perform a delicate balancing act.  On the one hand, in seeking to ensure the case is 
decided on a solid factual basis, the Court may in certain cases feel obliged to undertake steps 
to obtain information or adapt its approach to the fact-finding process.  On the other hand, 
however, it is clear that the Court must not step in to take the place of the non-appearing state 
by conducting fact-finding and making legal arguments on its behalf.  To do so would place a 
considerable burden on the Court and provide an incentive for non-appearance to states.
580
   
 
On the face of it, it would appear that Article 53 obliges the Court to take some proactive 
steps with regards to fact-finding in cases of non-appearance to ensure that it is satisfied that 
the claim is well founded in fact and law.  It is important to emphasise at the outset that the 
following sections do not consider Article 53 problematic in itself – it is not the provision but 
rather the way the Court has applied the provision in practice which is problematic.  What is 
troublesome is the effect produced by the combination of non-appearance and the Court’s 
reactive approach in such cases.  As we shall see in the following sections, faced with a 
lopsided evidentiary record and traditionally taking a reactive approach to the facts, the Court 
has made conflicting statements on the standard that must be achieved in order to fulfil its 
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Article 53 duty.  Ultimately, doubt is expressed as to whether the Court can in fact ever fulfil 
Article 53 in cases of non-appearance whilst maintaining its current reactive approach to fact-
finding. 
 
To elaborate, uncertainty surrounds Article 53 with regard to the exact standard to which the 
Court should satisfy itself.
581
   In cases of non-appearance, does Article 53 require the Court 
to make its own independent verification of the facts or ‘…may the Court, in the absence of 
challenge by the absent State, take the facts to be as they have been presented, and 
concentrate its attention on the legal deductions made therefrom by the active State?’582  This 
is a question that the Court has struggled to answer in the past.  At different times the Court 
seems to have deviated between two main positions: (i) that non-appearance places a greater 
fact-finding burden on the Court to establish a sound factual foundation, and the contrary 
position (ii) that non-appearance does not affect the Court’s approach to fact-finding and the 
Court need not necessarily take additional fact-finding action to fulfil its Article 53 duty.  
However, as will be shown in the following sections, in cases of non-appearance the Court 
has in fact struggled to provide the most basic guarantees that the case is well founded in fact. 
 
2.2.1. Cases of Non-Appearance 
 
Non-appearance is a not-uncommon occurrence in the history of the case law of the Court.
583  
In particular in the thirty or so years between the establishment of the ICJ and the Nicaragua 
case there were nine cases of non-appearance.
584
  A brief survey of these cases highlights that 
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the Court’s traditionally reactive approach to fact-finding has caused it considerable difficulty 
in cases of non-appearance.  
 
The Court’s statements in the final phase of the Corfu Channel case after the withdrawal of 
Albania have had a profound influence on how it has approached the issue of non-appearance 
in cases before it over the years.  In Corfu Channel the Court stated that Article 53 only 
obliges the Court to: 
 
‘…consider the submissions of the Party which appears, it does not compel the Court 
to examine their accuracy in all their details; for this might in certain unopposed cases 
prove impossible in practice.’585 
 
As such, the Court seemed to suggest that in cases of non-appearance it was unproblematic 
for the Court to satisfy itself the submissions are well founded on the basis of the facts put 
before it by the appearing party. 
 
In Nuclear Tests, however, the Court appeared to suggest that in cases of non-appearance 
there is an additional burden on the Court to fulfil its Article 53 duty, stating that in such cases 
it is ‘especially incumbent upon the Court to satisfy itself that it is in possession of all the 
available facts’.586  Despite stating that it was especially incumbent on the Court to satisfy 
itself of the facts in such cases, the Court stuck to its reactive approach and did not undertake 
any of its own fact-finding.  Instead, the Court went to ‘curious lengths’ to include statements 
of French officials in the press and elsewhere that had not been put before the Court.
587
  This 
illustrates that the approach of the Court at this time in attempting to ensure that it could fulfil 
its Article 53 duty was to, as far as it could, incorporate irregular procedural communications 
such as the statements of French officials in this case, rather than conducting its own fact-
finding. 
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Similarly, in light of the non-appearance of Turkey in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case 
the Court relied on a number of informal submissions to substantiate its arguments instead of 
conducting its own fact-finding.
588
  Again, the Court’s reluctance to move away from its 
reactive approach and conduct its own fact-finding meant that its only option was to cast its 
net wider to incorporate informal submissions or public sources of evidence in an attempt to 
fulfil its Article 53 duty,
589
 insisting that such practice was necessitated by Article 53(2).
590
 
 
In the Tehran Hostages case the issue of Article 53 arose once more.
 591
  Again the Court 
stuck to its traditional approach and avoided conducting its own investigations into the 
facts.
592
  However, the Court’s interpretation of its Article 53 duty in this way saw it run into 
trouble as the US complained that due to events inside Iran it had been unable to access the 
information upon which it sought to rely.
593
  In response, in seeking to prevent the objections 
of the US that the Court did not have sufficient factual information regarding the treatment of 
hostages from derailing the case, the Court argued that the ‘essential facts’ of the case were 
public knowledge and that ‘…the Court has available to it a massive body of information 
from various sources concerning the facts and circumstances of the present case’.594   
 
This position is open to criticism.  Not only did the Court’s reactive approach and reluctance 
to undertake its own fact-finding force it to rely on public information, the Court’s approach 
raises the question of whether it is ‘…legally permissible to rely on the silence of the absent 
party, in view of the clear intention of the draftsmen of the Statute that non-appearance should 
not be taken as an admission of the other party’s case…’595 As such, placing reliance on the 
absence of contradiction by a non-appearing party would ‘constitute exactly what Article 53 
was intended to forbid: the treatment of non-participation in the proceedings as in itself an 
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implied admission’596 and would threaten the equality of the parties before the Court.597 
 
The Nicaragua case was also significant in terms of non-appearance.  Whilst Judge Sir Robert 
Jennings noted in his dissenting opinion that the withdrawal of the US was inevitably 
prejudicial to the US itself,
598
 it is clear that the withdrawal also damaged the Court in 
preventing it from adopting its usual reactive approach to the facts.  The non-appearance of 
the US posed a number of considerable difficulties for the Court’s reactive approach to fact-
finding.  Most significantly, the Court was deprived of the oral and documentary evidence of 
the US, meaning that it had a necessarily lopsided evidentiary record upon which to draw 
upon
599
 and consequently found itself ‘required to deal with this extraordinarily complex 
evidence entirely on its own...’600 The withdrawal of the US meant that witnesses put forward 
by Nicaragua were only examined by its own counsel and were not tested by cross-
examination by counsel for the US.
 
 In this respect, the role of Judge Schwebel was 
particularly significant as he took it upon himself to conduct an at times painstaking 
examination of counsel and witnesses himself.
601
  
 
As one commentator stated, it is interesting to note that the Court was ‘ill-served by its natural 
proclivity to say that the outcome would be the same regardless of whose versions of the facts 
were true’,602 being obliged to theorise more than it normally would have done in order to 
justify its factual determinations.
603
  As such, and as we have seen in relation to earlier cases, 
the non-appearance of one party, in this case the US, can have a significant impact on the 
Court due to its traditionally reactive approach to fact-finding.  Despite the non-appearance of 
the US, however, the Court was adamant that it ‘…must attain the same degree of certainty as 
in any other case that the claim of the party appearing is sound in law, and, so far as the nature 
of the case permits, that the facts on which it is based are supported by convincing 
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evidence’.604  Highet described the Court as being caught in a vicious circle;  
 
‘the Court’s job under Article 53 was made almost impossible by the complexity of 
the facts, just as the ability of the Court to deal with those complex facts was rendered 
almost impossible by the need for the Court to proceed under its Statute.’605 
 
 
Consequently, the Court’s factual findings in Nicaragua and the interpretation of its Article 53 
duty came in for considerable criticism.
606
  For instance, Reisman argued that the Court did 
not in fact satisfy its Article 53 duty but rather lowered ‘the burden of Article 53 by 
selectively quoting Corfu Channel, citing only one-half of the relevant sentences in the Corfu 
Channel case and, in so doing, created the impression that Corfu was holding something it did 
not hold’. 607  Reisman argued that by leaving out the sentence that ‘[i]t is sufficient for the 
Court to convince itself by such methods as it considers suitable that the submissions are well 
founded’608 – the Court misconstrued Corfu Channel to avoid the necessity of resorting to 
‘such methods’ to which the Court in Corfu Channel referred.   
 
More generally, such cases raise doubts as to whether the Court can ever fulfil its Article 53 
duty under its current reactive approach to fact-finding.  These doubts resurfaced again after 
the Nicaragua case as instances of non-appearance continued to occur.
609
  The most 
significant case of non-appearance in recent times is The Wall advisory opinion.
610
  In the 
course of proceedings, Israel’s failure to participate again placed considerable strain on the 
Court’s approach to fact-finding.611   
 
Whilst the deft phrasing of the question asked of the Court by the General Assembly meant 
that Palestine did not have to ‘substantiate its claim nor meet a burden of proof, whether 
positive or negative, thus removing all burdens that ought to have been on the supposed 
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applicant’,612 the refusal of Israel to participate in the proceedings meant that the Court 
nonetheless was faced with familiar difficulties of a lopsided factual record.  The Court 
sought to fill the evidentiary gap left by Israel by relying on the Fact-Finding Report of the 
UN Secretary-General referred to in the request for the advisory opinion.
613
  However, the 
Court was nonetheless faced with the same difficulties as in any other case of non-appearance, 
namely ‘…a serious problem with regard to its factual record’.614  And indeed the facts were 
crucial in the case, despite the legal nature of the advisory opinion sought, in determining 
whether Israel’s construction of the wall in occupied Palestinian territory was contrary to 
international law.   
 
Judge Burgenthal in his dissenting opinion went so far as to argue that the Court did not have 
sufficient facts upon which to base its decision, and that the Court ought to have made this 
explicit,
615
 going on to say that ‘Israel’s non-participation, coupled with the ill-suited format 
of advisory proceedings, meant that the court would be hard pressed to develop a factual 
record sufficient to enable the court to properly answer the question’.616  In addition, the 
Court’s opinion was criticised for not taking into account legal justifications that could have 
been advanced by Israel
617
 and for overreliance on abstract legal principles rather than the 
facts
618
 – both arguably a consequence of the Court’s lopsided factual record.  Similarly, 
Judge Owada in his separate opinion expressed concern about whether the Court’s fact-
finding approach could enable it to properly assess whether the wall in question was 
necessary to obtain Israel’s security objectives.619   Judge Owada lamented that the Court 
simply expressed a ‘lack of conviction’ that the wall was necessary based on ‘the material 
before it’ rather than making an ‘in-depth effort…proprio motu, to ascertain the validity of 
this argument…’620  Such expressions of concern from judges in cases of non-appearance 
                                                 
612
 See General Assembly Resolution A/RES/ES-10/14 (A/ES-10/L.6) 8 December 2004; Fry 65 
613
 See Report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution ES-10/13, A/E-10/248, 
24 November 2003 
614
 Fry 65 
615
 Ibid; see WHO Advisory Opinion, para 95, see Dissenting Opinion of Judge Burgenthal at para 10 The Wall 
Advisory Opinion, where the Court stated that ‘The Court considers that it does not have sufficient elements 
to enable it to conclude with certainly that the use of nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with 
the principles and rules of law applicable in armed conflict in any circumstance’ 
616
 Fry 65 
617
 See the Submissions of the United States of America and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=5a&case=131&code=mwp&p3=1 
618
 I. Scobbie, ‘Regarding/Disregarding: The Judicial Rhetoric of President Barak and the International Court of 
Justice's Wall Advisory Opinion’ 5 Chinese Journal of International Law 269 at FN 111 
619
 The Wall Advisory Opinion, dissenting opinion of Judge Owada at para 23 
620
 Ibid, dissenting opinion of Judge Owada at para 30 
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bring into sharp focus the problems facing the Court as a result of its current reactive 
approach to fact-finding. 
 
2.2.2. The Court’s Role in Cases of Non-Appearance and Resulting Difficulties 
 
As such, it is argued that the Court’s reactive approach to fact-finding significantly impedes 
the Court in its attempts to fulfil its Article 53 duty.  Of course the negative impact on the 
workings of the Court due to non-appearance are hard to quantify in exact terms but the 
practice of the Court shows that in cases of non-appearance, where the Court has a lopsided 
evidentiary record, the Court has historically sought to rely to a greater extent on pubic 
information and more often resorted to drawing inferences,
621
 rather than conducting its own 
fact-finding.
622
  However, this approach has only aided the Court to a limited extent and in 
practice it has continued to experience difficulties.  The limitations of a more proactive 
approach are examined in greater detail in Chapter 5 at 5.5., but for now it can be said that 
cases of non-appearance are particularly problematic for the Court which is likely to always 
encounter significant difficulties faced with the non-cooperation of parties to cases that come 
before it. 
 
It would appear that a potentially high profile instance of non-appearance looms on the 
horizon.
623
  On 22 January 2013 the Republic of the Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings 
against the People’s Republic of China under Annex VII of UNCLOS.624  The Philippines 
                                                 
621
 Tehran Hostages Case, para 12-13; Nuclear Tests Case 1974, para 40-41 
622
 Fry 64 
623
 For detailed historical background to the dispute and thorough assessment of the law of the sea issues 
involved see Zhiguo Gao and Bing Bing Jia, ‘The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, 
and Implications’ [American Society of International Law] 107 The American Journal of International Law 
98 and Florian Dupuy and Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘A Legal Analysis of China's Historic Rights Claim in the 
South China Sea’ [American Society of International Law] 107 The American Journal of International Law 
124; and Robert Beckman, ‘The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Maritime Disputes in the 
South China Sea’ [American Society of International Law] 107 The American Journal of International Law 
142 
624
 Under Article 3(b) of Annex VII the Notification and Statement of Claim included the appointment of an 
arbitrator by the Philippines, namely Rüdger Wolfrum; Article 3(c) provides that the other party will appoint 
one member of the arbitral tribunal no later than thirty days after the receipt of the Notification and Statement 
of Claim – and that if notification is not made within that period of time the party instituting the claim may 
request that the appointment be made by the President of the Tribunal.  The Philippines subsequently did so 
on 22 February 2013.; See ITLOS/Press 191, 25 April 2013, Arbitrators Appointed in the Arbitral 
Proceedings Instituted by the Republic of the Philippines against the People’s Republic of China; On 25 April 
2013 the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea announced that the President of ITLOS had appointed 
three arbitrators to serve as members of the arbitral tribunal; Pierre Cot (France), Chris Pinto (Sri Lanka), 
Alfred Soons (the Netherlands); and appointed Chris Pinto as President of the arbitral tribunal. Note that on 
24 June 2013 Chris Pinto stepped down as from the arbitral panel and was replaced by Thomas Mensah as 
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specifically limited its claim to matters ‘other than those on territorial sovereignty, boundary 
delimitation or historic title’,625 taking into account China’s 1996 Declaration under Article 
298 of UNCLOS which excluded these issues from compulsory dispute settlement under the 
Convention.
626
   Nevertheless, on 19 February 2013 China rejected the Philippines’ 
Notification and indicated it would take no part in the proceedings.
627
 
 
Some commentators have argued that it is in China’s best interest to either enter into 
negotiations with the Philippines or participate in the arbitral proceedings or risk being the 
subject of an unfavourable award.
628
  Whether or not this is the case it would appear unlikely 
that China will participate, and that proceedings will continue in its absence.
 629
  All this is to 
say that the issue of non-appearance is not merely historical and that given its problematic 
handling of the facts in such cases, the fact that the Court may at any time find itself face with 
an instance of non-appearance should be of great concern.  
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2.3. Chapter 2 Summary – Criticisms of the Court Warranted  
 
This chapter has attempted to set out in a systematic manner the main criticisms of the Court’s 
current reactive approach to fact-finding. These criticisms were divided into two main groups: 
(i) those relating to abundant, particularly complex or technical facts and (ii) those relating to 
a lack of evidence before the Court. In relation to the first group of criticisms, it was argued 
that the Court’s reactive approach to fact-finding in cases which involve ‘highly complex, 
factually intensive inquiries requiring the application of particular forms of expertise outside 
the ken of respective adjudicators’ can be a recipe for an unsure factual foundation upon 
which to make legal judgments.
630
  The Court’s approach to expert evidence and use of 
experts fantômes, cross-examination, and over-reliance on UN Commissions of Inquiry all 
have problematic aspects which undermine the Court’s fact-finding process.   
 
In relation to the second group of criticisms, it was argued that in cases where a party fails to 
appear before the Court, its reactive approach to fact-finding is found wanting due to the fact 
it only has the evidence of one party upon which to make its findings of fact.  Without 
conducting its own investigations into the factual background of the case at hand the Court’s 
reactive approach, which makes the court dependent on states to submit the facts to it, is a 
handicap for the Court.  These criticisms having been set out, the next chapter seeks to look to 
other inter-state courts and tribunals in order to assess how they approach the problems the 
ICJ currently faces and asks whether the ICJ can learn anything from these other courts and 
tribunals in order to remedy some of the weaknesses set out in this Chapter. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
630
 Alvarez 87 
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Chapter 3. The Practice of Other International Courts and Tribunals 
Or: How Other Tribunals Learned to Stop Reacting and Love Fact-Finding 
 
Introduction 
 
The preceding chapter set out a number of recent criticisms of the ICJ’s current reactive 
approach to fact-finding.  It was argued that the Court’s current reactive approach to fact-
finding is not fit for purpose both (i) where there are abundant, particularly complex or 
technical facts, since the Court’s reluctance to appoint experts or conduct cross-examination 
impede the Court in its attempts to effectively assess the evidence presented and (ii) where 
there is a paucity of facts, since the Court struggles to fulfil its Article 53 ICJ Statute 
obligation to satisfy itself the case is sound in fact and in law. 
 
It might be said that this much is uncontroversial.  As such, the thesis seeks to take the next 
step and explore whether we can envisage an approach that would allow the Court to more 
effectively conduct fact-finding.  In doing so, Chapter 3 takes advantage of the much-
discussed proliferation of international courts and tribunals and draws upon the substantial 
body of practice in this area.
631
 The ICJ itself has ‘shown increased openness to drawing 
insights from other international courts and tribunals’ in recent judgments and it is argued that 
the practice of other courts and tribunals suggests a number of procedural mechanisms that 
the Court could adopt in order to, in the words of Judge Donoghue in the recent Maritime 
Dispute (Peru v. Chile case), ‘…further enrich its practice and jurisprudence’.632 
 
By way of clarification, it should be stated that due to the fact that the ICJ deals exclusively 
with inter-state cases, the focus of Chapter 3 is likewise limited to inter-state adjudicatory 
bodies.  Of course, various other (less exclusively state-centric) areas of international law 
such as investment arbitration and human rights law regularly deal with interesting and 
important issues relating to fact-finding.  However, the decision was taken to focus 
exclusively on inter-state cases in order to ensure the most meaningful comparisons possible.  
For example, it was felt that drawing conclusions from a dispute between an individual and a 
state, such as a case before the European Court of Human Rights, would be of dubious utility 
as a comparison, owing to the fact that the courts seek to achieve such different goals, deal 
with parties of a diverse nature and apply significantly different law and procedure.    
                                                 
631
 For a thorough overview of the proliferation of international courts and tribunals see; Cesare P.R. Romano, ‘A 
Taxonomy of International Rule of Law Institutions’ 2 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 241 
632
 Maritime Dispute (Peru v Chile), 27 January 2014, Judgement, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Donoghue 
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Consequently, Chapter 3 is limited to a survey of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
adjudicative bodies and recent inter-state arbitrations.  As we will see in the following 
sections, this survey reveals that these adjudicatory bodies generally take a more proactive 
approach to fact-finding. Chapter 3 sets out the main noteworthy aspects of these more 
proactive tribunals, notably the most popular international tribunals in terms of case load at 
the moment.  Doing so is a necessary first step before Chapter 4 will ask whether the adoption 
of similarly proactive approach by the ICJ could potentially help to remedy some of the fact-
finding deficiencies the Court has been criticised for in recent times. 
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(i) Fact-Finding and Fact-Assessment before the Adjudicative Bodies of the WTO 
 
This section sets out to examine the handling of issues of fact-finding and fact-assessment in 
cases before the Panels and Appellate Body (AB) of the WTO, often referred to as 
representing ‘best practice’ in terms of international judicial fact-finding.633  A survey of the 
practice of the Panels indicates that they take a broadly reactive approach to evidence.  Panels 
have not fully utilised the relatively broad statutory fact-finding powers given to them by the 
DSU.  Instead, Panels have demonstrated a preference to rely on the facts as presented to 
them by the parties.  However, on the whole it can be said that Panels and the AB take play a 
more active fact-finding role than the ICJ.  This is so due to a number of interesting aspects of 
the Panels and AB’s approach to evidence that are examined infra in detail.  These include the 
use of expert evidence, a distinctive burden of proof and the drawing of adverse inferences 
amongst others. In examining these issues this section will first examine the situation before 
the Panels in Part 1 before moving on to consider issues of fact and law that have arisen 
before the AB in Part 2.  Part 3 examines a number of crosscutting evidentiary issues that 
apply to both Panels and the AB. 
 
(ii) Introduction 
 
The WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) was created during the Uruguay Round to deal 
with disputes that arose out of the operation of the Agreements in practice.  The DSB is made 
up of representatives of every WTO Member and governed by the Understanding on Rules 
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU).  The DSB is endowed with the 
competence to make rulings and recommendations, establish Panels, oversee the Appellate 
Body, adopt Panel and AB reports and even impose sanctions for non-compliance.
634
  Reports 
of Panels and the AB are adopted by the DSB automatically unless there is consensus to the 
contrary.
635
  
 
Under Article 3.2 DSU Panels and the AB are given the (relatively narrow) mandate of 
preserving the rights and obligations of WTO Members and of clarifying the provisions of the 
                                                 
633
 Pulp Mills Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma, para 16; Foster 28 
634
 See Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU regarding surveillance of implementation of recommendations and rulings 
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635
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Mark Wu (eds), The law of the World Trade Organization (WTO) : documents, cases & analysis (Series: 
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Agreements.
636
  This can be contrasted with the broader mandate of the ICJ which also 
contains the task of progressive development of international law.
637
  Any Member can 
request the establishment of a Panel to adjudicate on a dispute with another WTO Member 
under the Agreements.  The following section seeks to examine how the Panels of the WTO 
deal with issues of fact-finding in cases that have come before them.  In turning to consider 
how the Panels have dealt with issues of fact-finding and fact-assessment in cases that have 
come before them, it is necessary to first examine the relevant evidentiary practice and 
statutory provisions as set out in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).  The relevant 
AB statutory provisions will be examined in detail below in section 3.1.3. 
 
3.1. Part 1 - Evidence at the WTO - The Panels 
 
General Provisions    
 
As with the ICJ’s statutory fact-finding powers (examined in detail in Chapter 1), before the 
specific fact-finding provisions of the DSU can be examined, it is first of all necessary to 
consider a number of general provisions which apply in all cases before the WTO 
adjudicative bodies. 
 
(i) Article 12.7 DSU 
 
Article 12.7 DSU provides that ‘the report of a Panel shall set out the findings of fact, the 
applicability of relevant provisions and the basic rationale behind any findings and 
recommendations that it makes’.  In doing so, a duty to respect due process and provide 
logical and transparent reasoning behind both the establishment of the facts and the law is 
imposed upon Panels.  No Panel has yet been censured for failing to meet the Article 12.7 
duty although the AB has criticised Panels in the past for a lack of transparency such as in in 
US- Upland Cotton in which the Appellate Body stated that the Panel could have provided a 
more detailed explanation of its analysis of the complex facts.
638
  However it should be noted 
                                                 
636
 D. Steger, ‘Amicus Curiae: Participant or Friend? The WTO and NAFTA Experience’ The WTO and NAFTA 
Experience (October 26, 2011) European Integration and International Coorindation: Studies in Honour of 
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that there are limits to transparency such as considerations of confidentiality.
639
 
 
(ii) Article 11 DSU 
 
Article 11 DSU states that a Panel must ‘make an objective assessment of the matter before it, 
including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and 
conformity with the relevant covered agreements…’ As such, guided by the procedural 
provisions set out in Article 12 and Appendix 3
640
 each and every Panel is required to assess 
issues of both fact and law in cases that come before it in order to establish a solid factual 
basis upon which to make legal determinations.
641
 
 
What exactly does the Article 11 DSU duty to provide an objective assessment of the facts 
entail?  Although the wording of Article 11 could potentially be interpreted in such a way as 
to provide the Panels with a broad mandate to carry out fact-finding activities in order to 
make an objective assessment of the facts, in reality the AB has taken a limited view of the 
duty imposed on the Panels by Article 11.
642
  Rather than justifying a broad fact-finding 
mandate Article 11 has been interpreted to mean simply that the Panels are required to 
observe due process considerations of conclusion.
643
   
                                                 
639
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In other words, it would appear that the objective assessment of facts simply requires that the 
Panel treat the evidence placed before it by the parties objectively and reach a conclusion that 
logically follows from the evidence produced.
644
  Whilst the Panel has complete discretion to 
decide what evidence to focus on in particular in its analysis,
645
 it must always ensure that its 
ultimate decision is reasoned and grounded in the basis of the evidence submitted by the 
parties.
646
  The principle that decisions follow reasonably and logically from the evidence 
submitted by the parties is an important limit on the judicial function adjudicators and 
prevents complete unfettered judicial discretion.
647
  Nevertheless, whilst Article 11 has not 
been interpreted in such a manner as to justify a broad fact-finding duty placed on the Panels, 
there is little doubt that the Panels possess such powers, as set out in Article 13 DSU and there 
is an intimate relationship between these two provisions to which we shall return 
momentarily.
648
 
 
3.1.1 Evidentiary Practice Before Panels 
 
3.1.1.1. Evidence Put Before Panels by the Parties  
 
Panels rely to a great extent on the evidence provided by the parties themselves.
649
  In this 
regard, Panels take a reactive approach similar to that of the ICJ, as examined in Chapter 1.  
Whilst in the case of technical or scientific disputes, as we shall see infra, Panels have made 
regular use of individual experts in relation to technical issues, on the whole they establish the 
facts upon which their legal determinations are made on the basis of the evidence put before 
them by the parties without utilising the fact-finding powers the Panels possess.
650
  In this 
regard, by leaving fact-finding to the parties the Panel’s assessment of the facts becomes even 
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more important. As such, the general practice is to establish the facts by weighing the 
submissions of the parties to the dispute before the Panel on the basis of the evidential support 
for the legal positions defended by one party or the other.
651
   
 
3.1.1.2. Experts Appearing on Behalf of the Parties 
 
WTO Members appearing before Panels have the right to appoint their own experts to provide 
evidence in support of their case and they do so in practice. No rules of procedure govern the 
appointment of individual experts or regulate who can be appointed in terms of expertise.
652
  
It is perhaps obvious to state that the reports of Panel-appointed individual experts or expert 
review groups, an issue that we shall return to infra, will generally be accorded greater weight 
as a result of a perception of greater impartiality.
653
  Rightly or wrongly, experts appearing on 
behalf of the parties are often perceived as being ‘hired guns’ – willing to express their expert 
opinion on a matter in such a way that it most closely accords with the interests of the party 
by whom he or she has been appointed.
654
  It is for this reason that some have advocated that 
parties ought to endeavour to have the expert in question appointed by the Panel, rather than 
appointing the expert themselves.
655
 
 
However, whilst Panels may most often establish the facts on the basis of the information put 
before them by the parties, this evidence put before the Panels ‘should not be understood as 
the frontiers of truth’.656  Article 13 DSU is an acknowledgement that there may be 
information that will not be revealed to the Panels through the adversarial process, for one 
reason or another,
657
 and accordingly provides Panels with the authority to seek information 
on its own initiative. 
 
                                                 
651
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  It is likely that through cross-examination of the expert, any doubts regarding competence would be exposed, 
see Section 4.3.1. below Pauwelyn 334; further, Marceau & Hawkins have argued that a general practice can 
be described in this regard; see Marceau and Hawkins 502 
653
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3.1.2. WTO Fact-Finding Powers – Traversing the Frontiers of Truth 
 
3.1.2.1. Information that can be gathered by the Panel – Article 13 DSU 
 
Article 13(1) and (2) DSU provide Panels with the power to ‘seek information and technical 
advice from any individual or body which it deems appropriate’ and ‘seek information from 
any relevant source and…consult experts to obtain their opinion on certain aspects of the 
matter’ respectively.  Articles 12 and 13 DSU together represent an extremely broad fact-
finding power.
658
  This ‘significant investigative authority’659 is comprised of a number of 
constituent powers such as the power to ask questions, the power to request information and 
the power to mandate both individual experts and expert review groups.
660
  Each falls to be 
considered in turn. 
 
3.1.2.2. Power to ask questions 
 
Firstly, Article 13 DSU broadly provides for what could be called the ‘central prerogative’ of 
any international court or tribunal to participate in hearings before it.
 661
  In practical terms, 
like Article 49 of the Statute of the ICJ, Article 13 DSU confers on the Panel the ability to 
become actively involved in proceedings before it by conferring two distinct powers.  Firstly, 
Article 13 gives Panels the right to put questions to the parties in the course of proceedings in 
order to clarify any aspect of their factual or legal contentions.  As such, under Article 13, 
Panels have the power to ask questions of the parties appearing before them in the course of 
proceedings –and they regularly do so in practice.  Appendix 3, §8 of the DSU confirms that 
Article 13 DSU is a general judicial power to gather information that has not been put before 
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the Panel by the parties themselves, through asking questions, relevant to the case before it.
662
 
 
Further, Article 13 DSU regulates the obtaining of evidence by the Court itself as opposed to 
the evidence submitted by the parties as part of their pleadings.  In other words, Article 13 
sets out a general power of the Court to request further information.   
 
3.1.2.3. Power to Request Information Under 13 DSU 
 
Article 13 DSU formally grants Panels a broad power to request information from parties 
appearing before them.  Article 13 provides the Panels with an investigative power that is not 
limited to scientific or technical evidence or even to expert evidence.
663
  In fact, the Appellate 
Body has held that Panels can seek information from any relevant source it so chooses
664
 and 
that in principle there are no limits to this discretionary authority.
665
  In the words of the 
Appellate Body in Canada Aircraft, Panels are ‘vested with ample and extensive discretionary 
authority to determine when it needs information to resolve a dispute and what information it 
needs’.666  In practice Panels have made use of this broad fact-finding power contained in 
Article (1) and (2) although at times reference has merely been made to ‘Article 13’ generally. 
 
On the face of it, it would appear that the use of the term ‘should’ rather than ‘shall’ in Article 
13.1 gives requests an exhortatory character rather as opposed to binding legal effect.
667
  
Consequently, requests for information made of parties under Article would not compel WTO 
Members to place information before the Panel, and similarly individuals would be under no 
binding obligation to provide information (nor would Members themselves be obliged to 
require individuals provide the requested information).
668
 
 
However, despite the fact a straightforward reading of Article 13 does not appear to impose a 
binding legal obligation on the parties to comply with requests for information there has been 
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some suggestion in recent times that Article 13 nevertheless places a binding duty on parties.  
For instance, in Canada-Civilian Aircraft the AB stated that although the term ‘should’ has an 
exhortatory character, it could also ‘express a duty or obligation’.669  This is a significant 
innovation in terms of fact-finding and one that will be considered in greater detail in Chapter 
4 at 4.1. 
 
3.1.2.4. Power of Panels to Mandate Individual Experts and Expert Review Groups Under 
Article 13 DSU 
 
 
Panels have the power to seek expert assistance under Article 13 DSU whenever any issue of 
fact is raised that requires more extensive expertise than the Panel possesses.
670
  The 
procedure in general (which has been fairly consistent despite some criticism
671
) has been 
comprised of a three-stage process comprising; the selection of experts; written questions to 
experts, and meetings with experts.
672
  During the written submissions a list of questions is 
typically submitted to the experts who are asked to submit a written reply.  Whilst the parties 
are closely consulted at every stage of the process their consent is not required for the 
consultation of experts by the Panels.
673
   
 
The use of expert evidence is an important difference between the practice of the International 
Court of Justice and the Panels and AB of the WTO.  Whilst the practice of the ICJ until very 
recently has been that experts have appeared as counsel for one of the parties before the 
Court, in the context of the WTO, (individual) experts are mandated to provide evidence on a 
regular basis.  Expert evidence is information of such a specialised nature that, by virtue of its 
nature, cannot be effectively gathered or fully appreciated by the Panels themselves.  In other 
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words, it comes from a source that is more knowledgeable than the Panel.
674
 
 
It should be made clear at the outset that under Article 13 (1) and (2) DSU Panels have the 
option of consulting both individual experts and expert review groups.  The perception of 
both individual experts and expert review groups as a tool for the Panel to utilise in order to 
establish a sound factual basis upon which it can make legal determinations
675
 is supported by 
the Panel’s broad fact-assessment responsibility, the power to ‘appreciate the weight and 
persuasiveness of the evidence before it’.676  Panels are endowed with the power to establish 
and consult expert review groups to provide information on certain aspects of the case before 
it in the form of a written report submitted to the Panel.
677
   Importantly, these reports are of 
an advisory nature and do not bind the Panels but of course their findings necessarily carry 
great weight and could not be easily overlooked by any Panel.   
 
Notwithstanding the numerous reasons that go some way to explaining the preference of 
Panels to appoint individual experts, there are advantages to be gained from utilising the 
statutory power to establish expert review groups.  For instance, Panels, being made up of 
lawyers, jurists and other non-scientific professions are arguably not the best placed forum to 
effectively assess and weigh technical and scientific opinions of experts.
678
  For example, 
what may appear to be two contradictory positions taken by experts causing Panels to choose 
between one side or another, may not conflict in the eyes of the experts who could ultimately 
find a common position.
679
  For this reason, commentators have argued that that use of expert 
review groups would be preferable to ensure the most accurate possible outcome for WTO 
fact-finding.
680
  However, to date Panels have not established any such expert review groups. 
 
Instead, the clear preference of Panels has been to appoint individual experts under Article 
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13(1) DSU.
681
  The procedure regarding individual expert advice is not regulated by the 
Agreements or DSU but parties are normally given fair opportunity to comment upon the 
findings of the expert both orally at the time of the investigation and formally during the 
proceedings.
682  
  
 
3.1.2.5. Preference for Individual Experts as Opposed to Expert Review Groups 
 
It is suggested that a contributing factor to the preference for individual as opposed to expert 
review groups is the DSU App 4 paragraph 6 requirement that expert review groups produce a 
report of their findings.  It has been argued that this requirement could be perceived as 
‘transforming the expert group into a form of a “tribunal within a tribunal”.683  In other words, 
Panels may be afraid to tie their hands, both in terms of the flexibility of the process and 
limiting their discretion as to the ultimate factual determination. Although formally non-
binding under paragraph 6 of the DSU Appendix 4, expert review groups would be more 
difficult to distinguish or make light of when compared with the opinion of one expert 
alone.
684
  In contrast, the appointment of individual experts in the eyes of the Panel offer 
greater freedom to retain more control over the fact-finding process as well as making it 
easier for the Panel to ask specific questions of the expert in a way that would not be so easy 
in relation to an expert group.
685
  Considerations of cost and time also play a role and it has 
been suggested that it may be easily to simply call upon one exert rather than establishing an 
expert review group given the time constraints imposed by the DSU.
686
  These are important 
considerations that would be faced by the International Court of Justice were it to heed calls 
to make greater use of court-appointed experts. 
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3.1.2.6. Neglect of Expert Review Groups & the Discretionary Nature of the Article 13 Fact-
Finding Power 
 
In relation to the practice of exclusively consulting individual experts as opposed to expert 
review groups there has been some suggestion that the neglect of the Article 13(1) expert 
review group could be in contravention of the general rules of interpretation set out in the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that interpretation must give meaning and 
effect to all terms of a treaty.
687
  For instance in the Reformulated Gasoline case the Appellate 
Body stated that ‘[a]n interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing 
whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility’.688  As such, the failure to 
explain the preference for individual experts, it has been suggested, could mean that the WTO 
Agreements provisions on expert review groups will fall into desuetude, if they have not 
already done so.
689
 
 
However, it is argued that any suggestion to this effect is unlikely to succeed due to the broad 
nature of the discretion Panels enjoy regarding this investigatory power.  Panels generally 
enjoy broad discretion with regard to whether to carry out its own fact-finding and the means 
it chooses to apply when doing so.
690
  Panels and the AB have on a number of occasions 
referred to the broad discretion of Panels to decide on its own volition whether to seek 
information under Article 13(1) or (2) and that it is under no obligation to do so even if 
requested to do so by one or both of the parties.
691
  Ultimately, it is for the Panels to decide 
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whether or not to appoint experts, even if the parties so request. Not only are Panels under no 
obligation to appoint experts if so requested, they may appoint experts of their own accord, 
without the request of either party.
 692
   In any case, the decision to appoint experts, whether 
requested by the parties or not, ‘…sends out a signal that the Panel takes the issue seriously 
and wants to obtain as much information as possible (not just the facts pre-selected by the 
parties).’693 
 
3.1.2.7. Special Permanent Expert Bodies 
 
In addition to the Panel’s fact-finding powers, a number of expert bodies exist under the 
WTO dispute settlement system that operate in relation to specific WTO agreements.  Such 
bodies have not been widely used thus far but nevertheless form part of the WTO’s fact-
finding apparatus.   
 
Perhaps the most important example is Article 11.2 of the Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) which obliges Panels to seek expert 
advice although discretion remains as to what form this advice can take.  As such experts 
have been appointed in every SPS case except one to date.
694
  One option is resort to the 
Permanent Group of Experts established by the Committee on Subsidies under Article 24 of 
the SPS Agreement.  The Permanent Group, composed of five impartial experts, can provide 
a non-binding advisory opinion at the request of the Committee and, interestingly, submit a 
report to the Panel with the question of whether a measure is a prohibited study which must 
be accepted by the Panel – the Panel has no discretion in this respect.695  However, no Panel 
to date has ever requested the Permanent Group of Experts to submit a report, perhaps due to 
a desire to retain control of the proceedings.
696
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Further, the WTO SCM Committee under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM Agreement) can establish a Permanent Group of Experts.  The SCM 
Agreement provides that the Permanent Group of Experts must review the evidence and 
report its conclusions to the Panel.  However, no Panel has ever made use of this provision to 
establish a permanent expert group, perhaps due to the obligation to accept its conclusions 
‘without modification’.697 
 
Similarly, Article 18.2  (see Annex 2) of the Agreement on Customs Valuation provides for 
the establishment of the Technical Committee on Customs Valuation under the Customs Co-
operation Council.  Article 19.4 permits Panels to ‘request the Technical Committee to carry 
out an examination of any question requiring technical consideration’.  Again, the Committee 
must submit a report to the Panel but unlike the Subsidies Permanent Group of Experts the 
report is not binding on the Panel.  Despite this, no use has been made of the advisory 
procedure to date.
698
 
 
Such expert bodies have been said to represent an important symbol of the WTO’s 
commitment to factual accuracy and expert advice.
699
  The significance of permanent bodies 
as opposed to ad hoc made up of experts as opposed to jurists or politicians is important and 
means that they are neither judicial nor political and ‘epitomise the “expert group” called in to 
assist both the political and the judicial decision-maker.’700  Nevertheless, it can be said that 
their practical significance is limited. 
 
3.1.2.8. Annex V SCM Agreement Procedures for Developing Information Concerning Serious 
Prejudice  
 
One final fact-finding mechanism that is deserving of mention due to its potential utility is 
Annex V of the SCM Agreement.  Under this Annex, entitled ‘Procedures for Developing 
Information Concerning Serious Prejudice’ there exists an information-gathering procedure 
for disputes in which it is claimed that a Member has, through subsidization, caused adverse 
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effects in the form of serious prejudice to the interests of another Member.
701
  This process is 
initiated by the DSB and carried out by a member of the DSB known as a ‘facilitator’ within 
sixty days of the dispute being established and is intended to help the Panel elucidate the facts. 
 
Paragraphs 5 to 9 of Annex 5 set out the modalities of the process such as the time for 
completion of the process and how the Panel is to use such information.  The AB has 
described the rationale of the process: in imposing on parties a duty to cooperate in the 
gathering of information, along with sanctions for non-cooperation, Anenx V ‘seeks to ensure 
that a complaining party is afforded access to information critical to its claims, and that such 
Member is not hampered, in the subsequent panel proceedings, in the event of a responding 
party’s non-cooperation in an Annex V procedure.’702 
 
These sanctions for non-cooperation are set out in paragraph 7 of Annex 5 which specifically 
states that adverse inferences can be drawn from non-compliance whilst Paragraph 8 sets out 
that the facilitator will advise the Panel as to when a party is being uncooperative, although 
the final decision on this remains with the Panel.  Paragraph 9 sets out that the fact an Annex 
V procedure is being conducted does not prevent the panel seeking additional information 
under, for instance, Article 13 of the DSU.  The Annex 5 procedure also has in-built 
safeguards which prevent the procedure from being abused or turned into ‘an open-ended and 
unduly burdensome fishing expedition’.703  These safeguards include a time limit for the 
conduct of the procedure, the kind of information being sought being limited to ‘such 
information…as necessary to establish the existence and amount of subsidization…’ and a 
‘reasonableness’ requirement that would exclude any spurious requests. 
 
In the recent US-Large Civil Aircraft – 2nd Complaint case the European Communities (EC) 
repeatedly requested that the DSB initiate such a procedure under Annex V.
704
  The US 
objected to the establishment of such procedures, arguing that the establishment required 
consensus of the DSB (whilst the EC contended that a negative consensus was needed to stop 
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the establishment of this process).  The Panel in this case found against the EC.
705
  However, 
the AB found that the Panel had erred in this respect and concluded that the first sentence of 
paragraph 2 of Annex V requires the DSB to take action, and that such action must be taken 
automatically as soon as there is a request for the initiation of the procedure under Annex V.
706
  
Despite the AB taking this position, agreement remains elusive with the US maintaining that 
the processes must be initiated by the DSB and refusing to cooperate with the Annex 5 
process.  As such, this remains a contested procedure in one particular area of WTO law and 
one that has not to date been put to use.  However, at the very least it has the potential to act 
as a form of centralised evidence-gathering mechanism. 
 
3.1.2.9. Part 1 Summary – The Fact-Finding Approach of WTO Panels 
 
Panels possess broad statutory fact-finding powers but in practice have not made full use of 
them.  Instead, as a result of broad rules of admissibility, almost any piece of evidence is 
allowed to come before the Panels that the parties so choose.  As we have seen, the general 
tendency of the Panels has been to ‘ask the parties to produce the evidence and operate with 
rules concerning burden of proof, rather than to have investigations into facts led by the Court 
itself’.707  As such it can be said that the maxim da mihi factum, dabo tibi jus (give me the 
facts, I will give you the law) accurately governs the practice of the Panels, which it is 
suggested can be described as relatively reactive in terms of fact-finding.
708
  Nevertheless, 
there are a number of factors that mark the WTO adjudicative bodies out as more proactive in 
terms of fact-finding than the majority of other international courts and tribunals.  First, 
however, it is necessary to examine the treatment of facts by the Appellate Body. 
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3.1.3. Part 2 –Evidence before the Appellate Body – Article 17 DSU 
 
The Appellate Body is remarkable in international law as one of the few standing appellate 
bodies. Article 17.6 of the DSU states that the Appellate Body ‘shall be limited to issues of 
law covered in the Panel report and legal interpretations developed by the Panel’, formally 
restricting the AB to the evidence put before the Panels and precluding it from seeking 
additional evidence at the appeal stage.
709
   In so providing, the DSU established a system of 
appeal on points of law only, at least theoretically, that is in line with the majority of courts of 
appeal in domestic legal systems.
710
  Whilst the AB may receive expert evidence in some 
limited circumstances, it can only hear such evidence relating to purely legal issues, such as 
‘amici curiae strictly limited to legal arguments in support of the applicant’s legal position on 
the issues of law or legal interpretations in the Panel Report with respect to which the 
applicant has been granted leave to file a written brief’.711  Despite these formal restrictions, 
however, issues of fact-finding and fact-assessment frequently arise in cases before the AB, 
but how can this be?   
 
First of all, it is clear that the separation of fact from law is and has always been a fiendishly 
difficult endeavour.
712
  The AB itself has openly grappled with this distinction
713
 and a 
number of commentators have remarked upon the apparent futility of attempting to do so in 
the context of the AB.
714
  Instead, it will be shown that aside from this fundamental 
conceptual difficulty, issues of fact-finding and fact-assessment most often come into play 
before the AB as a result of two separate but related factors; (i) allegations that the Panel has 
failed in its Article 11 DSU duty to make an ‘objective assessment of the facts’ and (ii) the 
consequences of a finding of a failure in this regard and the practice of ‘completing the legal 
analysis’. 
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3.1.3.1. ‘Objective Assessment of the Facts’ 
 
Whether a Panel has failed to make an objective assessment of the facts under Article 11 DSU 
necessarily raises the question of whether the Article 11 duty to make an ‘objective 
assessment of the facts’ should be considered an ‘issue of law’ under Article 17.6 DSU.  The 
AB has taken two broadly different approaches to this issue.  In the Canada- Periodicals 
case,
715
 the Appellate Body stated that it must consider that firstly there has been a failure of 
the Panel to carry out the required objective analysis of the facts or to base its judgment in 
these facts or secondly incorrect reasoning by a Panel including illogical conclusions, or 
unreasonableness.
716
   In contrast, in the EC Hormones case
717
 the AB applied a more 
stringent standard,
718
 the Appellate Body highlighted ‘the deliberate disregard of, or refusal to 
consider, the evidence submitted to a Panel’ and ‘wilful distortion or misrepresentation of the 
evidence put before a Panel’ as incompatible with the Panel’s Article 11 duty to objectively 
assess the facts.
719
   
 
However, on the whole, the AB has generally given Panels extremely broad discretion when 
dealing with fact-assessment.
720
  As one commentator has put it, ‘[i]n its actual application of 
its task “as a trier of facts” the Panel must go very far astray before the Appellate Body will 
do anything about it’.721  Consequently, commentators have argued that the criteria as set out 
by the Appellate Body in EC Hormones is too strict in that it ‘requires an insight into the 
minds of the Panellists’ and as such the distinction between a Panel which has made a mistake 
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in assessing the facts and one which has made a deliberate mistake is too difficult to prove.
722
  
However, a finding of an error of law by the AB is not the end of the story in that the question 
of what consequences should flow from such a finding remain.   
 
3.1.3.2. ‘Completing the Legal Analysis’ 
 
Article 17.3 sets out that the AB has the power to ‘…uphold, modify or reverse the legal 
findings and conclusions of the Panel’ however the application of this provision, which 
happens at the end of the appeal procedure, has been problematic in practice.  Generally, in 
the case that the AB finds that an error of law has been made, the practice to date has been to 
proceed to ‘complete the legal analysis’ by applying a correct legal interpretation to the 
factual record.
723
  This practice is most likely the result of the AB not possessing any power to 
remand the case back to the Panel.  In doing so, the AB has in practice proceeded to apply the 
revised legal determination to the facts as they were established before the Panel, as if it were 
the first instance court.
724
  However, the judicially created practice of completing the analysis, 
in effect substituting the AB’s reasoning into the decision has not been uniformly applied in 
practice and as such has created somewhat disjointed case law.
725
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Pauwelyn 334 
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 Yang, Mercurio and Li 212; Jan Kuyper has suggested that the drafters of the DSB acknowledged that giving 
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Members; see Kuyper 310; Such remand authority exists in other international tribunals such as the EU Legal 
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3.1.4. Part 3 Notable Crosscutting Evidentiary Issues Affecting both Panels and the AB 
 
Finally, part 3 will focus on a number of crosscutting evidentiary issues that affect both the 
Panels and the AB.  These include the burden of proof, the prima facie case requirement and 
the practice of drawing adverse inferences and the use of amicus curiae briefs. 
 
3.1.4.1. Burden of Proof 
 
A significant crosscutting evidentiary aspect of the practice of the Panels and AB of the WTO 
that is of potential significance is the treatment of the burden of proof.  In contrast to the 
vague position on the burden of proof taken by the International Court of Justice, Panels and 
the AB have consciously attempted to address this issue in cases that have come before them.  
However, this increased attention has not brought about increased clarity, as we will be shown. 
 
Neither the GATT nor the DSU specifically address the issue of the burden of proof in cases 
before the dispute settlement apparatus of the WTO.  As such, this fundamentally important 
issue has been left to the Panels and AB themselves to clarify and develop in piecemeal 
fashion in cases that they are asked to deal with.  It is customary to separate the burden of 
proof into the two constituent functions it plays; the burden of production (determining which 
party must provide evidence in support of their legal claim) and the burden of persuasion 
(determining which party must satisfy the standard of proof).
726
  However, the extent to which 
the separation of the two constituent elements of the burden of proof is helpful is also 
debatable given the approach taken by the Panels and AB to which we now turn. 
 
3.1.4.2. The Burden of Production 
 
In international adjudication generally the approach to the burden of production would appear 
to be governed by the principle actori incumbit probatio (that the party making the legal claim 
bears the burden of proving it), whilst the party invoking an exception to a general rule bears 
the burden of justifying it (quincumque exceptio invokat ejusdem probare debet).
727
  However, 
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of Art XX GATT – US-Gasoline, pp 22-23, US-Wool, Shirts and Blouses, pp15-16, US-FSC (Article 21.5-EC) 
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whilst the notional burden may lie with the complaining party in cases in the context of the 
WTO, in reality both parties generally put forward evidence in support of their position 
simultaneously at the start of each case.
728
  As a result of the practice of simultaneous 
submission of evidence and the insistence by Panels and the AB that the requirement of 
making a prima facie case governs the operation of the burden of proof, it is not helpful to 
separate the burden of production from the burden of persuasion in this context.  Instead, an 
evaluation of the prima facie case requirement is needed in order to appreciate the operation 
of the burden of proof. 
 
3.1.4.3. The prima facie case requirement 
 
Consistent case law reveals that in cases that come before the dispute settlement apparatus of 
the WTO the complaining party is required to make a prima facie case that its claim is 
meritorious, after which it will fall to the defendant party to effectively refute this claim.
729
  
Failure to refute the claim made by the other party will result in the complaining party 
prevailing.
730
  Whilst this requirement may appear straightforward in theory, in practice the 
ambiguity surrounding what exactly constitutes a prima facie case has created much 
uncertainty.
731
  The case law reveals that there are a number of plausible ways that the prima 
facie case requirement could be construed. 
 
 
(i) Possibility 1: Prima Facie Case as a Threshold Requirement 
 
A number of Panel reports have suggested that the prima facie case requirement operates as a 
                                                                                                                                                        
§ 133 – see Section 4.2.2. The Evidentiary Burden Falls Heavier on the Complainant with Interpretation in 
ibid; These principles are applied in tandem with the dubio mitius principle that WTO Members’ actions 
should be presumed legitimate unless proven otherwise.  Of course all of this assumes that discerning 
between a general rule and an exception is a feasible task.  However, it has been shown that due to a number 
of factors, in WTO law this distinction is in fact extremely difficult to make; see Grando, at 151 onwards 
728
 Mavroidis 294 
729
 Grossman, Horn and Mavroidis 86 
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discharged’ Brown 96.  The AB in Korea- Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy 
Products, Appellate Body Reports, WT/DS98/AB/R, 14 December 1999 at para 145 stated that the Panel is 
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threshold for evidence that must be met before the case can proceed or before the Panel can 
examine the evidence placed before it.
732
  However, the main problem with conceiving the 
prima facie case requirement as a form of threshold that must be met after the submission of 
some preliminary evidence before the Panel will proceed with its determinations is that in 
practice Panels do not issue intermediate rulings stating whether party has met prima facie 
case or not.  As stated above, the WTO adjudicative bodies do not wait for the production of 
evidence from the claimant party before requesting evidence from the defendant party but 
instead asks for all the relevant evidence both parties wish to place before it.  From this point 
onwards, ‘the WTO judge is an umpire who will evaluate the evidence submitted to it by both 
parties’733 and will pronounce on whether a prima facie case has been sufficiently established 
only in the report and not before.
734
  The Panel is in no way required to make an explicit 
ruling on whether or not a prima facie case has been established before considering the 
evidence as a whole.
735
  In addition, the AB has in a number of cases held that Panels are 
entitled to consider not just information submitted by the complaining party but any 
information submitted at all and even information sought by the Panel itself in determining 
whether a prima facie case has been made.
736
  As such, parties are unable to amend their 
submissions in response to an intermediate pronouncement that a prima facie case has been 
made or not.  Instead, the exact level of evidence to be provided in order to make a prima 
facie case will be determined by the discretion of the Panel in the particular case, and the 
application of the prima facie standard beyond individual cases will be extremely limited.
737
   
 
As such, the conception of the prima facie case requirement as a form of evidentiary threshold 
does not square with the practice of not issuing an intermediate ruling on whether this case 
                                                 
732
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has been made or not,
738
 but would rather suggest that it is a standard of proof, which leads us 
on to the second conception of the prima facie case requirement. 
 
(ii) Possibility 2: Prima Facie Case as Initial Standard of Proof (presumption that if met shifts 
burden) 
 
The second conception of the prima facie case requirement that is plausible from a reading of 
the case law is that it represents a presumption which if raised by the claimant party shifts the 
burden of proof to the defendant party.  In this sense the requirement would represent the 
initial standard of proof.
739
  Such conceptions of a real shift in the burden of proof once a 
prima facie case has been made in effect means that ‘a prima facie case is in fact the standard 
of proof that the claimant must meet in order to discharge the burden of proof’, having the 
same effect as a rebuttable presumption of law.
740
  Such a conception finds support in the 
literature
741
 however it is suggested that it is also distinctly problematic.   
 
To elaborate, equating the burden of proof with the concept of raising a presumption does not 
shed any further light on the issue: presumptions are at least equally conceptually unclear and 
give no guidance as to the degree of persuasion needed in order to find that a presumption has 
been rebutted.
742
  Furthermore, conceiving of the prima facie case as the initial standard of 
proof sets the bar very low in terms of the quantum of proof required of the claimant party.  
This is so since, after a mere prima facie case is established by the claimant party, its evidence 
is taken as a given whilst the burden of proof shifts to the defendant party to conclusively 
rebut.  Failure to do so will result in the loss of the case for the defendant ‘even though the 
circumstances may be such that if a holistic examination of all the evidence on the record 
were to be conducted, the adjudicator would find that there was not enough evidence to 
                                                 
738
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support…’ the submission of the claimant.743  Such a conception, accepting the claim of a 
party based on a prima facie case rather than the preponderance of evidence or some other 
higher standard would clearly be weighted in favour of the claiming party.
744
 
 
(iii) Possibility 3: Prima Facie Case as the Final Standard of Proof (no shift in burden) 
 
The third possible conception is that the prima facie case requirement represents the final 
standard of proof that must be met by the claiming party.  In a number of cases, when 
considering all the evidence submitted to it and sought by the Panel itself, there has been 
some suggestion that by either establishing or failing to establish a prima facie case is in some 
way or another the final determinative standard of proof.
745
   
 
Such pronouncements that appear to treat the establishment of a prima facie case after 
considering all the evidence together as the standard of proof beg the question; ‘…why use 
the cryptic language of “establishing a prima facie case”, instead of just describing it as 
“reaching the required standard of proof” (which is the normal way of describing it in most 
legal systems)?’746  Again, as with equating the prima facie case requirement with the initial 
standard of proof that shifts the burden to the defendant party, if one conceives the 
requirement as the final determinative standard of proof, the main issue is that it creates a bias 
in favour of the claimant party.
 747
  As such, conceiving of the prima facie case as the 
determinative standard of proof creates a situation whereby defendant parties have a much 
more onerous task than claimants which carries with it its own problems such as the 
possibility of encouraging spurious claims.  
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(iv) Most Likely Conception: Prima Facie as Merely Indicating a Tactical Burden 
 
A lack of conceptual clarity persists to this day and is evident in the most recent case law.
748
   
Having examined three possible conceptions of the prima facie case requirement, it is argued 
that, ultimately, none of them satisfactorily describes the operation of the burden of proof in 
the case law.  As has been pointed out, in practice Panels do not actively shift the burden of 
proof from one party to the other as if the parties were opponents in a tennis match.
 749
  Indeed, 
the shifting of the burden of proof has no basis in the text of the DSU, and, in representing an 
exception to the approach taken to the burden of proof by the clear majority of other 
international courts and tribunals, such explicit provision in the DSU might have been 
warranted. The traditional approach in international adjudication of actori incumbit probatio, 
that the party alleging the claim bears the burden of providing adequate evidence to back up 
its claim, is a general position that provides a degree of clarity to parties considering 
international litigation. 
 
It is difficult to provide any further clarity on this issue, other than to say that it is a concept 
that introduces an element of needless complexity into WTO adjudication, that it is a form of 
legal MacGuffin.
750
 Whilst it may represent to some extent the very least that is required from 
the claimant party in terms of evidence, it is most likely to refer to the when the tactical 
burden shifts in procedural terms.  Although the requirement may take on greater relevance in 
cases where one party refuses to submit evidence, in general the requirement ‘will most likely 
never be of any practical importance for as long as the WTO proceedings continue to have the 
same form as today’.751  This use of this conception of the prima facie case requirement has 
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been confirmed in recent case law.
752
  
 
3.1.4.4. Summary – An Unclear Burden of Proof 
 
To date the International Court of Justice has somewhat shied away from making explicit 
statements on the burden and standard of proof in cases that have come before it.  Whilst 
increasingly complex cases come before the Court may call for a clearer articulation of the 
burden of proof and related issues, it is suggested that the practice of the adjudicative bodies 
of the WTO should be a somewhat cautionary tale for the Court.  The handling of the prima 
facie case requirement has brought an element of uncertainty to proceedings that are 
otherwise more fact-focussed and forward-looking than those in operation before the Court.  
As such, any developments in this direction ought to be resisted.  
 
 
3.2. Adverse Inferences 
 
A further notable aspect of the practice of the WTO Panels and AB is the practice of drawing 
adverse inferences from the refusal of a party to provide information requested of it by the 
other parties or that is generally relevant to the legal issues in consideration before the Panel – 
something that the ICJ has to date refrained from doing.
753
  For example, in Argentina-
Footwear the Panel drew an adverse inference from Argentina’s refusal to provide 
information requested by the United States, stating this this refusal taken together with the 
evidence presented by the US favoured their position.
754
   The sole reference to adverse 
inferences in the WTO Agreements is Article 7 of the SCM Agreement, paragraph 7, Annex 5 
‘[i]n making its determination, the Panel should draw adverse inferences from instances of 
non-cooperation by any person involved in the information gathering process’. 
 
The power to draw adverse inferences more generally flows from the duty of collaboration 
found in international adjudication generally which requires that states cooperate in good faith 
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in providing the Panel with the required evidence.
755
  In relation to the duty of collaboration, 
although the parties are free to submit or not submit any piece of evidence they so choose, the 
Appellate Body has in the past urged that parties be ‘fully forthcoming from the very 
beginning both as to the claims involved in the dispute and as to the facts relating to those 
claims…Claims must be stated clearly.  Facts must be disclosed freely.’756  This is an issue 
considered in much greater detail in Chapter 4. 
 
The practice of drawing adverse inferences is simply another way to aid the Panels in 
determining the facts through flushing out the facts it needs that have not been placed before 
them by the parties themselves,
757
 or in the words of one commentator ‘…the real value of an 
adverse inference lies in its capacity to induce cooperation rather than the inference itself’.758  
The Panel in US-Wheat Gluten demonstrated that the power to draw adverse inferences is 
discretionary by refusing to do so despite being requested to do so, owing to the fact it felt the 
factual record it possessed was sufficient to fulfil its Article 11 DSU duty.
759
 
 
There are drawbacks to the practice of drawing adverse inferences such as the fact that where 
neither the Panel nor the other party are aware of information that has been withheld from the 
Panel, the power is rendered useless.
760
  Nonetheless, the tendency for governments to ignore 
requests for information in cases before Panels,
761 
coupled with the uncertain nature of the 
power to compel the production of evidence suggest that the practice of drawing adverse 
inferences from a failure to comply with requests for information made by other parties can 
potentially play an important role in fact-finding before the Panels.
762
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3.1.5. Amicus Curiae Briefs 
 
The submission of amicus curiae briefs by individuals or bodies not party to the case, a 
fixture of adjudication both domestic and international to a greater or lesser extent,
763
 are a 
further interesting case in the context of WTO dispute settlement.  Whilst their use has been 
somewhat limited before the International Court of Justice, in the context of the WTO this has 
been a much debated and to this day reminds an unresolved issue.   
 
Amicus curiae briefs are potentially a useful source of additional information.
764
  Essentially, 
their value to fact-finding and evidence lies in their bringing fresh information before a Panel 
or the AB, or in the words of the AB itself, their ‘contribution to the resolution of [the] dispute 
that is not likely to be repetitive of what has been already submitted by a party or third 
party’.765  The value of submitting briefs for the amici is varied but includes goals such as 
clarification of a particular aspect of the law or bringing to the court’s attention (and to the 
attention of the wider world, as the case may be) a particular issue for which the amici are 
champions.
766
 
 
Numerous amicus curiae briefs have been, and continue to be, submitted to both the Panels 
and AB of the WTO despite the fact the Dispute Settlement Understanding makes no 
reference to such a possibility.  The issue of amicus curiae briefs is one that has persisted in 
causing legal controversy and uncertainty.  The practice of the Panels and AB shows that 
unsolicited briefs are no longer rejected outright as having no legal basis but are not often 
taken into account by Panels.
767
  Although Panels and AB continue to receive amicus curiae 
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briefs,
768
 and despite the fact that some Members have advocated the use of such briefs in 
relation to both factual and legal issues,
769
 to this day the issue of unsolicited amici curiae 
briefs remains an unanswered question for the WTO dispute settlement system.
770
  The 
situation has been described by Steger as a ‘stand-off’ between the adjudicative organ of the 
WTO and the Membership itself – with one side keen to gain every advantage they can to 
establish a full factual record and the other concerned about a loosening of their grip on the 
dispute settlement process.  Consequently it has been argued that there is a clear need for 
procedural regulation of this issue as the current uncertainty suits neither the Members, the 
amici nor indeed the adjudicative body.
771
  Ultimately it can be said that the practical 
influence of such briefs is limited. 
 
3.1.6. Implications: the Autonomy of the Panel’s Fact-Finding Powers  
 
Taken together, potential reliance on amici curiae briefs and the provision of evidence by 
Panel-appointed experts introduces the possibility of arguments being made to the Panels that 
are distinct from those put forward by the parties themselves.  This possibility, one that has 
rarely arisen before the International Court of Justice, begs the question of whether Panels can 
rely upon or take into account arguments not made by the parties themselves.   
 
This issue is especially pertinent with regard to amicus curiae briefs which, as we have seen, 
have no solid legal basis in the Agreements or DSU.  As such, it has been argued that these 
briefs can be relied upon only to the extent that they speak to the arguments made by the 
parties themselves.  Such consideration of the limitations that should be imposed on the use of 
such evidence goes to the heart of the issue of due process before Panels and the AB.
772
  Due 
process considerations inform arguments that information put before the Panels and AB 
should not seek to make arguments on behalf of one of the parties and that there should be 
                                                                                                                                                        
on Angels, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland, Appellate Body 
Report, WT/DS122/AB/R – in which the AB received amicus curiae brief from Consuming Industries Trade 
Action Coalition (CITAC) but did not accept it as it ‘did not find the brief filed by CITAC relevant to its task’, 
para 78; Yang, Mercurio and Li 180 
768
 Steger has described the panels as being inundated with submissions from NGOs - Steger 439 
769
 In particular the US has been an outspoken supporter of the use of amicus briefs; see Yang, Mercurio and Li 
180 
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 Mavroidis 15 
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 An argument echoed by Steger 439 
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 Mavroidis 14; By the same token, Mavroidis points out that the DSU does not mention due process but that 
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Members, in their submissions, whenever they raise a procedural concern, almost always refer to due process’ 
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sufficient opportunity for the parties to reply to any information contained within them.
773
  It 
was such due process concerns that led the AB to find that the Panel had deprived Chile of a 
‘fair right of response’ by relying on an argument not made by Argentina in the case.774 
 
This issue has arisen in the case law, such as in Japan-Varietals where there was discussion of 
whether an expert invited to the Panel raising an issue that had not been raised by the 
complaining party could form party of the AB’s ratio in its decision.775  The AB stated that: 
 
‘A Panel is entitled to seek information and advice from experts and from any other 
relevant source it chooses, pursuant to Article 13 of the DSU and, in an SPS case, 
Article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement, to help it to understand and evaluate the evidence 
submitted and the arguments made by the parties but not to make the case for a 
complaining party’.776   
 
The Appellate Body in Canada- Aircraft clarified its earlier case law in Japan- Varietals
777
 
by stating that the Panel should not base its decision in an argument that the complaining 
party ‘had not even alleged or argued before the Panel, let alone something on which [it] had 
submitted any evidence’.778  However, the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones again had to 
address this issue as it introduced itself an additional factual argument under the 
complainant’s claim of SPS Article 5.5.779  This has introduced doubt into the DSB’s finding 
that it should not rely on an argument not made by the parties.   
 
At this stage it is important to emphasise the distinction between issues of law and fact.  
Whilst Panels are entitled to conduct their own fact-finding and bring evidence that had not 
been submitted by the parties, they are not able to make legal determinations on claims not 
related to those made by the parties themselves.  This issue is one of ‘drawing the line 
                                                 
773
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between the Panel’s duty under DSU Article 11 and the obligation of parties to adduce 
evidence in support of their case, and is a line that may not be drawn easily’.780 
 
To elaborate, it is clear that by virtue of the fact-finding power given to Panels in Article 13 
DSU discussed above, they should not consider themselves bound to only consider the facts 
submitted by the parties themselves.
781
  Indeed, the Panel’s Article 11 DSU duty to make an 
objective assessment of the facts refers to ‘the facts of the case’ and not the facts as submitted 
by the parties.
782
  Consequently, Pauwelyn argues that restricting the Panel’s attention only to 
those facts submitted by the parties ‘…unduly restricts the inquisitorial role of WTO Panels as 
international tribunals and constitutes an unwarranted transplantation of common law 
principles into the WTO process.’783 
 
However, the situation is different in terms of the legal arguments made.  The discretion of 
the Panel in this respect is fettered by considerations of due process, the operation of the 
principle of non ultra petita and the terms of the reference itself.
784
  For instance, in Chile-
Price Band System the AB held that Panel had ‘acted ultra petita and inconsistently’ with 
Article 11 DSU duty when it determined a claim under second sentence of Article II:1 (b) of 
the GATT rather than the first sentence, as the parties had contested.
 785
  Grando argues that 
‘non ultra petita rule is a function not only of the language of Articles 7.1, 6.2, and 11 of the 
DSU but also of the due process requirement of meaningful participation; a Panel must not 
rule on a claim which the parties did not have a meaningful opportunity to address.’786  A 
similar argument has been made by Mavroidis who has state that, whilst Panels and the AB 
may adopt their own legal reasoning they cannot ‘make the claim in the place of the party 
carrying the burden of proof’ and argues that ‘…the independent legal reasoning of the WTO 
adjudicating bodies will have to be subordinated to the claims as presented by the parties: if 
they agree with what is pleaded, they will accept the claim; if they disagree, they will reject 
without however being in a position to move to legal standards not pleaded by the parties to a 
                                                 
780
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particular dispute’.787  In sum, then, Panels and the AB must be mindful of the fact that whilst 
of potentially crucial importance to the establishment of the factual record, there are a number 
of limitations on their power to consider evidence brought before them through the use of 
amicus curiae briefs or expert evidence.   
 
 
3.1.7. WTO Concluding Remarks 
 
This brief survey of the operation of the issues of fact-finding and fact-assessment reveals a 
number of aspects of WTO dispute settlement that are innovative and potentially influential 
outside the confines of the WTO. For instance, the WTO dispute settlement bodies have 
interpreted their Article 13 DSU power to request information in a manner that allows it to 
almost compel the production of evidence from parties (and the drawing of adverse inferences 
from any failure to do so).  Furthermore, there is a much greater willingness to appoint 
experts from the Panels and a practice of considering amicus curiae briefs from third parties.   
Although there are a number of less-than-satisfactory elements of WTO fact-finding and fact-
assessment such as an unclear burden of proof, on the whole it can be said that there is much 
that is innovative and could potentially influence older courts and tribunals.  A selection of 
these innovative and proactive fact-finding practices will be examined in Chapter 4.   
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
787
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3.2. Fact-Finding and Fact-Assessment in Recent Inter-State Arbitrations 
 
This section sets out to examine the handling of issues of fact-finding and fact-assessment in a 
number of recent inter-state arbitrations conducted under the auspices of the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration (PCA).
788
  Inter-state arbitration as means of dispute settlement has experienced 
somewhat of a renaissance in recent times.
789
  In fact, there are now more pending inter-state 
arbitrations than cases in the docket of the ICJ.
790
  Given the increasing use being made of 
inter-state arbitration, this section will attempt to discern whether any broad approach to fact-
finding issues can be identified from the work of three prominent inter-state arbitrations 
conducted in the last few years; the Guyana/Suriname, Abyei and Kishengana arbitrations.
791
  
The selection of these arbitral disputes is based on the fact they are timely, high profile and, 
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Law (1 edn, Springer, Asser Press 2013) 450 
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unlike all arbitrations, completely available to the public.  Furthermore, it is significant that 
these are inter-state arbitrations since disputes before the ICJ are similarly limited to states 
parties.  So-called ‘mixed arbitrations’ (involving states and non-state actors) it is suggested 
are of more limited value in terms of providing guidance for procedural improvements that 
the purely state-centric ICJ could implement.  
 
The recent revitalisation of inter-state arbitration can be attributed to two main factors.
792
  The 
first is the dispute settlement procedure set out in Annex VII of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
793
 and the second is the adoption of the series 
of Optional Procedural Rules as part of the New Directions Initiative of the PCA.
794
  Indeed, 
of the three arbitrations examined in this section, the Abyei arbitration utilises a particular set 
of Optional PCA Rules and the Guyana/Suriname arbitration is a result of a dispute arising 
under UNCLOS.
795
  As such, they serve as clear examples of how the PCA is increasingly 
relevant in contemporary international dispute settlement. 
 
To elaborate on the first rejuvenating factor, Article 287(1) UNCLOS provides that states may 
make a declaration stipulating their preferred means of settling any dispute that arises under 
the Convention, including ad hoc arbitration in accordance with Annex VII UNCLOS.  In 
addition to the fact that arbitration is looked upon favourably by states as providing a degree 
of flexibility (in relation to the selection of arbitrators, for example),
796
 Article 287(5) 
provides that arbitration is the default means of settling disputes where parties fail to agree to 
any alternative means.  As such, it can be said that the UNCLOS system of dispute settlement 
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is somewhat predisposed to arbitration.   
 
In relation to the second factor contributing to the revitalisation of the PCA, the Optional 
Procedural Rules have their roots in the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law Rules (UNCITRAL Rules).
797
  Following the codification of the arbitration procedure in 
The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 a number of high profile arbitrations had taken 
place before the procedure fell in to decades of desuetude.
798
  In seeking to reverse the 
fortunes of the PCA, the UNCITRAL Rules were a major influence in the drafting of the 
Optional Rules in 1992 following the New Directions initiative.
799
  The Working Group opted 
to give (a revised version of) the UNICTRAL Rules a central place in the PCA system due to 
their perceived flexibility and ability to apply to both states and non-state parties.
800
  The 
success of the UNCITRAL Rules and resulting significant influence on the revitalisation of 
the PCA is also bound up with the operation of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal which 
significantly increased awareness of them.
801
 
 
3.2.1. The Influence of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal 
 
Whilst the Iran-US Claims Tribunal is not an inter-state arbitral body, its operation to at least 
some extent influenced the adoption of the series of Optional Procedural PCA Rules and has 
in turn logically influenced the way that modern inter-state arbitrations operate.  The Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal is a product of the diplomatic crisis between the US and Iran that 
encompassed the Hostages crisis, the imposition of economic sanctions on Iran and the 
subsequent judgment by the ICJ that Iran had breached its international obligations towards 
the diplomatic and consular staff taken hostage.
802
  The Claims Settlement Declaration, part of 
the Algiers Accords designed to bring the diplomatic crisis to an end, provides for the 
establishment of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, its competence, composition and rules of 
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procedure.   
 
The Algiers Accords stipulated that the Iran-US Claims Tribunal would follow the 
UNCITRAL Rules, approved by the General Assembly only a few years before in 1976, with 
necessary amendments since these Rules were designed for ad hoc commercial arbitration 
between only two private parties.
803
  Crucially, in terms of fact-finding, the UNCITRAL 
Rules are significant for a number of reasons.  For instance, particularly noteworthy is the fact 
that the Rules provide for a more proactive role for the tribunal, at least compared to the 
existing inter-state court, the ICJ.  
 
3.2.1. (i) The Extent to Which the Iran-US Claims Tribunal Takes an Active Role in 
Investigating Facts 
 
From its early days the Tribunal has taken an active role in investigating the facts.
804
  
Generally in cases where the Tribunal feels the information put before it by the parties 
themselves is not adequate to establish the facts of the case it issues orders informing the 
parties of what information the Tribunal feels it lacks.
805
  Such orders are often made after 
pre-hearing conferences with the parties.  Such pre-hearing conferences are a notable aspect 
of the Tribunal’s approach to fact-finding and have been described as an effective tool in 
alerting the Tribunal to what documents it requires to be produced.
806
  As practice evolved, 
‘the Tribunal has continued to be quite activist and to issue detailed orders requiring parties to 
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submit specifically described evidence’.807 
 
3.2.1. (ii) Production of documents – Article 24(3) 
 
The most significant fact-finding provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal is Article 24(3) (based on the corresponding UNCITRAL provision), which states 
that: 
 
‘[a]t any time during the arbitral proceedings the arbitral tribunal may require the 
parties to produce documents, exhibits or other evidence within such a period of time 
as the tribunal shall determine’.808   
 
Article 24 is significant in providing a binding power of discovery in an international 
arbitration involving a sovereign state.
809
  A number of caveats must be added, however.  
Firstly, the standard of discovery at the Iran-US Claims Tribunal is much stricter compared to 
the traditional common law form of discovery and the Tribunal retains discretion as to 
whether or not it is granted.
810
  Secondly, the Tribunal has developed a number of safeguards 
against so-called ‘fishing requests’ whereby one party would speculatively request a broad 
category of information from the other, without specifically identifying the evidence or how it 
will aid the resolution of the dispute, but merely seeks to use the procedure as a way to 
procure evidence to bolster its own case.  In guarding against such requests, the practice 
emerged that the request made is firstly ‘necessary’,811 ‘warranted’, or ‘appropriate’812 and 
that secondly, the party had already taken ‘all reasonable steps’ to obtain the requested 
information.
813
   
 
3.2.1. (iii) Enforcement of Production Orders 
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Once the Tribunal is satisfied that the request for disclosure is necessary, warranted or 
appropriate and that the requesting party has already taken ‘all reasonable steps’ to obtain the 
information, the Tribunal hands down a production order for disclosure.  McCabe has 
estimated only half are complied with.
814
  UNCITRAL Rules provide no sanctions for non-
compliance stating only in Article 28(3) that, as noted above, ‘the arbitral tribunal may make 
the award on the evidence before it’ – however this may in some cases benefit the party 
withholding the information since it can keep damaging evidence from coming before the 
Tribunal.  As such, the possibility of drawing adverse inferences from any failure to produce 
requested information has been described as ‘most effective response to a party’s failure to 
comply with a discovery order…’815 
 
3.2.1. (iv) Adverse Inferences 
 
Generally, in situations where a party has access to information relevant for the case, the 
Tribunal is authorised to draw adverse inferences from the failure of that party to disclose 
it.
816
  And in practice the Tribunal has used its Article 24(3) power to draw adverse inferences 
from the failure of a party to comply with a request for evidence.
817
  However generally the 
Tribunal has been reluctant to draw adverse inferences in practice often because one of the 
main prerequisites to drawing adverse inferences, ‘namely showing that the missing 
documents are in the possession of the opposing party’ has not been established.818  Further 
even where the prerequisite is established, the Tribunal was remarkably reluctant to draw 
adverse inferences in cases where it arguably could have.
819
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3.2.1. (v) The Use of Experts 
 
Experts have been appointed both by the parties and by the Tribunal itself.  Brower has 
described the use of experts appointed by the parties as ‘invaluable’ to the Tribunal in relation 
to factually complex issues - not just scientific issues - but also in relation to property 
valuation and assessing accounting standards for example.
820
  Whilst parties regularly appoint 
experts, the Tribunal’s power to appoint its own experts at the request of the parties or on its 
own initiative under Article 27 has been used sparingly.
 821
  Since parties regularly appoint 
experts it is sometimes not necessary for the Tribunal to appoint its own.  And even in those 
rare cases where the Tribunal does so, it will most often only do so after the parties own 
witnesses have been heard.  However, it is nonetheless significant that the Tribunal appointed 
experts itself at all – something the ICJ has only done in a small number of cases.822 
 
3.2.1. (vi) The Iran-US Claims Tribunal in the Round 
 
On the whole the Iran-US Claims Tribunal takes a generally proactive approach to fact-
finding, ‘actively seeking to elucidate the facts, rather than simply evaluating what the parties 
put before it’.823  But what is the significance of this brief summary of the practice of the Iran-
US Claims Tribunal to our consideration of recent inter-state arbitrations?  It is argued that the 
practice of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, operating under a modified version of the 
UNCITRAL Rules that influenced the revitalisation of the PCA, highlights some of the most 
significant aspects of modern inter-state arbitration that we will see recur when considering 
the following arbitrations.   
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to draw adverse inferences from failure to cooperate fully with the Tribunal in the establishment of the 
factual record; See William J. Levitt and Islamic Republic of Iran, The Tribunal was openly critical, stating 
‘Their often contradictory and evasive explanations suggest deliberate non-compliance rather than an 
inability to produce [the documents]’, but stopped short of explicitly drawing adverse inferences, stating it 
would assess the case in the light of the respondent’s behaviour in non-production; Award No. 520-210-3 (29 
Aug 1991) reprinted in Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 145 at 165; See also; Dissenting Opinion of Richard. C. 
Allison. At 190; ‘When a party in possession of evidence that is clearly relevant and would be of assistance 
to the Tribunal opts to make a selective presentation apparently designed not to illuminate the facts but only 
to support its own arguments, that party assumes the risk that the Tribunal will reach its own conclusions as 
to the content of the material withheld’ 
820
 See Chas. . Main International, Inc. and Kluzestan Water and Power Authority, Interlocutory Award No. ITL-, 
23-120-2 (27 July 1983) reprinted in 3 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep 156, 164-67; See ibid 
821
 Ibid, FN 949 for extensive case law examples 
822
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823
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To reiterate, whilst the Iran-US Claims Tribunal is not an inter-state arbitral body, its 
operation to at least some extent influenced the adoption of the series of Optional Procedural 
PCA Rules and has in turn logically influenced the way that modern inter-state arbitrations 
operate.  The noteworthy fact-finding aspects of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal such as its 
binding power of discovery, use of adverse inferences, its generally proactive approach 
regarding pre-hearing conferences, asking questions, requesting information and appointing 
experts are all innovative when compared to the approach of the ICJ at this time, and to a 
large extent this remains the case even today.  A similarly more proactive approach to fact-
finding is evident in the following inter-state arbitrations to which we now turn our attention. 
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Recent Inter-State Arbitrations – Fact-Finding Provisions 
 
First, a preliminary word on the statutory basis for the fact-finding powers that modern inter-
state arbitrations possess.  Whilst the arbitral Panel most commonly has the discretion to 
adopt its own rules of procedure (through consultation with the parties),
824
 in the end the rules 
of procedure relating to fact-finding are often similar.   Arbitrations constituted under Annex 
VII of UNCLOS such as Guyana/Suriname most often adopt Rules of Procedure based on the 
PCA Optional Rules
825
 meaning that there is a degree of commonality between such 
arbitrations and those brought on an ad hoc basis that opt to base their Rules of Procedure on 
the PCA Optional Rules also, such as the Abyei Arbitration.  To elaborate, the 2012 PCA 
Rules of Procedure, Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two States and 
Optional Rules for Arbitrating disputes between Two Parties of which Only One Is a State all 
contain broadly similar provisions, based on the corresponding UNCITRAL provisions, to the 
effect that the Arbitral Tribunal may at ay time call on the parties to produce any information 
it requires and may draw adverse inferences for any failure to do so.
826
  The vast majority of 
modern inter-state arbitrations adopt Rules of Procedure containing such provisions or slight 
variations thereof.   
 
  
                                                 
824
 See Article 5 Annex VII UNCLOS 
825
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826
 See Article 27(3) PCA Arbitration Rules 2012, Article 24(3) PCA Optional Rules for Arbitrating a Dispute 
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Which Only One is a State, Article 11(2) Rules of Procedure Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Pursuant to Article 
287, and in Accordance with Annex VII, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, in the 
Matter of Arbitration Between: Guyana and Suriname, Award, 17 September 2007, Article 12(2) Rules of 
Procedure MOX Plant Arbitration, Article 24(3) UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, General Assembly 
Resolution 31/98 1976 or Article 27(3) UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010 
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3.2.2. Guyana/Suriname 
 
The recent Guyana/Suriname arbitration has a number of notable fact-finding elements 
including the appointment of experts and a Tribunal actively engaging with a dispute over 
disclosure of documents.  
 
3.2.2. (i) Introduction 
 
On 24 February 2004 Guyana initiated arbitration proceedings with Suriname concerning the 
delimitation of their maritime boundary, and related alleged breaches of international law by 
Suriname in disputed maritime territory.  Guyana brought proceedings under Articles 286 and 
287 of UNCLOS and in accordance with Annex VII of the Convention.
827
  Neither party had 
made a declaration regarding their preferred method of dispute settlement under Article 
287(1).  In its Notification of Claim, Guyana stated that both parties had accepted arbitration 
in accordance with Annex VII through Article 287(3) of UNCLOS. The Tribunal adopted its 
rules of procedure with the consent of the parties on 30 July 2004.   
 
3.2.2. (ii) Hydrographic Expert 
 
By Order No. 6 of 27 November 2006, after consultation with the parties, the Tribunal 
appointed an expert, more specifically a hydrographer, to assist it in the course of proceedings 
‘in the drawing and explanation of the maritime boundary line or lines in a technically precise 
manner’.828  The hydrographer appointed by the Tribunal played a notably active part in the 
proceedings requesting information he felt necessary to effectively carry out his task.
829
  In 
addition, through Order No. 8 the hydrographer undertook a site visit to inspect the position 
                                                 
827
 Under the dispute settlement regime of UNCLOS, Art 279 provides that parties are to settle disputes 
peacefully in accordance with Art 2(3) UN Charter.  Art 280 sets out that there is nothing to prevent states 
from settling disputes by their own means.  Art 280(1) contains an obligation to proceed to exchange of 
views once dispute arises.  Art 281 provides that where parties have chosen preferred means of dispute 
settlement then this applies.  Only when no agreement that further procedure is needed.  If no agreement is 
reached then Section 2 of Part XV ‘Compulsory Procedures Entailing Binding Decisions’ comes into play 
states can make declaration choosing ITLOS, ICJ, arbitral tribunal or special arbitral tribunal as preferred 
means under Art 287.  Where no agreement is met then arbitration is initiated to find agreement 
828
 3.1. Order No. 6; Guyana v Suriname Arbitration, para 108, Order No. 6 
829
 Namely: ‘the position of Marker “B”, and other points in this 1960 survey within the geographic area of the 
mouth of the Courantyne River, their geodetic datum, and the WGS-84 datum position of these points if they 
have been determined by re-computation of the 1960 survey’; ibid, para 110, confirmed by Order No. 7 12 
March 2007 that the information had been received  
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of Marker “B” on 31 May 2007.830  The appointment by the Tribunal of an expert to assist it 
clearly indicates that it wished to proactively engage with the evidence to establish a sound 
factual basis upon which to make a judgment rather than simply relying on the information 
submitted by the parties, or even on the expert evidence presented by the parties themselves.  
Furthermore, in contrast to the ICJ’s practice of consulting experts fantômes criticised in the 
previous chapter, the Tribunal was transparent in actively consulting with an independent 
expert in assisting it in the course of proceedings.
831
 
 
3.2.2. (iii) Dispute Over Disclosure of Documents 
 
On 4 November 2004 Guyana alleged that Suriname had objected to its requests for access to 
a number of files located in the archives of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
 832
 
and later requested the Tribunal to ‘require Suriname to take all steps necessary to enable the 
parties to have access to historical materials on an equal basis and immediately advise The 
Netherlands that it withdraws its objection to disclosure of 7 December [2004]’.833  Suriname 
justified its objection, saying that this was not an issue of equal access to public records for 
the records were not public, owing to the fact they related to matters of national security and 
that it was the policy of the Netherlands to restrict material relating to ongoing boundary 
disputes.
834
 
  
By letter to the President of 4 January 2005 Guyana again requested that the Tribunal ‘adopt 
an Order requiring both parties to cooperate and to refrain from interference with each other’s 
attempts to obtain documents or other information…and…to take all necessary steps to undo 
the effects’ of interference that had already taken place.  835  The Tribunal, in asking for 
Suriname’s views on Guyana’s letter, reminded the parties of the importance of the principles 
of equality of arms and cooperation in the course of international proceedings- citing Articles 
5 and 6 of Annex VII of UNCLOS as well as Articles 7(1) and (2) of the Tribunal’s own Rules 
of Procedure in support of this position.
836
  It is a significant and bold move for the Tribunal 
to explicitly remind the parties of their duty to collaborate with the Tribunal and is another 
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indicator of a tribunal actively engaged in the fact-finding process seeking to achieve as close 
an approximation of the objective truth as possible.   
 
In order to resolve the impasse the President of the Tribunal asked Guyana to submit a ‘list of 
specific documents and information in the archives of The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs it is seeking to access, indicating in general terms the relevance of each item solely as 
it pertains to the maritime boundary before this tribunal’ and asked Suriname to communicate 
its position on ‘whether the specific items sought by Guyana in that list should be released to 
Guyana, and if not, on what basis they should be withheld’.837 
 
Subsequently Suriname complained that Guyana had not specified the information it required 
as requested by the Tribunal, nor explained why the information it had requested was 
necessary and stated that it believed that ‘none of the items on Guyana’s list…is a file or 
document that Suriname has an obligation under international law to make available to 
Guyana’.838  Predictably, Guyana argued that since it had been denied access to the 
information it could provide no further clarification or details about the evidence it sought.
839
 
 
3.2.2. (iv) The Tribunal’s Approach to Fact-Finding 
 
After extended disagreement over access to documents, the Tribunal issued Order No. 1 on 18 
July 2005, entitled ‘Access to Documents’, which addressed a number of interesting fact-
finding issues. First of all, the Order stated that the Tribunal would not consider any document 
from the archives of The Netherlands to which Guyana had been denied access.
840
  This can 
be seen a proactive move by the Tribunal to counteract the difficulties and apparent reluctance 
of Suriname to cooperate with the Tribunal in relation to this evidence.   
 
Secondly the Order made clear that each party had the right to ‘request the other Party, 
through the Tribunal, to disclose relevant files or documents, identified with reasonable 
specificity, that are in the possession or under the control of the other Party’.841  In this 
statement the Tribunal reminds the parties of their duty to collaborate with the Tribunal and 
                                                 
837
 7 February 2005, ibid, para 26 
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 Letter to President, 21 February 2005, ibid, para 28 
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 2 March 2005, letter to President, ibid, para 30 
840
 Order No. 1 Operative Paragraph 1 
841
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seeks to facilitate the disclosure of information between the parties – taking a more active role 
than the ICJ would do.  However the Tribunal chose its words carefully, referring not to a 
general right of discovery but to a right to ‘documents, identified with reasonable specificity, 
that are in the possession or under the control of the other party’.  As such the Tribunal places 
two important limitations that prevent a general discovery right – firstly referring only to 
information within the possession or under the control of the other party
842
 and laying down 
the condition that the information must be ‘identified with reasonable specificity’, to prevent 
so-called fishing expeditions.  It is suggested that in this the influence of the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal can be discerned. 
 
3.2.2. (v) Independent Expert 
 
The Order was also notably innovative in establishing an independent expert, under article 
11(3) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure whose task was to, at the request of a party 
disclosing information, review any proposal by that party to ‘remove or redact parts of that 
file or document’843 in light of the fact that that party may have a right to non-disclosure for 
valid reasons.
844
  Importantly, any dispute as to the failure to produce a document, in whole or 
part, was to be resolved by the expert, with whom, under Article 11(4) of the Tribunal’s Rules 
of Procedure, the parties are under a duty to cooperate with.
845
   
 
Through a letter to the President on 20 July 2005 Guyana requested a number of ‘relevant 
files’ in the possession or under the control of Suriname, pursuant to Order No. 1.  On 25 July 
2005 Suriname asked the Tribunal to reject Guyana’s request, but stated that it was willing to 
comply with its obligations under paragraph 2 of the order.
846
  On 27 July Surname wrote to 
the President setting out the way in which it intended to provide the information to Guyana, in 
implementation of Order No. 1, paragraph 2.  After some equivocation, Suriname agreed to 
submit the documents to the independent expert.
847
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 See Corfu Channel on this 
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844
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847
 (Files 161 and 169A); Professor Hans van Houtte was appointed as independent expert – see Order No. 3, 12 
October 2005, ibid, paras 59-60 
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The Tribunal’s Order No. 3 provides that the Tribunal will retain ultimate control over the 
evaluation of the evidence.
848
  The Order provides that if a party invokes paragraph 5 to 
remove or redact information requested to be produced, ‘the Party proposing removal or 
redaction shall produce the entire un-redacted file or document for the Expert’s inspection.’849  
The Expert is then to invite the party to justify why it ought to be redacted or removed.
850
 
 
Subsequently the Tribunal issued Order No. 4 by which it ordered Suriname to cooperate with 
the independent tribunal in accordance with Order No. 3
851
 and ordered the independent 
expert to review Suriname’s proposals for removal or redaction852 and to determine whether 
Guyana’s request for information had made with ‘reasonable specificity and appear 
relevant.’853   This corresponding obligation is a clear attempt to prevent any ‘fishing 
expeditions’ from Guyana.  Both parties interacted with the Tribunal and the independent 
expert extensively in attempting to reach common ground regarding the submission of a 
number of documents and attempts to withhold or redact them.
854
  The independent expert, 
after reviewing the relevant files, submitted a report to the Tribunal which was made available 
to the parties.
855
 Guyana completely agreed with the findings of the Report and pushed for 
disclosure of the documents mentioned.  Suriname, on the other hand, concurred with 
everything apart from the disclosure of one specific document, File 161, which it protested 
ought not to be disclosed. 
 
On 16 February 2006 the Tribunal issued Order No. 5 ‘adopting’ the recommendations of the 
independent expert’s report in sections 5 and 6 relating to Files 161 and 169A stated that 
Suriname was ‘hereby requested to grant Guyana immediate access to the files in accordance 
with those recommendations’.  In relation to other documents, the Tribunal ordered that 
Suriname either disclose them to Guyana or submit them to the expert for redaction, as it so 
chose – a course of action that Suriname pursued, providing a number of documents to the 
expert along with a memorandum containing its reasons why they ought to be redacted.
856
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850
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The wording of the evidentiary Orders is significant and deserves closer attention.  Although 
the Tribunal phrases the order in terms of ‘requesting’ information from the parties, it is 
unclear what the exact legal force of their orders is.  The Tribunal’s authority to compel the 
production of evidence of course stems from its constitutive instruments, in this case 
UNCLOS and its Rules of Procedure adopted by the parties.  Neither of these instruments 
clearly sets out that the Tribunal possesses a power to compel the disclosure of information 
and unlike the WTO adjudicative bodies, as we have seen, no clear attempt has been made to 
develop such a power in this context.  As such the exact legal nature of the Tribunal’s requests 
remains unclear.  However the possibility of developing a binding power drawing on the duty 
of collaboration that all states are under once they accept the jurisdiction of an international 
tribunal is one that remains open and is an issue that is examined in greater detail in relation 
to the ICJ in Chapter 4 at 4.1. 
 
3.2.2. (vi) The Arbitral Tribunal’s Approach in the Round 
 
At the very least it can be said that this arbitral tribunal, as with a number of others in recent 
times, has taken a clearly proactive approach to fact-finding in engaging with the parties, 
mediating in their dispute regarding the disclosure of evidence, requesting information itself 
and even appointing an independent expert to review and redact information in order to reach 
a solution that would satisfy both parties and, most importantly, give the Tribunal the best 
chance of achieving as close an approximation of the truth as possible.  The appointment of 
the independent expert to adjudicate on issues of disclosure of information is particularly 
innovative and appears to have worked well in the present case and to the satisfaction of both 
states – illustrating that more proactive tribunals are not immediately threatening to states and 
can in fact help to illicit further information required for the proper administration of justice.  
The Tribunal also relied heavily on independent experts’ advice and cited expert advice 
referred to in the submissions of the parties – a practice not often seen in the ICJ.857  
Admittedly some bargaining was necessary in order to ensure that both parties were happy 
with the solution reached but this is to be expected in the course of international litigation.  
The Tribunal’s proactive approach facilitated the evidentiary compromise and could serve as a 
model for other international courts and tribunals considering being more proactive in their 
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approach to fact-finding.
858
 
3.2.3. Abyei Arbitration 
 
The Abyei Arbitration is similarly noteworthy for its approach to issues of fact-finding 
including requesting information, active involvement in the proceedings and the appointment 
of experts. 
 
3.2.3. (i) Introduction 
 
The Abyei Arbitration took place at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2009 under the 
PCA’s Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two Parties of Which Only One is a 
State.  The arbitration was a politically significant one concerning a long-running dispute over 
territorial boundaries between the state of Sudan and the newly formed state of South Sudan.  
The dispute was brought before an arbitral tribunal due to the non-state nature of the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) at the time.  Although the International 
Court of Justice has a long history with territorial disputes, it would have been unable to deal 
with this dispute since its Statute does not permit non-state parties to appear before it.
859
   
 
Following decades of civil war the Protocol on the Resolution of the Abyei Conflict was 
signed in May 2004 however it did not contain any agreement in relation to the boundaries of 
the Abyei area.  Instead, the Protocol provided for the establishment of the Abyei Boundaries 
Commission (ABC) to ‘define and demarcate the Area of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms 
transferred to Kordofan in 1905’860 consisting of members appointed by the parties and five 
independent experts appointed by the US, UK, and IGAD.
861
  The ABC was to prepare a 
report that would be final and binding upon the parties.
862 
  However the award was 
immediately disputed by the parties and the 2008 Abyei Road Map contained an obligation on 
both parties to refer the dispute to arbitration.
863
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The task of the resulting Arbitral Tribunal was twofold, (i) firstly to effectively conduct 
judicial review to determine whether or not the ABC had exceeded its powers,
864
 and (ii) 
secondly, if it was found to have done so, to ‘proceed to delimit the boundaries of the area of 
the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905, based on the submissions of 
the parties’865 or to declare that the report of the ABC was valid.866 
 
3.2.3. (ii) Evidence - Tribunal’s Request for Certain Documents 
 
The SPLM/A alleged that it had been denied access to a number of documents and requested 
of the Tribunal ‘full and unhindered access to the SPLM/A and counsel to the relevant 
archival documents at the Survey Department…’867 In turn the Tribunal requested that the 
documents in question be produced.  Under Article 24(3) of the PCA Rules the Tribunal 
requested that the Government of Sudan supply the Tribunal and the SPLM/A with a detailed 
list of documents including a full record of maps and records as specified.
868
  The Tribunal 
laid out a detailed procedure regarding what information it desired, and the options that the 
Government of Sudan had in producing it, including a procedure for objecting to disclosure.
 
869
   
 
The Tribunal also invited the SPLM/A to request any other documents it needed,
870
 which the 
SPLM/A did on a number of occasions.
871
  Nevertheless, the SPLM/A continued to argue that 
it had been denied complete access to the Sudan Survey Department and Sudan National 
Records Office and urged the Tribunal to draw adverse inferences from Sudan’s failure to 
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provide unfettered access to this information.
872
  Sudan refuted these allegations throughout, 
accusing the SPLM/A of ‘an unfettered fishing expedition’ and arguing that the SPLM/A’s 
‘own failure to exercise due diligence is no justification for a late request to seek access to 
such a potentially wide array of documents’.873 
 
On the other side, Sudan claimed that a number of its witnesses had been harassed and 
threatened,
874
 (allegations which the SPLM/A promised it had investigated and found to have 
no basis in fact).
875
  Furthermore the SPLM/A continued to protest that its legal 
representatives had been ‘wholly obstructed from viewing a single relevant document” and 
“prohibited from carrying out any of their own research”.876  After a long exchange of letters 
between the parties the Government of Sudan stated that it had already provided a number of 
the maps requested to the Tribunal and to the SPLM/A and that others could not be located.
877
  
Throughout this time the Tribunal played an active role, prompting the production of the 
requested evidence.
878
   
 
In response to the possibility of drawing adverse inferences, the Tribunal made an astute 
distinction in order to avoid addressing the issue directly.  The Tribunal stated that it believed 
that the SPLM/A was not asking the Tribunal to draw adverse inferences at this precise 
moment but rather the SPLM/A was putting the Government of Sudan ‘on notice’ that it may 
seek adverse inferences if its requests for information are not complied with.
879
  In doing so 
the Tribunal stated that ‘[i]n light of the arguments presented at oral pleadings, the Tribunal 
will decide, in the fullness of these proceedings, whether any adverse inferences or other 
appropriate conclusions should be drawn’.880 
 
Both parties presented arguments regarding admissibility and weight of evidence produced.
881
   
The Tribunal, however, ultimately accorded no weight to allegations of intimidation, 
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obstruction of access to documents and drew no adverse inferences,
882
 a point lamented by 
Judge Al-Khasawneh in his dissent.
883
  During the oral pleadings Judge Al-Khasawneh asked 
four witnesses of the Government of Sudan if they had been intimidated by agents of the 
SPLM/A, however in the end nothing came of these allegations with the Award describing the 
witnesses as giving ‘varying answers’.884 
 
3.2.3. (iii) Experts Appointed by the Tribunal 
 
On 16 April 2009 the Tribunal passed Procedural Order No.2 which provided for the 
appointment of Douglas Vincent Belgrave and Bill Robertson as experts to provide assistance 
to the Tribunal in the course of this arbitration.
885
  The task of the experts was to be, should 
the Tribunal find that the ABC had exceeded its mandate, to assist the Tribunal in delimiting 
the boundaries of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905 in 
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement.  
 
3.2.3. (iv) Experts & Witnesses Appointed by the Parties 
 
Furthermore, the parties presented witnesses to the Tribunal.  The Government of Sudan had 
criticised the use of witness evidence in this case, which the Tribunal agreed with in cases of 
oral evidence passed down through generations, however it went on to state that ‘depriving 
witness evidence per se of all probative value would be unjustifiable’886 and that it would 
‘…accordingly admit oral evidence and will assign it the weight proper to it in each instance.  
It will be duly taken into account, in particular, in so far as it corroborates other sources of 
evidence’.887  Furthermore, throughout the course of proceedings, both the Government of 
Sudan
888
 and the SPLM/A
889
 produced experts to speak to their case.  In appointing its own 
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experts and hearing both witnesses and expert opinion put forward by the parties it can be 
said that the approach of the Tribunal is reminiscent of the similarly more proactive approach 
to fact-finding taken in the Abyei and Kishenganga arbitrations as we will see in the following 
section.   
 
3.2.3. (v) Dissent 
 
As he has in previous cases,
890
 Judge Al-Khasawneh was vehemently critical of the Tribunal’s 
approach to both fact-finding and fact-assessment.
891
  Judge Al-Khasawneh even went so far 
as to accuse the Tribunal of doing the very thing it had accused the ABC of, namely 
exceeding its mandate, by delimiting boundaries ‘without the reasoning required of it by 
Experts’.892  In particular, in relation to the reasoning for the eastern and western boundaries 
and their intersection with the northern boundary, Al-Khasawneh described the authority for 
the Tribunal’s delimitation as one source, and that that source was ‘the imprecise, non-
contemporaneous remarks made by Howell in 1951 which the majority quoted out of context 
and misinterpreted’.893 
 
3.2.3. (vi) Abyei in the Round 
 
What can be said about the fact-finding approach of the arbitral tribunal in the Abyei 
arbitration?  Mbengue and D’Aspremont interestingly characterise the approach of the 
tribunal in the Abyei arbitration as providing ‘passive treatment of scientific fact-finding’ 
since the tribunal interpreted its mandate so as to not require ‘an analysis of the substantive 
correctness’ of the science and stated that it would not ‘engage at the outset in an omnibus re-
operating of the…appreciation of evidence’.894  However, whether or not the tribunal had the 
scientific expertise to be able to engage with such disputed scientific facts or whether an 
arbitral tribunal was the best place to do so is somewhat doubtful.  Rather, the approach of the 
tribunal in establishing experts and engaging with the parties is anything but passive, 
especially compared to the practice of the International Court of Justice. 
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There are a number of proactive aspects of its fact-finding process.  For instance, in the 
dispute over access to documents between the parties, the Tribunal played a proactive role in 
handling the requests and brining the dispute to a mutually agreeable compromise.  In 
addition the Tribunal was proactive in requesting information, asking questions and 
appointing its own experts in addition to those appointed by the parties.  Although the tribunal 
was diplomatic, or some might say hesitant, in its approach to drawing adverse inferences, 
and whilst Al-Khasawneh’s vociferous dissent suggests that the fact-finding process is far 
from perfect, it can nevertheless be said that the Tribunal was readily willing to engage with 
the parties in the fact-finding process and to utilise some of its fact-finding powers to 
establish a solid factual basis for the resolution of the dispute.  A similar willingness to engage 
with the facts can be seen in the third and final arbitration examined in this chapter, that of the 
recent Kishenganga arbitration. 
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3.2.4. Kishenganga 
 
3.2.4. (i) Introduction 
 
The recent Partial Award of the Kishenganga Indus Waters Arbitration (Kishenganga) 
constituted in accordance with the Indus Waters Treaty 1960 between India and Pakistan 
contains a number of notably proactive fact-finding elements.  Conducted under the auspices 
of the PCA, the dispute concerns the Kishenganga Hyrdo-Electric Project (KHEP) and centres 
around the two legal questions defined by Pakistan as; ‘The First Dispute’: whether India’s 
proposed diversion of the river Kishenganga (Neelum) into another Tributary i.e. the Bonar-
Madmati Nallah, being one central element of the Kishenganga Project, breaches India’s legal 
obligations owed to Pakistan under the Treaty, as interpreted in accordance with international 
law, including India’s obligations under Article III(2) (let flow all the waters of the Western 
rivers and not permit any interference with those waters) and Article IV(6) (maintenance of 
natural channels) and the ‘Second Dispute’: whether under the Treaty, India my deplete or 
bring the reservoir level of a run-of-river plant below Dead Storage Level (DSL) in any 
circumstances except in the case of an unforeseen emergency.
895
 
 
3.2.4. (ii) Adoption of Rules of Procedure 
 
Under Procedural Order No.1 of 21 January 2011, and in accordance with Paragraph 16 of 
Annexure G, the parties agreed the supplemental Rules of Procedure for the arbitration.  The 
Court noted that the parties had expressed two viable options; firstly the PCA Optional Rules 
for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two States, or secondly the rules of procedure similar to 
those used by arbitral tribunals established under UNCLOS in proceedings administered by 
the PCA.   After hearing the parties’ views at the first meeting the Court issued Procedural 
Order No. 2 on 16 March 2011 adopting the Supplemental Rules of Procedure.
896
 
 
3.2.4. (iii) Site Visits 
 
Interestingly, at the First Meeting of the parties, before even the Rules of Procedure had been 
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adopted or the scope of the dispute set in stone, the parties agreed on the need for the Court to 
conduct a site visit in the course of proceedings.
897
  The parties agreed that the Court should 
visit the site of the Pakistan Neelum-Jhelum Hydro-Electric Plant (NJHEP) as well as the 
KHEP.
898
  The Parties agreed that the only presentations made to the Court during the Site 
Visit were to be those of experts limited to objective, technical issues, meaning that legal 
issues and argumentation were not permitted to be put forward during the visit.
899
 
 
Furthermore the Court conducted a second site visit, on request of Pakistan on 6 December 
2011.  After circulating a draft of Procedural Order No. 7 to canvas the thoughts of the parties 
the Court issued it on 16 January 2012 stating that from 3 to 6 February 2012 three members 
of the Court, Sir Franklin Berman, Professor Wheater and one member of the Secretariat 
would visit the site.  The visit would be documented by video and pictures to be shown to the 
rest of the Court and experts not part of the delegations of the parties would make brief 
presentations to the members of the Court visiting.   
 
The parties were reassured that the procedure adopted regarding the content of the 
presentations made to the visiting Court and warned the parties against participating in ex 
parte discussions with Members of the Court – a problematic issue faced by the ICJ in recent 
times.
900
  The second site visit consisted of a visit to the Neelum valley and inspection of the 
gauge-discharge observation site at Dudhnial and a water-pumping station at Athmuqam – 
videos of the site visit and the presentations made to the visiting Court were presented to the 
parties in accordance with Procedural Order No. 7. 
 
3.2.4. (iv) Information Requested of the Parties 
 
From the outset the Court played an active role in proceedings.  For instance, on 27 August 
2011, Professor Wheater, the umpire appointed by the Rector of Imperial College London 
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requested information from India regarding technical aspects of the KHEP dam including 
cross-sections of the dam, drawings of the dam elevation and India’s Environmental Impact 
Assessment, amongst other things.
901
  The Chairman asked India to furnish the information 
requested by Professor Wheater by 2 September 2011 and Pakistan to comment on the 
information submitted by India by 7 September 2011.
902
 
 
As we can see already, the Arbitral Tribunal is actively participating in the proceedings, 
requesting information and taking charge of the fact-finding process.  Subsequently India 
informed the Court that the majority of the information requested of it had already been given 
to Pakistan and that any information that had not been given to Pakistan would be put before 
the Court with India’s Counter-Memorial.903  On 7 September Pakistan submitted its 
comments on India’s letter to the Court and provided the Court with two additional 
documents that had not already been made available to the Court.
904
  Furthermore, a 
substantive part of the Partial Award is dedicated to the Court’s finding that it had insufficient 
data on record to determine a precise minimum downstream flow.
905
  The parties did not 
dispute that such a minimum was to be set but could not agree on what this minimum should 
be and as such this task fell to the Court.  However the Court felt it had insufficient data to 
make such a judgement.  Accordingly, the Court took the decision to be proactive and to 
request further information from the parties.   
 
This is significant in that, as opposed to the reactive approach of the ICJ where judgements 
are made on the basis of the information submitted by states the vast majority of the time, in 
this case the Court was willing to admit that it had a factual deficiency and what’s more was 
willing to take steps to remedy it.
906
  The Court requested further information from the parties 
and deferred its judgement on this matter in a detailed request, listing the specific information 
required of each of the parties.
907
  The Court’s request is wide-ranging, stipulating that the 
data ‘should be accompanied by full information on the assumptions underlying these 
analyses, including these for power generation and environmental concerns, and the 
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associated uncertainty in the Parties’ estimates’ and other such specific requests.908   The 
Court went on to state the strict time limits placed on the submission of the information to the 
tribunal.
909
  
 
3.2.4. (v) Information Requested by the Parties 
 
In the phase of the written submissions, after the submission of Pakistan’s Memorial and 
India’s Counter-Memorial910 each party made a number of requests for documents and further 
information – an interesting procedural practice, especially considering how the arbitral 
tribunal dealt with these requests.  Requests of this type are more akin to the common law 
procedure of discovery and are commonplace in international commercial arbitration, but are 
much less common in international inter-state adjudication.  It is for this reason that the 
practice of the Court in this case is particularly interesting. 
 
By email Pakistan requested that India produce a number of documents that had been referred 
to in India’s Counter-Memorial: an unredacted version of a letter from 1960 from the 
Chairman of India’s Central Water and Power Commission (CWPC Letter), a letter dated 13 
January 1958 referred to in the CWPC letter, the preliminary hydro-electric survey of the 
Indus basin and letter of 13 January and revised environmental impact assessments conducted 
in 2006 (EIAs).
911
  This request was later reiterated on 21 January.
912
  Meanwhile India 
requested that Pakistan produce additional information on the purpose of the construction of 
Adit 1 and the range of uses it could be put to in relation to KHEP,
913
 and later on 13 January 
requested Pakistan provide a copy of the EIA and other assessments for the NJHEP and 
technical details of the four upstream projects planned.
914
  These queries were resolved 
satisfactorily at the merits stage of proceedings.
915
 
 
In relation to the CWPC letter, Pakistan had requested that it be disclosed in full since it was 
central to India’s case, and, importantly, that the Court was competent to do so under 
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Paragraph 20 of Annexure G of the Treaty.
916
  On the other hand, India argued that the letter 
itself is not relevant to the case at hand, that secondly India does not rely on them ‘in terms of 
Rule 11(i)(a) of the Supplementary Procedural Rules and that lastly the full disclosure of the 
unredacted letter risks ‘prejudice to India’, also making reference to the Official Secrets Act 
1923 in force in both India and Pakistan.
917
  The requests between the parties for the 
disclosure of information prompted the Court itself to intervene and notify the parties of the 
procedure that would cover Pakistan’s application for production of the CWPC letter: 
 
‘India is requested to provide to all Members of the Court (through the Registrar) a 
full copy of [the CWPC] letter at India’s earliest convenience, but in no case later than 
Tuesday, February 7, 2012.  By no later than Tuesday, February 7, 2012, India is to 
provide its views on any applicable principle of state secrecy or privilege that the 
Court should take into account in deciding Pakistan’s disclosure application.  Pakistan 
is invited to comment on India’s submission by no later than Friday, February 10, 
2012’.918 
 
In reply to Pakistan and the Court’s prompting, India provided a full, unredacted copy of the 
CWPC letter along with a copy of the Official Secrets Act 1923 (India) and a copy of the 
Official Secrets Acts 1923 (Pakistan) – each party restating their respective positions.919 
 
In order to resolve this impasse the Court passed Procedural Order No. 8 on 14 February 2012.   
Significantly, the Court stated that it ‘believes that any Party offering a document in evidence 
should provide the full document and noted that indeed, under Paragraph 20 of Annexure G 
and Article 13(2) of the Supplemental Rules of Procedure, that it had the power to ‘require 
from the Parties the production of all papers and other evidence it considers necessary’920 
either proprio motu or at the request of one of the parties.  In attempting to balance its views 
that a party should disclose information in full with India’s concerns regarding official secrets, 
the Tribunal proposed a compromise solution of seeking an examination of the material in 
camera before making a judgement as to whether it should be disclosed in full to the other 
party.
921
  After reviewing the document the Court found that it was not directly relevant to the 
issues currently in dispute and that ‘the non-disclosure of the redacted passages will not 
hamper Pakistan’s ability to respond to the arguments made in India’s Counter-
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Memorial…’922  This practice can be seen as similar as the approach of the Tribunal in the 
Guyana/Suriname arbitration without the formal appointment of an independent expert to 
review the evidence.  Nevertheless we can see active engagement from the Tribunal in 
eliciting and procuring information from the parties through compromise. 
 
3.2.4. (vi) Expert Witnesses 
 
Under paragraph 3.2 of Procedural Order No. 9 on 15 June 2012 the parties indicated the 
names of both the experts and the witnesses that they intended to cross-examine.  Due to the 
fact the oral proceedings are not publicly available it is not possible to comment in any great 
detail on the value added to the tribunal’s fact-finding process by the cross-examination of 
expert witnesses or the exact format that such examination followed.  However, at the very 
least it can be said that in conducting cross-examination of both witnesses and experts, by all 
accounts a valuable element of the proceedings,
923
 the procedural approach of the arbitral 
tribunal, and of the parties themselves, is notably more proactive than the ICJ. 
 
3.2.4. (vii) The Kishenganga Arbitration in the Round 
 
The arbitral tribunal in Kishenganga, like the preceding two, has taken a proactive approach 
to fact-finding.
924
  From the outset the tribunal showed a willingness to become actively 
involved in the fact-finding process through the agreement to undertake a site visit (and a later 
follow-up visit).  Furthermore the Tribunal was forthright in requesting information from the 
parties that it felt it required in order to establish a solid factual foundation upon which to 
decide the case.  In relation to the disputed documents, the Tribunal was also similarly 
proactive in mediating the dispute and although it stopped short of going as far as the tribunal 
in Guyana/Suriname in appointing an independent expert, it did take extra steps to examine 
the information in camera before making a judgement on its relevance to the case at hand.  
This approach appears to have been acceptable to both parties.  And whilst the tribunal did not 
appoint any experts of its own in this case, this can more likely be attributed to the 
composition of the Panel itself which was deliberately made up of arbitrators with relevant 
expertise in the requires areas (and in addition experts were appointed by the parties 
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themselves).  As such, there is much to consider in the approach of the tribunal when 
considering potential lessons for the ICJ.  
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3.4. Chapter 3 Summary – The Lost Art of Fact-Finding 
 
What can be gleaned from this brief survey of the WTO adjudicative bodies and recent inter-
state arbitrations?  First of all, it can be said that the approach of the two most popular means 
of settling international disputes today take a generally more proactive approach to fact-
finding than the ICJ.  However this fact should not be surprising in itself.  These tribunals 
have different constitutive instruments, operate as part of different institutional structures (as 
part of no strict institutional structure as the case may be) and certainly do not carry the same 
symbolic value nor bear the same burden in terms of progressive development of international 
law as the ICJ does.  Indeed, in some instances the differences between the tribunals are more 
clearly apparent; in particular in relation to the fact that there is no standing bench of 
arbitrators (despite the PCA being nominally ‘permanent’) or in relation to the flexibility 
regarding the rules of procedure that arbitrating states enjoy.  Nevertheless, the tribunals have 
more similarities than differences.  All are tribunals dealing with states, applying international 
law and playing an important role in the peaceful settlement of international disputes.   
 
As such, it is suggested that the differences between the approaches of the tribunals to the 
issue of fact-finding cannot simply be dismissed as inevitable given their genetic make up.  
Rather, it is argued that many of the differences identified are the result of a more or less 
proactive attitude to fact-finding.  But what can be said are the main differences?  There are a 
number of aspects of the fact-finding process that are particularly distinctive: 
 
1.  First of all, both the WTO adjudicative bodies and inter-state arbitration more 
actively engage with the case before them through asking questions and requesting 
information.  In both cases the tribunals come close to asserting a power to compel the 
disclosure of evidence, 
2. Secondly, the WTO adjudicative bodies have (with limited success) attempted to 
assert a clear burden of proof through the prima facie case requirement to take more 
control over the fact-finding process, 
3. Thirdly, both the WTO adjudicative bodies and inter-state arbitration both regularly 
hear and examine witnesses put before them by the parties and more significantly, 
appoint their own experts in seeking to better evaluate the evidence put before them, 
4. Fourthly, in addition to the (already remarkably proactive in comparison to the ICJ) 
step of requesting information from the parties, both tribunals have also drawn adverse 
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inferences from a party’s failure to produce the requested information. 
5. Fifthly, one arbitral tribunal undertook a site visit (and necessary follow-up visit).  The 
site visit mechanism is one which has been seldom used before the ICJ but one which 
by all accounts was significant in the arbitration in question. 
 
 
These aspects of the fact-finding processes of the tribunals examined in this chapter stand out 
as being significantly different from the approach taken by the ICJ.  In fact, in these respects 
the tribunals examined mark themselves out as clearly more proactive in terms of fact-finding 
than the ICJ.  It is this conclusion that begs the question of whether by adopting a similarly 
proactive approach to fact-finding, such as being more assertive in its requests for information, 
the ICJ could perhaps remedy some the current fact-finding deficiencies examined in the 
previous chapter.  It is this question, the possibility of seeing a Court more proactively 
engaging in the process of fact-finding, and the potential obstacles facing the Court were it to 
choose to do so, that is the focus of the following chapters. 
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Chapter 4. Winds of Change: The Possibility (Audacity) of Reform 
 
Richard B. Lillich famously argued that the Court often fails ‘to take advantage of existing 
procedures to help unearth the facts that may be the key to the resolution of disputes’.925  This 
point was made and developed at length in Chapters 1 and 2.  However, it is the conclusions 
that Lillich drew from this state of affairs that is the subject of this chapter, namely that the 
Court should ‘be far more aggressive in seeking the facts’ and utilising the fact-finding tools it 
already possesses.
926
  This chapter seeks to draw on the practice of the other international 
courts identified and suggests that there are a number of avenues open to the Court that could 
potentially remedy some of its current fact-finding weaknesses, should it choose to do so: 
 
1. The first relates to the possibility of making greater use of the fact-finding powers that 
the Court already possesses.  Section 4.1. explores the possibility of the Court taking a 
teleological approach to its Statute and Rules and the so-called duty of collaboration in 
asking whether the Court could potentially construe its fact-finding powers to compel 
the production of evidence, as opposed to merely requesting it.   
2. Secondly, the possibility of better utilising the Court’s power to order provisional 
measures under Article 41 of its Statute is examined. 
3. Thirdly, relating to both the fact-finding and fact-assessment process, section 4.3. 
explores the possibility of increased use of experts, the refinement of the current 
procedure for the presentation of expert evidence and greater use of cross-examination 
as a way of aiding the Court effectively assessing the facts put before it by the parties. 
 
Subsequently Chapter 5 examines the merits of taking a more proactive approach to fact-
finding, as facilitated in the manner set out in the present chapter. 
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4.1. Developing a Power to Compel the Disclosure of Evidence 
 
The first avenue that it is suggested the Court could explore in taking a more proactive 
approach to the facts relates to the Court’s fact-finding process – namely the possibility of 
making greater use of the fact-finding powers the Court already possesses.  This section 
explores the possibility of the Court taking a teleological approach to its Statute and Rules 
and relying on the so-called ‘duty of collaboration’ in asking whether the Court could 
potentially construe its fact-finding powers to compel the production of evidence, as opposed 
to merely requesting it. 
4.1.1. As Things Stand – Discovery & the Unclear Binding Nature of Article 49 ICJ Statute 
 
As we saw in Chapter 1, the Court possesses considerable fact-finding powers including the 
ability to request information from the parties under Article 49 of its Statute.  However in 
practice the Court has not made any significant use of this fact-finding power.  Instead, the 
consistent practice of the Court has been to allow the parties to retain almost exclusive control 
over the fact-finding process whilst it has played a reactive role in this process.
927
   
 
But what of the suggestion that the Court could interpret its Article 49 powers to seek 
information as being binding on the parties?  Tams states that whilst this would undoubtedly 
increase the effectiveness of the Court in its dispute settlement role, de lege lata, ‘the more 
convincing view is that the parties are under no legal obligation to comply with requests 
under Art. 49…’928 since, where this duty is imposed on states, the relevant statutory 
instruments or rules of procedure will usually state this clearly or heavily imply such a 
duty.
929
  Indeed, the wording of Article 49 merely states that the Court can ‘call upon’ parties 
to submit evidence and as such has been described as a ‘rather meagre substitute for real 
powers for procuring evidence, which the ICJ does not possess’.930   
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The argument could be made that states are under an obligation to comply with requests for 
information under Article 49 of the Statute as a result of the fact the UN Charter imposes an 
obligation on states to comply with ‘decisions’ of the Court.  However, as Brown has 
demonstrated, it is unlikely that orders requesting information under Article 49 could be 
regarded as decisions in themselves, highlighting that the consequences for not complying 
with requests under Article 49 are set out expressly in that provision, namely the possibility of 
‘formal note’ being taken of such a refusal, not a breach of the Charter.931  
 
A legal obligation for parties to comply with requests for information is regularly imposed on 
parties before other international courts and tribunals.  Some have a specific power set out in 
their constitutive instrument,
932
 whilst others such as the ICYY and ICTR derive such a power 
from a special source. To elaborate, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY stated in the Blaškić 
case that it possessed a power to compel the production of information in Article 29 of the 
Court’s Statute arising from ‘the provisions of Chapter VII and Article 25 of the United 
Nations Charter and from the Security Council Resolution adopted pursuant to these 
provisions’.933  The ICTY at the time described this power as ‘novel and indeed unique’ – 
arising as it did from the Security Council’s Chapter VII powers.934  Other international 
tribunals such as the adjudicative bodies of the WTO have established a binding power 
through judicial interpretation – an issue to which we shall return presently.   
 
However international legal scholarship has traditionally regarded the ICJ’s powers to request 
information from the parties as lacking binding legal force.  For instance, Highet stated that 
the Court’s most significant impediment to functioning decisively in evidentiary positions is 
its inability to compel the production of evidence or subpoena witnesses.
935
  Similarly, Alford 
Jr. stated that whilst the Court may request information of the parties and international 
organizations, without a power to compel production ‘the Court tends to rely heavily upon the 
evidence submitted without positive efforts to police the truth of the facts’.936 
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As well as not making any significant use of its Article 49 ICJ Statute power to request 
information, the Court has not developed a practice of granting discovery requests (whereby 
one party may request that the court order the other party to produce documentation relevant 
to the case before it) as generally found in common law jurisdictions.  One exception is the 
ELSI case in which counsel for Italy complained that the US had not put forward crucial 
evidence and requested that the United States make available to the Court a financial 
statement of the year 1967 of Raytheon/ELSI’s auditors which the US had referred to in its 
oral argument but had not produced.
937
  In mentioning but not producing the information, the 
US appeared to be in breach of Article 56(4) of the Court’s Rules which prohibits any 
reference during the oral proceedings to information that has not been put before the Court 
under Article 43 of the Statute or that is not readily available to the public.
938
 
 
Italian counsel asked the Chamber to request the financial statement be disclosed in 
accordance with Article 49 of the Statute and Article 62(1) of the Rules and the President 
requested the US to do so.
939
  The US complied with the request for disclosure promptly – and 
the document proved to be significant for the outcome of the case.
940
  Italy’s request for 
information was described as ‘unprecedented’ in the history of the Court, a form of (indirect) 
discovery, saying that it provided ‘an effective substitute for more forthright discovery 
powers.
941
  What the Court would have done had the US refused to comply with the Court’s 
request is unclear and this remains the sole example of the Court agreeing to a request for 
information.  For instance, as we saw in Chapter 2, in the Bosnian Genocide case the Court 
refused to order Serbia to produce the minutes of the Serbian Supreme Defence Council 
which were believed to be the evidence that would prove that the army of the Republika 
Srpska was under the control of Serbia, stating that the Court had sufficient evidence before it, 
including ICTY records.
942
  Relatedly, in the recent preliminary objections phase of the 
Croatian Genocide case, the Court refused a similar request made by Croatia, stating that it 
was ‘not satisfied that the production of the requested documents was necessary for the 
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purpose of ruling on preliminary objections’943 going on to say that ‘Croatia had failed to 
provide sufficient reason to justify the great lateness of its request and that to accede to this 
request made at this very late juncture would, in addition, raise many practical problems’.944 
 
As such the practice of the Court shows that it has not routinely either been asked to make 
orders for discovery or consented to granting them.
945
  Given the lack of practice in this area it 
is not surprising that the Court has not laid out any guidelines as to what conditions must be 
met to ensure the granting of a discovery order.
946
 
 
Nevertheless it is suggested that these traditional conceptions of the Court’s powers to request 
information, and its limited use of any form of discovery procedure, do not tell the whole 
story.  In fact, in light of the practice of other international courts and tribunals, it is argued 
that the Court could feasibly interpret its powers to insist upon the disclosure of evidence.  In 
this regard, the practice of the WTO adjudicative bodies merits attention. 
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 Croatian Genocide Preliminary Objections, 416, p. 13-15 
944
 Ibid, para 15 
945
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946
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4.1.2. ‘Should’ Means ‘Shall’? The Curious Case of Article 13 WTO DSU 
 
As we saw in Chapter 3 at 3.1.2.1., Article 13 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding 
formally grants Panels a broad power to request information from parties appearing before 
them.  Article 13 provides the Panels with an investigative power that is not limited to 
scientific or technical evidence or even to expert evidence.
947
  In fact, the Appellate Body has 
held that Panels can seek information from any relevant source it so chooses
948
 and that in 
principle there are no limits to this discretionary authority.
949
  In the words of the Appellate 
Body in Canada Aircraft, Panels are ‘vested with ample and extensive discretionary authority 
to determine when it needs information to resolve a dispute and what information it needs’.950  
In practice Panels have made use of this broad fact-finding power contained in Article (1) and 
(2) although at times reference has merely been made to ‘Article 13’ generally. 
 
On the face of it, it would appear that the use of the term ‘should’ rather than ‘shall’ in Article 
13.1 gives requests an exhortatory character as opposed to binding legal effect.
951
  
Consequently, requests for information made of parties under Article 13 would not be 
compulsory, and similarly individuals would be under no binding obligation to provide 
information (nor would Members themselves be obliged to require individuals provide the 
requested information).
952
 
 
However, despite the fact that a literal reading of Article 13 does not appear to impose a 
binding legal obligation on the parties to comply with requests for information there has been 
some suggestion in recent times that Article 13 nevertheless places a binding duty on parties.  
For instance, in Canada-Civilian Aircraft the AB stated that although the term ‘should’ has an 
exhortatory character, it could also ‘express a duty or obligation’.953  As such, some 
consideration of the facts of the Canada-Civilian Aircraft case is warranted.   
                                                 
947
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Brazil raised a preliminary motion requesting documentary discovery at the very beginning of 
the case (even before any submissions had been made) asking the Panel to undertake 
extensive ‘additional fact-finding’.954  In the course of the case Brazil argued that Canada was 
under a legal obligation to disclose the information requested of it, and averred that it was 
under a duty to fully cooperate with the tribunal.
955
 
 
Canada meanwhile refused to comply with Brazil’s wide-ranging requests for information, 
accusing Brazil of having ‘embarked on a fishing expedition and cast a drift-net – and has 
asked the Panel to pilot the ship.’956  Crucially, Canada did not deny that it had a duty of 
collaboration with the tribunal, but argued that this duty only came into effect with regard to 
countering the legal arguments and evidence produced against it.
957
  In other words, Canada 
argued that the duty of collaboration only came into effect when the other party had made a 
prima facie case against it, and that in cases where the other party is arguably engaging in a 
‘fishing expedition’ for information, this duty did not apply.958  The duty of collaboration is 
one that we will return to examine in greater detail in section 4.1.4. 
 
Canada also argued, relying on Japan- Agricultural Products, that Article 13 DSU does not 
permit the Panel to engage in fact-finding for the purpose of making the case of a claimant.
959
  
As such, Canada refused to co-operate with what it called a ‘shot-gun’ request for information 
and argued that there was nothing in GATT or WTO jurisprudence that substantiated the 
position that a responding party can be subject to a process of discovery.
960
 
 
However, the Appellate Body upheld that Panel’s right to make binding requests, arguing that 
if Article 13 DSU were to be interpreted as representing merely a non-binding request for 
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information, the Panel’s ‘right to seek information’ would be rendered meaningless.961  As 
such, the AB pointed to the wording of Article 13.1 that WTO Members were under a duty to 
‘respond promptly and in full’ to requests for information made by the Panels,962 suggesting 
that this stipulation added further weight to the argument that ‘should’ ought to be read as 
‘shall’ in this provision.963  The AB went on to state that: 
 
‘To hold that a Member party to a dispute is not legally bound to comply with a 
panel’s request for information relating to that dispute, is, in effect, to declare that 
Member legally free to preclude a panel from carrying out its mandate and 
responsibility under the DSU.  So to rule would be to reduce to an illusion and a 
vanity the fundamental right of Members to have disputes arising between them 
resolved through the system and proceedings for which they bargained in concluding 
the DSU.  We are bound to reject an interpretation that promises such 
consequences’964 
 
As such, relying on Arts 11 and 12, the AB ‘transformed the right of a panel to seek 
information first into a right to obtain such information and then into a task of ‘finding the 
facts constituting the dispute before it’ or ‘ascertaining the real or relevant facts of a 
dispute’.965 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the AB’s interpretation of the fact-finding power contained in Article 
13 DSU has come in for some criticism.  For instance, Kuyper has pointed out that inferring a 
binding duty to provide evidence from the obligation to act in good faith is somewhat 
unsound since any refusal to do so, whilst providing a satisfactory basis upon which to draw 
adverse inferences, does not warrant taking the extra step of extrapolating a duty to provide 
information, a duty described as ‘an unnecessary logical step and construed on the basis of 
rather flimsy contextual analysis’.966  Furthermore, as one commentator has stated, ‘where 
judicial or arbitral bodies can impose upon States a duty to disclose evidence, the statutory 
instruments or procedural rules will say so, or will at least clearly imply it’.967  The question 
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in this case is whether Article 13 can be read as clearly implying a duty to disclose requested 
information or not – a question not definitively answered in the case law. 
 
Further, another commentator has questioned the dangerous precedent created by such 
interpretation, asking ‘how are government lawyers and private sector counsel to advise their 
clients as to the nature and scope of their obligation?  How are future negotiators to be 
counselled on drafting treaty language?’968 
 
It would appear at the very least, however, that Panels and the AB conceive of Article 13 as 
granting a power to compel the production of evidence in a way that is notably more proactive 
than the ICJ, for instance.
969
  Although the AB’s reasoning in this case may be far form 
satisfactory, the end result of asserting a power to compel the disclosure of information did 
not provoke outrage from WTO Members.  It is suggested that the same result can be 
achieved for the ICJ but through less problematic legal reasoning, such as relying on the duty 
of collaboration, should the Court so choose. 
 
  
                                                 
968
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4.1.3. Developing a Power to Compel the Disclosure of Evidence for the ICJ 
 
Judge Owada in Oil Platforms argued that the Court has in the past been overly concerned 
with the sovereign nature of the parties before it and the desire to not appear to favour one 
party over another.  In other words, the Court’s preoccupation with appearing impartial has 
meant that it has under-utilised its Article 49 ICJ Statute power to request information from 
the parties.  Judge Owada argued that the Court, as a court of justice, must act like one in the 
course of judicial proceedings and do all that it can to address the problems arguably caused 
by the Court’s traditional reactive approach to fact-finding.970  In order to do so, the judge 
argued that; 
 
‘…the only way to achieve this would have been for the Court to take a more 
proactive stance on the issue of evidence and that of fact-finding in the present 
case’.971 
 
 
Arguably the need for a more proactive approach extends beyond the facts of the Oil 
Platforms case to all cases where the Court’s traditionally reactive approach to fact-finding is 
a hindrance to the proper administration of justice (see Chapter 2).  Drawing on the practice 
of the WTO adjudicative bodies it could be argued that there is little preventing the Court 
from requesting information from the parties again in the future and insisting that its powers 
to do so are compulsory, in the right circumstances.
972
  Such circumstances would include 
where the information requested is in the sole possession of one party, where the other party 
has made a prima facie case and where it can demonstrate that it has made reasonable efforts 
to obtain the information requested, conditions to which we shall return in section 4.1.4.(iv). 
 
It is argued that the Court’s extensive fact-finding powers and the broad wording of Article 49 
of the Statute and Article 62 of the Rules permit an interpretation of the Court’s powers that 
holds that it has the power to compel production and draw adverse inferences from any 
unexplained refusal to do so.  Quite simply, it is argued that the open wording of Article 49 of 
the Court’s Statute and the corresponding Article 62 of the Rules mean that the Court would 
not need to engage in the type of linguistic gymnastics that the WTO adjudicative bodies were 
forced into in order to construe its power to seek information as binding on the parties to the 
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case before it.  Article 49 of the Statute states plainly that the Court ‘may, even before the 
hearing begins, call upon the agents to produce any document or to supply any explanations’ 
whilst Article 62 of the Rules relatedly states that the Court ‘may at any time call upon the 
parties to produce such evidence or to give such explanations as the Court may consider to be 
necessary for the elucidation of any aspect of the matters in issue, or may itself seek other 
information for this purpose.’  Quite plainly, interpreting the Court’s power to ‘call upon’ 
agents or parties to produce evidence it ‘considers to be necessary for the elucidation of any 
aspect of the matters in issue’ is less of a stretch compared to interpreting that a party ‘should’ 
produce information to mean that it ‘shall’ do so.   
 
Whilst, admittedly, international courts and tribunals that possess such compulsory powers of 
production usually have this power explicitly laid out in statutory form, it is argued that the 
trailblazing example of the WTO adjudicative bodies could act as a precedent for the Court, 
should it feel the need to insist upon its powers in order to secure evidence necessary to 
establish a solid factual foundation for the case at hand.  Furthermore, it is argued that any 
purposive interpretation of its Article 49 powers to request information, in line with the 
principle of effectiveness, point to the conclusion that the argument that the Court can issue 
binding requests for information is not completely implausible.   
 
A purposive interpretation of the provisions that contain the Court’s fact-finding powers is 
permitted as part of the customary rule for treaty interpretation as set out in Article 31(1) of 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).  This ‘general rule of 
interpretation’ states that that ‘[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith and in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose.’  The WTO has given the most concise statement of the 
‘general rule of interpretation’ set out in Article 31(1) of the VCLT in recent times in the US-
Shrimp case, stating that; 
 
A treaty interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular 
provision to be interpreted.  It is in the words constituting that provision, read in their 
context, that the object and the purpose of the states parties to the treaty must first be 
sought.  Where the meaning imparted by the text itself is equivocal or inconclusive, or 
where confirmation of the correctness of the reading of the text itself is desired, light 
from the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole may be usefully sought’.973 
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Whilst the ICJ has also stated that the ordinary meaning is the starting point for treaty 
interpretation which the interpretation must be based ‘above all upon the text of the treaty’,974 
the reference in Article 31(1) to the ‘object and purpose’ introduces an element of purposive, 
teleological interpretation.
975
  Accordingly, it is argued that, despite the fact doing so is far 
from an exact science,
976
 purposively interpreting its existing powers to request information to 
insist upon the production of evidence is an option open to the Court.  
 
This is especially so given the fact that purposive interpretation has ‘traditionally played a 
part in the interpretation of constitutions of international organisations (and their implied 
powers) and other multilateral, “legislative” conventions,977 in international law purposive 
interpretation is closely linked to the principle of effectiveness.
978
  Crucially, ICJ has in its 
case law consistently ‘harnessed’ the principle of effectiveness to the purposive interpretation 
of treaties.  As such, any ambiguity or uncertainty may be interpreted in line with the object 
and purpose of the treaty as a whole in order to ‘enable the treaty to have appropriate 
effects’.979  An example of this can be seen in the Territorial Dispute case where the Court 
applied the principle of effectiveness with regards to the object and purpose of the treaty in 
seeking to delimit a settled boundary.
980
  The Court interpreted the treaty provision so as to 
best to give practical effect to the object and purpose of the treaty, and stated that doing 
otherwise ‘would be contrary to one of the fundamental principles of interpretation of treaties, 
consistently upheld by international jurisprudence, namely that of effectiveness’.981   
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Taking up such reasoning, the Court could conceivably purposively interpret its own fact-
finding powers and assert that the way to best give effect to these powers is that they be 
binding on the parties.  The Court’s Statute (being without a preamble), Rules and the relevant 
provisions of the UN Charter provide little more than the fact that Court is both a principal 
organ and principal judicial organ of the United Nations.
982
  Despite this, it is clear that the 
object and purpose of Article 49 of the Court’s Statute, for example, is to ensure that the Court 
has all the facts it needs to make sound legal determinations, and if the Court felt that the 
most effective way to establish such facts was to compel the production of evidence it is 
difficult to imagine an argument that states parties could advance without somehow appealing 
to traditional privileges of state sovereignty and the control over the fact-production process 
that states have enjoyed in the past.
983
 
 
In short, it is argued that through taking a teleological approach to this power the Court can 
begin to assert that parties must comply with its requests for information.  Bolstering this 
interpretation is the related duty of collaboration, to which we now turn. 
 
4.1.4. The Duty of Collaboration & the Burden of Proof 
 
(i) Definition 
 
In the recent Argentina-Footwear case a Panel of the WTO adjudicative bodies, considering 
whether it should allow a request from the US to order the production of documents from the 
Argentina, stated that the very idea of the peaceful settlement of international disputes by 
adjudication is founded on the notion of co-operation between the parties, and that to this end 
there existed a ‘rule of collaboration’ with regard to the production of evidence.984  It is this 
rule or duty that is considered in the following section. 
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However, before we can turn our attention to the duty of collaboration that is the topic of the 
following section, a preliminary word is needed about the burden of proof before the ICJ.  
Like the majority of international courts and tribunals,
985
 the burden of proof before the Court 
has always generally been said to lie with the party alleging a fact in accordance with the 
principle of actori incumbit probatio.
986
  In this regard the status of the party as applicant or 
defendant is not determinative.  In reality the Court does not operate a strict burden of proof 
and it may be the case that in relation to different legal issues before the Court, different 
parties bear the burden at different times.
987
  For instance, in the Guinea v. Congo case it was 
for one party to establish that local remedies were exhausted or that extenuating 
circumstances existed that avoided this requirement – whilst at the same time it was for the 
other side to prove that these local remedies had not been exhausted.
988
  Similarly, in Rights of 
US Citizens in Morocco, the Court determined that the US bore the burden of proving that its 
citizens had certain rights in the French Zone of Morocco, despite the fact that France was 
formally the applicant party in this case.
989
  The Court’s operation in this way means that 
when cases are brought before it through mutual agreement it has no need to alter its approach 
to the burden of proof.
990
 
 
Additionally, the Court recently held that the burden does not shift in relation to the 
precautionary principle stating that ‘while a precautionary approach may be relevant in the 
interpretation and application of the provisions of the Statute, it does not follow that it 
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operates as a reversal of the burden of proof’.991  Similarly, the Court has not in the past 
stressed a strict standard of proof.
992
  But what is the significance of there not being a strict 
burden of proof before the Court?   
 
It is argued that whilst the party alleging a fact generally bears the burden of proof in 
accordance with the principle of actori incumbit probatio, this party does not bear the burden 
of production of evidence alone.  Once jurisdiction has been established in the case before the 
Court each party is under an obligation to collaborate with the Court in the establishment of a 
sound factual foundation upon which the Court can make legal determinations.  And indeed, 
the Court most recently in the Pulp Mills case explicitly stated that both states were to co-
operate in the production of evidence in order to assist the Court in order to resolve the 
dispute before it.
993
 
 
The Court specifically mentioned that the parties ought to co-operate in the provision of 
evidence to the Court beyond that which supports their own case.  It is this sort of statement 
and conception of the role of states in the fact-finding that the Court could seize on in order to 
take a more proactive approach to the facts.  In doing so the ICJ could become more like other 
courts who have become more assertive in their own function and more assertive in 
emphasising the duty of collaboration whilst no longer seeing themselves as at the mercy of 
the whims of states or of their sovereignty. 
 
It has long been argued by international legal scholars that in light of the absence of an 
explicit power which would enable the Court to compel the production of evidence like those 
that exist in domestic law, states ‘have a more extensive obligation to produce all evidence 
within their control than that normally imposed upon litigants in municipal proceedings’.994  
For instance, in Georges Scelle’s report to the International Law Commission in 1950 as 
Special Rapporteur on Arbitral Procedure stated that;  
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‘il est…un principe certain, c’est que les Etates en litige ont l’obligation de collaborer 
de bonne foi à l’administration de la preuve’.995   
 
This obligation has often been termed the ‘duty of collaboration’ but what exactly is it?  The 
duty of collaboration can be broadly defined as the obligation placed on states appearing as 
parties before international courts and tribunals to provide information necessary for the 
establishment of the facts of the case and the proper administration of justice more 
generally.
996
  The duty of collaboration arises when states agree to submit their disputes to 
international adjudication.
997
  As such, the rationale underpinning the duty of collaboration 
has much to do with the sovereign nature of the states appearing before the Court and the 
fundamentally important principle of consent in international law.  As V.S. Mani famously 
stated; 
 
‘Adjudication cannot take place in a vacuum; it can function properly only if the 
parties are willing to co-operate with the tribunal by furnishing it with all necessary 
and relevant facts by way of evidence.’998 
 
Once consent has been given to international adjudication it is a widely held position that 
parties are obligated to act in good faith and to put evidence before the tribunal ‘so as to 
enable it to arrive at a viable and fair resolution of the conflicting claims’.999  The duty of 
collaboration falls on both the claimant and defendant states, or any party appearing before 
the Court, and is meant to benefit all parties in this non-discriminatory manner.
1000
  The duty 
has a positive aspect, this being the duty to cooperate with the other party and with the Court 
to achieve the settlement of the dispute through the judicial process,
1001
 including the 
establishment of the factual foundation of the case.  Similarly, there is a negative aspect to this 
duty, in that Sates are obligated not to destroy or deliberately obstruct access to information 
within their sole possession.
1002
  Whilst the rule of collaboration is not specifically mentioned 
                                                 
995
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996
 Sandifer 117; Mosk 137 
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in either the Court’s Statute or Rules, the rule is contained in other international legal 
instruments.   
 
(ii) The Duty of Collaboration in International Instruments  
 
For instance, the 1907 Hague Convention contains a mention of the duty in relation to the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration.  Article 75 lays down that states are under a duty ‘to supply 
the tribunal, as fully as they consider possible, with all the information required for deciding 
the case.’  The Draft on Arbitral Procedure produced by the International Law Commission in 
1958 stated in Article 21 that: 
 
‘The parties shall cooperate with the tribunal in the production of evidence and shall 
comply with the measures ordered by the tribunal for this purpose.  The tribunal shall 
take note of the failure of any party to comply with its obligations under this 
paragraph’1003 
 
This was developed even further in Article 10 of the 1962 Permanent Court of Arbitration 
‘Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation for Settlement of International Disputes Between Two 
Parties of Which Only One is a State’ which states that ‘the parties undertake to facilitate the 
work of the Commission and particularly to furnish it to the greatest possible extent with all 
relevant documents and information’.1004 
 
Similarly Rule 33(3) of the Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules) 
of ICSID 1986 states that: 
 
‘The parties shall cooperate with the Tribunal in the production of evidence and in the 
other measures provided for in paragraph (2).  The Tribunal shall take formal note of 
the failure of a party to comply with its obligations under this paragraph and of any 
reasons given for such failure’.1005 
 
                                                 
1003
 Draft on Arbitral Procedure adopted by the International Law Commission at its Fifth Session, (1958), 
Article 21(2) in II Yearbook of the International Law Commission, A/CN.4/SER.A/1958/Add.1, p. 9, para 20; 
20. Article 21 (formerly article 15) could be placed before article 20, for it is concerned with the general 
subject of the hearing of evidence before the closure of proceedings. It is based partly on theory, partly on the 
jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals, and partly on the jurisprudence of The Hague Court.20 Its underlying 
principles can be traced back to the 1907 Convention (articles 74 and 75) and to Articles 4S and 49 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
1004
 Article 10, superseded by rules based on the UNICTRAL rules; http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=194 
1005
 Rule 33(3) of the Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules) of ICSID 1986 
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Further, Article 2 of the 1991 Resolution of the Institut de Droit International, on the subject 
of non-appearance, made reference to the duties of a state appearing before the Court.  The 
Resolution states that ‘in considering whether to appear or to continue to appear in any phase 
of proceedings before the Court, a State should have regard to its duty to co-operate in the 
fulfilment of the Court’s judicial functions’.1006   
 
In addition, Article 6 of Annex VII of UNCLOS relating to arbitral proceedings under the 
Convention provides explicitly for the duties of the parties to the dispute, stating that parties 
are under a duty to facilitate the wok of the arbitral tribunal, or in other words a statement of 
the duty of collaboration. Subjection (a) provides that the parties are under a duty to provide 
the tribunal with ‘all relevant documents, facilities and information’ and subjection (b) 
provides that parties are under a duty to ‘enable it when necessary to call witnesses or experts 
and receive their evidence and to visit the localities to which the case relates’. 
 
However, these statutory documents reveal little about the content of the obligation.  For more 
useful insight into the duty of collaboration it is to the case law of various international courts 
and tribunals that we must look. 
 
(iii) The Duty of Collaboration in International Jurisprudence  
 
The development of this duty can be traced throughout the history of international dispute 
settlement.  The classic example often referred to is the Parker Case before the Mexican 
Claims Commission, in which the Commission said: 
 
‘It is the duty of the respective Agencies to cooperate in searching out and presenting 
to this tribunal all facts throwing any light on the merits of the claim presented.  The 
Commission denies the ‘right’ of the respondent to merely wait in silence in cases 
where it is reasonable that it should speak’.1007 
 
It is interesting to note the similarity of the wording of this famous formulation of the duty of 
collaboration to the most recent high-profile invocation in the Pulp Mills case before the 
Court, to which we shall return.
1008
 The Commission also said that states were bound to make 
                                                 
1006
 Institut de Droit International, Session of Basel, 1991, Non-Appearance Before the International Court of 
Justice, Rapporteur, Arangio-Ruiz, Preamble 
1007
 RIAA, Vol IV, p. 39 
1008
 Contrast: ‘‘It is…to be expected that the Applicant should, in the first instance, submit the relevant evidence 
to substantiate its claims.  This does not, however, mean that the Respondent should not co-operate in the 
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full disclosure of the facts reasonably within their knowledge or that can reasonably be 
ascertained by them, no matter whether they are exculpatory or otherwise.
1009
  The 
Commission emphasised the relationship between the duty of collaboration and the principle 
relating to burden of proof, namely, actori incumbit probatio, stating that:  
 
‘Whilst ordinarily it is incumbent upon the party who alleges a fact to introduce 
evidence to establish it, yet before this Commission this rule does not relieve the 
respondent from its obligation to lay before the commission all evidence within its 
possession to establish the truth, whatever it may be’.1010 
 
As such, whilst it may be the case that the onus falls on the claimant state in cases before 
international tribunals, the burden in the production of evidence is not that state’s burden 
alone.  The duty of collaboration complements the rule of actori incumbit probatio ‘and in 
cases where the full application of the latter may result in unreasonable consequences or 
impede the due process of the proceedings, the rule of collaboration plays a balancing 
role’.1011  The respondent state, in some cases, may be under a duty to collaborate with the 
court or tribunal in the establishment of the factual record.  And indeed it has been argued that 
the duty of collaboration is not a mere formality; it is not enough that the party deny the 
claims made against it, rather, the party must justify its denial and put before the Court 
documents that are in its sole possession.
1012
 
 
Admittedly, the exact extent to which states must comply with requests for information is not 
entirely clear.  As Feller stated with regard to the position taken by the Mexican Claims 
Commission ‘[t]o the cynical observer of the habits of lawyers all this may seem nothing 
more than a pious wish.’1013  And indeed, the practice of international courts and tribunals 
since the Parker case does not indicate that a clear legal obligation on states to this full effect 
has been definitively established, with states being reluctant to put information damaging to 
their case before the tribunal in full knowledge of the fact that the Court plays an almost 
completely reactive role and that this information would be unlikely to come before the Court 
                                                                                                                                                        
provision of such evidence as may be in its possession that could assist the Court in resolving the dispute 
submitted to it…’; Pulp Mills Case, paras 162, 163, and 168 
1009
 American-Mexican General Claims Commission, William A Parker (USA) v United Mexican States, Award 
of 31 March 1926, RIAA 4 (1951), pp 35, 39 (para 6) 
1010
 Ibid, pp 35, 39 (para 6) 
1011
 Kazazi 121 
1012
 Ibid 
1013
 Ibid 
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were they to withhold it.
1014
     
 
There is some evidence in recent case law of international tribunals that the duty of 
collaboration is one which could potentially be utilised to bolster the obligation to provide 
requested evidence.
1015
  Should the Court choose to do so, it could rely on the duty of 
collaboration in order to enforce a power to compel the production of evidence.  Indeed a 
number of states have advocated a rule of collaboration in their submissions to the Court.
 1016
  
Further, the ICJ itself recently made reference to the duty of collaboration in the Pulp Mills 
case stating that: 
 
‘It is…to be expected that the Applicant should, in the first instance, submit the 
relevant evidence to substantiate its claims.  This does not, however, mean that the 
Respondent should not co-operate in the provision of such evidence as may be in its 
possession that could assist the Court in resolving the dispute submitted to it…’1017 
 
As stated above, the sentiment expressed by the Court, namely that the party bearing the 
burden of proof does not bear the sole burden with regard to the production of evidence is 
expressed in not dissimilar terms to the famous statement of the US-Mexican Claims 
Commission in the Parker case.  Robert Kolb has argued that the duty of collaboration is 
especially pertinent in relation to the ICJ owing to nature of disputes before the Court the 
facts of which ‘are often unique, often spread over a long period of time, and…frequently 
difficult and uncertain of access.’1018  This being so, it is suggested that the duty of 
collaboration is one which could aid the Court in its fact-finding process and recent 
statements such as the one in Pulp Mills suggest that this is a course of action that the Court 
would not necessarily rule out. 
 
Another prominent recent discussion of the duty of collaboration came in the aforementioned 
Argentina-Footwear case in which a Panel of the WTO adjudicative bodies stated that the 
very idea of the peaceful settlement of international disputes by adjudication is founded on the 
notion of co-operation between the parties, and that to this end there existed a ‘rule of 
                                                 
1014
 See the position of the British Government in Corfu Channel Case; Mosk 100 
1015
 Mosk 100; Kazazi 136; Riddell and Plant 98 
1016
 I.C.J. Pleadings, The Wall A.O., CR 2004/1, 23/2/2004, para 57; see argument of Palestine that ‘As a matter 
of policy a Member State should not be allowed to undermine the judicial function of the Court by refusing 
to place facts it considers essential before the Court, and then benefit from this situation by seeking to use it 
as a means of denying the Court jurisdiction.’ 
1017
 Pulp Mills Case, para 163 
1018
 Kolb 943 
  209 
collaboration’ with regard to the production of evidence.1019  Furthermore, in the context of 
National Treatment, it has been argued placing an onus of production in light of the duty of 
collaboration on to the party deemed to be ‘better informed’ could help to alleviate some of 
the informational issues facing adjudicators trying to establish the facts in cases before 
them.
1020
  Being heavily influenced by law-and-economics literature, it has been argued that 
the best way to minimise the possibility of judicial mistakes, as well as assuring the 
adjudicative body have the most accurate picture of the facts upon which to make judicial 
determinations is to place the onus of production on the better informed party.  Such ‘better 
informed’ parties are defined as those who have access to information that the other party 
does not or can simple access it at a substantially lower cost.  In theory, this would achieve the 
result that ‘information that would otherwise not be available will be presented…’1021  Such 
proposals also arise in the in the anti-dumping context.  These proposals advocate that in the 
case where a party does not answer the questions put to it by the Panel or in some way 
impedes the establishment of the factual record, the Panel may instead base its decision on the 
best facts available.
 1022
 
 
Similarly, and most recently, in the context of the Annex V SCM Agreement mechanism 
discussed above (at 3.1.2.8.), the AB stated that any interpretation of the information-
gathering power contained in this provision that would frustrate the collection of evidence 
would be contrary not only to ‘WTO Members’ manifest intention to promote the early and 
targeted collection of information’ but also, crucially, contrary to ‘the duty of cooperation to 
which a responding Member is subject’.1023 
 
In international arbitration too there have been recent pronouncements on the duty of 
collaboration.  For instance, in the Guyana/Suriname arbitration discussed in Chapter 3 the 
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 Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, Panel Report, 
WT/DS56/R, 25 November 1997, para 6.40; similarly in India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS50/AB/R, 19 December 1997, the AB stated 
that parties should be ‘fully forthcoming from the very beginning both as to the claims involved in the 
dispute and as to the facts relating to those claims…Claims must be stated clearly.  Facts must be disclosed 
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Tribunal explicitly reminded the parties of the importance of the principle of collaboration in 
the course of international proceedings- citing Articles 5 and 6 of Annex VII of UNCLOS as 
well as Articles 7(1) and (2) of the Tribunal’s own Rules of Procedure in support of this 
position.
1024
  As stated above, it is significant that the Tribunal set out in clear terms that once 
consent has been expressed the parties have a duty to collaborate with the Tribunal in the 
interests of the proper administration of justice. 
 
Of course there are potential drawbacks to insisting that states are under a duty of 
collaboration to put information within their sole possession before the Court such as the fact 
that it may not be clear when information is ‘within the sole possession’ of one party or when 
the other has done all it can to secure the information.
1025
  Relatedly, there exists the danger 
that insisting on the duty of collaboration might encourage a flurry of speculative cases, or 
that any duty would disproportionately effect states with less resources.
1026
  In addition, 
commentators such as Benzing have argued that imposing on parties the such a duty of 
providing evidence, ‘…would mean a virtually unlimited duty of the parties to disclose all 
relevant facts and evidence, even in relation to evidence adverse to the interests of the party in 
possession of the particular document.’1027  Nevertheless, it is argued that the implication that 
the insistence on any such duty of collaboration resulting in practice to ‘a virtually unlimited 
duty’ is an exaggeration since the duty is in fact subject to a number of conditions which 
restrict the number of situations in which states can be compelled to comply with this duty. 
 
(iv) A Duty of Collaboration that is Conditional 
 
Whilst it is agued that the Court in fact has the right to insist that the parties, being under a 
duty of collaboration, cooperate with the Court in the fact-finding process,
1028
 this duty is not 
absolute.  Rather, it is subject to a number of conditions, illustrated well by the Panel in 
Argentina –Footwear which was careful to emphasise the two conditions that attach to the 
                                                 
1024
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1025
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rule of collaboration, namely: (i) that it only applies to the disclosure of evidence in the sole 
possession of the other party.  The fact that states may be compelled to place before the Court 
any information within its sole possession is one with a long lineage with the Court stating in 
first case that a ‘State may, up to a certain point, be bound to supply particulars of the use 
made by it of the means of information and inquiry at its disposal’.1029  Secondly, (ii) the duty 
does not arise until ‘the claimant has done its best to secure evidence and has actually 
produced some prima facie evidence in support of its case’.1030   
 
As a result of these conditions it is clear that parties do not have the right to full compulsory 
discovery of the kind generally found in domestic common law legal systems, but rather a 
narrower power to insist on collaboration in the production of evidence subject to strict 
conditions.  It is argued that this distinction and the limitations on these powers that make the 
prospect of the Court insisting on such a power before the ICJ a more realistic prospect, 
compared to the alternative of a more all-encompassing power of discovery. 
 
In sum, what can be said about the operation of the duty of collaboration in international 
judicial practice to date?  Whilst the Court’s Statute and Rules do not explicitly mention the 
duty of collaboration, and whilst Article 43(2) of the Statute appears to only require that 
States put information before the Court ‘in support of their arguments’,1031 it is nevertheless 
suggested that the argument that both parties appearing before the Court are under a duty of 
collaboration in relation to the production of evidence is strong.  The number of international 
instruments and mentions of the duty in international jurisprudence lend weight to this 
argument.  To this end, if the Court were to choose to do so, it is suggested that, subject to the 
conditions of sole possession, previous attempts to obtain information and the establishment 
of a prima facie case, the Court can insist that both parties are under a duty to put relevant 
information before the Court.  Subsequent refusals to do so, it is argued, could result in the 
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 Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, Panel Report, 
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drawing of adverse inferences against that party and it is to this issue to which we will turn in 
section 4.2.6.
1032
   
Whilst it has been demonstrated that the Court could insist that parties to a case before it are 
under a duty to put relevant information before the Court, it is easy to see the shortcomings of 
taking such an approach: in cases of refusal to cooperate it would appear that the only option 
left open to the Court is to draw adverse inferences – a power that the Court already possessed 
in the first place.  As such, the utility of insisting upon the compulsory nature of its power to 
order the production of evidence by the parties is open to question.  This is an issue that will 
be addressed in greater detail in Chapter 5 section 5.5. among with other shortcomings of the 
reforms proposed in this chapter.  Presently, however, the following section will examine 
whether, drawing on the duty of collaboration, the Court could couch its requests for 
information within provisional measures in order to give them binding force. 
 
  
                                                 
1032
 Sean D. Murphy, ‘The Experience of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission’ [American Society of 
International Law] 106 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 237; 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Rules of Procedure, art 1 
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4.2. Provisional Measures 
 
The following section argues that provisional measures are potentially a means of making 
binding requests for information that the Court could consider.  The Court’s previous 
interpretation of provisional measures and Article 41 of the its Statute represent a model for 
the kind of creative restyling that it is argued the Court could and should undertake in order to 
remedy some of the deficiencies in the Court’s current approach to fact-finding.1033  To 
elaborate, Article 41 of the Court’s Statute, dealing with the Court’s power to order 
provisional measures,
1034
 states: 
 
1. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so 
require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective 
rights of either party. 
2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith be 
given to the parties and to the Security Council. 
 
The Court’s power to order provisional measures is discretionary and exceptional.1035  This 
power is discretionary due to the fact that the Court is under no obligation to order provisional 
measures when requested to do so – Article 41 of the Statute stating that the Court need only 
provide provisional measures ‘if it considers that circumstances so require’.  The Court retains 
broad and unfettered discretion in this regard.  Further, the power is exceptional due to the 
fact Article 41 of the Statute imposes strict constraints on when this power can be exercised, 
namely only in situations ‘to preserve the respective rights of either party’.   
 
Whilst the Court’s power may be discretionary and exceptional, the power was for a long time 
somewhat uncertain due to the fact Article 41 does not explicitly state that such measures are 
binding on parties in cases that come before the Court.  Although the Court’s power to 
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 This creative restyling terminology is inspired by the proposals of the late Antonio Cassese; see Cassese, 
‘The International Court of Justice: It is High Time to Restyle the Respected Old Lady’ 
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UNCLOS 
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indicate provisional measures lies in the Statute, the Rules clarify the extent of this power, 
providing for example that the Court has the power to make such provisional measures 
proprio motu
1036
 and that it may indicate provisional measures not specifically requested by 
the parties.
1037
 
 
The long-running academic debate surrounding the binding nature of provisional measures 
before the ICJ centre around the wording of Article 41 of the Court’s Statute which refers to 
the power to ‘indicate’ provisional measures that ‘ought to be taken’.  The fact that Article 41 
does not employ imperative terminology and the fact the ordinary meaning of the term 
indicate does not imply any obligations ‘led most scholars to conclude that there is no 
question of a binding provisional measures order’.1038  However, the Court has since clarified 
for the first time that its power to order provisional measures under Article 41 is indeed 
binding upon the parties in the LaGrand case.
1039
 
 
In the course of the LaGrand case Germany argued that the US had failed ‘to take all 
measures at its disposal’ to ensure that Walter LaGrand was not executed for the crimes he 
had been convicted of pending the final judgment of the Court, as the provisional measure 
had stipulated.
1040
  The US, on the other hand, argued that the drafting history of Article 41 
did not support the argument that provisional measures were binding on the parties.  The 
Court ultimately held that, after considering the object and purpose of the Statute, and the 
English and French versions of the text, provisional measures under Article 41 of the Statute 
were binding on the parties.
1041
 
 
4.2.1. What is the Object of Provisional Measures? 
 
The Court in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case laid down its authoritative statement regarding 
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the object of provisional measures, namely that the Court’s power to order provisional 
measures ‘presupposes that irreparable prejudice should not be caused to rights which are the 
subject of a dispute in judicial proceedings’.1042  As such it is clear to see why provisional 
measures are often termed ‘protective measures’; due to the fact they have been traditionally 
conceived of as having the sole object of protecting the parties’ rights in international law and 
the integrity of the judicial process as a whole.
1043
  
 
Provisional measures seek to ensure that the rights of parties existing at the time of the 
request for the order are protected through ensuring that neither party takes any action (or 
omission) that would frustrate the object of the adjudicative process.
1044
  Not all international 
courts and tribunals have explicit powers to order provisional measures,
1045
 although some 
have insisted on the inclusion of such a power in their rules of procedure and practice in this 
regard has suggested to some commentators that international courts and tribunals believe the 
power to order provisional measures to be an inherent judicial power.
1046
  On whether there is 
an inherent power of international courts and tribunals,
1047
 Thirlway has asserted that this is 
an academic question where the tribunal in question has a specific power in its constitutive 
instruments, as with the ICJ, except ‘to the extent that the kind of measures which the Court 
has on occasion claimed the power to indicate might be thought to go in some respects 
beyond the exact wording of the Statute.’1048 
 
On a more practical level, the need for the power to order provisional measures stems from 
the fact that, once the case is brought it may be some years before the judgment is handed 
down.  The power to order provisional measures allows the tribunal in some small way to 
keep a handle on the dispute in the intervening period to ensure that the judicial process is not 
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frustrated by either party in the meantime.
1049  As Judge Ndiaye has said of provision 
measures in the context of ITLOS, the actions of one party can threaten the entire judicial 
process and as such: 
 
‘[t]he role of provisional measures is, therefore, to prevent those unfortunate 
consequences from happening, to ensure the effectiveness of the decision-making 
process, and to help maintain the status quo with regard to situations contested in the 
meantime, which the other party is allegedly seeking to alter.’1050 
 
The most common course of action ordered by the Court is to oblige the parties to cooperate 
and enter into negotiations to resolve the dispute at hand,
1051
 and to order that the parties do 
nothing that would aggravate or complicate the dispute.
1052
  Further, provisional measures 
have the purpose of preserving the integrity of the judicial process, or ‘the effective 
functioning of the system and the proper administration of justice’, for which the Court itself 
is responsible.1053 
 
4.2.2. When Can Provisional Measures be Made? 
 
A combination of the wording of Article 41 of the Court’s Statue and the case law of the 
Court have indicated that a number of conditions must be met for the Court to be able to order 
provisional measures.  
 
First of all, the Court has established that it must have prima facie jurisdiction in order to 
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consider ordering provisional measures.
1054
  The Court must convince itself that on the face of 
it, the facts of the case indicate that the Court has jurisdiction over the dispute and that the 
rights sought to be preserved are the rights that will be at the heart of the dispute at the merits 
stage.
1055
  Secondly, the Court must be convinced that there is the chance of irreparable 
harm.
1056
  The Court’s jurisprudence indicates that it will make an assessment on the risk of 
rights being irreparably harmed on the basis of probability, a standard short of certainty.
1057
 
 
Finally, the Court must be convinced of the urgency of the situation. Provisional measures 
must be required as a matter of urgency.
1058
  As such, this suggests that the temporal element 
relates to urgency at the time of the request, and not only ‘pending the final decision’.1059  
Multiple orders for provisional measures can be made.
1060
 
 
It is not inconceivable that these conditions may be met in cases regarding the preservation of 
evidence.  There is no reason to doubt that there may be situations where the Court has prima 
facie jurisdiction, such as where there is a danger that evidence may be at risk of destruction, 
that the danger of irreparable harm and urgency requirements may be met.
1061
  And indeed 
there are examples in the Court’s case law in which it has utilised provisional measures in 
relation to evidentiary issues. 
 
4.2.3. Provisional Measures and Evidence 
 
It is argued that the Court’s power to order provisional measures to ensure the protection of 
parties’ rights is broad enough to cover the proper conduct of the judicial process,1062 to 
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ensure that the Court is able to render a judgment that is effective.
1063
  To this end, the 
preservation of evidence ‘without which a party might not be able to prove its claim and the 
tribunal might not be able to settle the dispute’ is a legitimate aim of provisional measures.1064  
 
Expanding more specifically on the Court’s ability to order measures that protect the integrity 
of the judicial process, significantly, there is some precedent for the use of provisional 
measures in relation fact-finding.  In the Cameroon v Nigeria case, the Court referred to the 
fact-finding mission to the Bakassi Peninsula proposed by the Secretary-General
1065
 in 
ordering the parties to ‘take all necessary steps to conserve evidence relevant to the present 
case within the disputed area’.1066  Furthermore, crucially, the Court ordered the parties to 
‘…lend every assistance to the fact-finding mission which the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations has proposed to send…’1067 although the Court did not ultimately refer to the 
Secretary-General’s report in the final judgment.1068 
 
That the Court, in an order binding on the parties, ordered cooperation with the Secretary-
General’s fact-finding mission is significant in demonstrating the use of provisional measures 
to safeguard the judicial process as a whole and to aid the Court in its fact-finding task.  In 
this regard the order in the Cameroon v. Nigeria case, it is argued, can be seen as precedent 
for the more extensive use of provisional measures by the Court in taking a more proactive 
approach to the facts.  It is argued that, for example, the Court is competent to include in a 
provisional measure the obligation to disclose specific documents that lie in the sole 
possession of that party and that have been specifically requested by the other party.  Again, 
there is some precedent for such action. 
 
For instance, before the PCIJ in the Denunciation of the Treaty of 2 November 1865 between 
China and Belgium case, President Huber ordered, specifically referring to Article 41 of the 
Court’s Statute, that property and shipping not be sequestered or seized and be protected from 
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1064
 See Denunciation of the Treaty of 2 November 1985 between China and Belgium, PCIJ, Series A, No 8, 
Order of January 8th, 1927, II ('as regards property and shipping'); Brown, A Common Law of International 
Adjudication 122 
1065
 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Provisional Measures, Order of 15 March 
1996, ICJ Reports 1996, p 13 
1066
 Ibid 
1067
 Ibid 
1068
 Land and Maritine Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria case 
  219 
‘any destruction other than accidental’.1069  Similarly, the ICJ in the Frontier Dispute case 
ordered that both parties ‘should refrain from any act likely to impede the gathering of 
evidence material to the present case’1070 and in the Land, Maritime and Frontier Dispute case 
the Court ordered that the parties ‘take all necessary steps to conserve evidence relevant to the 
present case within the disputed area’.1071 
 
Further, there is evidence of the use of provisional measures for preservation in other 
international courts and tribunals.  For instance, in the Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania case the 
ICSID arbitral tribunal ordered the preservation and provision of documentation in respect of 
a number of pieces of evidence requested by the company.
1072
  There is some evidence of this 
in other areas of international law, such as the AGIP v. Congo case in which the ICSID arbitral 
tribunal granted a discovery order in a provisional measure.
1073
  Additionally, a particularly 
high-profile recent example of the use of provisional measures in relation to evidentiary 
matters arose during the provisional measures stage of the Land Reclamation case between 
Malaysia and Singapore. 
 
In this case provisional measures were sought by Malaysia to prevent the continuation of land 
reclamation works being carried out by Singapore that were alleged to adversely affect the 
marine environment in the Straights of Johor – the body of water that separates Malaysia from 
Singapore.
1074
  On 4 July 2003 Malaysia requested the establishment of an arbitral tribunal 
under Annex VII of UNCLOS to delimit the boundary between the territorial waters of the 
two states, determine whether Singapore’s land reclamation activities had breached its 
obligations under UNCLOS and to seek cessation of these activities.  However, before the 
arbitral tribunal could render its decision Malaysia sought provisional measures from ITLOS 
as they were entitled to under Article 290(5) of UNCLOS.
1075
  Malaysia’s request for 
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provisional measures attempted to bring a immediate halt to Singapore’s land reclamation 
activities and to impose an obligation on Singapore to provide Malaysia with all relevant 
information on their planned works, afford Malaysia the opportunity to comment on these 
works and for Singapore to agree to negotiate with Malaysia.
1076
   
 
During the course of proceedings Professor James Crawford made reference in passing to a 
meeting between the two states which had taken place on 22 August 2003 at which a proposal 
for a ‘jointly-funded assessment process’ had been discussed and remarked that the Malaysian 
delegation still wished this could happen.
1077
  In response, Professor Koh in making 
Singapore’s closing statement to the tribunal remarked that Singapore was willing to 
cooperate with Malaysia on a range of matters including cooperating to ‘co-commission and 
co-finance a new scientific study by independent experts’.1078  In its Order of 8 October 2003 
the Tribunal subsequently noted that Singapore had accepted Malaysia’s proposal to this 
end
1079
 and prescribed that the two states ‘shall…enter into consultations forthwith in order 
to…(a) establish promptly a group of independent experts…’1080  Whilst this measure only 
imposes an obligation on the parties to enter into consultations with regards to the 
establishment of the group of experts, it is nonetheless remarkable that the Tribunal would 
indicate such a provisional measure which relates specifically to the gathering of evidence as 
opposed to the preservation of the rights of the parties per se.  This fact appeared 
unremarkable to the judges, avoiding mention in any of the eight declarations and separate 
opinions made.  It is perhaps even more remarkable that the Tribunal indicated this 
provisional measure proprio motu since this was not a measure that had originally been 
sought by Malaysia, but had merely been mentioned before the Court in passing. 
 
Additionally, it is important to note that this group of experts (GOE) was in fact subsequently 
established and that it had a very real impact on the resolution of the dispute between the two 
states.  Whilst the report of the GOE is not publicly available, after the group had submitted 
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their final report the states signed a Settlement Agreement on 26 April 2005 which 
specifically states that the parties ‘have considered and reviewed the GOE’s Final Report and 
accepted its recommendations’ and which terminates the arbitral proceedings before the 
PCA.
1081
  Consequently, in taking a proactive approach to the fact-finding process in 
indicating a provisional measure proprio motu ITLOS has not only set an important precedent 
upon which the ICJ could draw but also materially contributed to the resolution of the dispute.  
 
Through making a request for information through provisional measures under Article 41 of 
the Court’s Statute, coming either from the other party or from the Court itself, the Court has 
the ability to make its requests binding on the parties.  In doing so, the Court would be able to 
circumvent the unclear legal issue as to whether its power to request information from the 
parties under Article 49 of its Statute (see Chapter 1 at 1.1.4.) is legally binding on the parties 
or merely recommendatory.  Since the Court has been reluctant to make requests for 
information in the past, and has not regularly drawn adverse inferences in those few cases it 
has requested information it is suggested that having the weight of the binding authority of 
provisional measures behind it, the Court could more easily take a more proactive approach to 
securing the facts necessary to make sound legal determinations in cases that come before it. 
 
4.2.4. The Obstacle to Using Provisional Measures as part of a more Proactive Approach to 
Fact-Finding 
 
There is a potential obstacle to the Court more often utilising its power to indicate provisional 
measures to secure the protection and production of evidence – namely the requirement that 
the provisional measures can only be made to preserve the rights of the parties before the 
Court that will form the basis for the merits of the case.  As Palchetti has stated; ‘[t]he Court 
does not have the power to protect proprio motu rights of the parties that are not in dispute in 
the case before it; this would constitute an ultra petita.’1082  In practice the Court has always 
stressed that the measures in question were related to the dispute rights in the case at hand. 
 
That having been said, Palchetti’s argument is open to question.  First of all, the history of the 
Court’s use of provisional measures in relation to evidence can be said to have the underlying 
rationale of protecting the judicial process rather than protecting the rights of individual 
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parties per se.  As such, they are not designed to protect a right that is in dispute in the case, 
but rather to protect the integrity of the judicial process, and as such it is hard to see how the 
Court could be acting ultra petita in such cases.
1083
  Consequently, in cases where the Court 
uses interim measures to protect or order the production of evidence, it is argued that the fact 
the orders do not relate to a right that is in dispute in the case at hand is inconsequential.  As 
Kolb has stated, ‘measures indicated by the Court of its own volition can be slightly further 
removed from the subject matter of the dispute than measures to protect disputed substantive 
rights…since damage to the procedure will unfailingly, albeit indirectly, affect the parties’ 
substantive rights too’.1084  In sum, it is argued that the Court is not precluded from couching 
its requests for information in provisional measures in this respect.  However, the prospect of 
the Court making binding requests for information, or orders to preserve existing evidence, in 
light of states traditional control over the fact-finding process, raises the possibility that states 
will simply not comply with such requests.   
 
4.2.5. Legal Consequences of Non-Compliance with Provisional Measures 
 
There have been a number of recent examples of non-compliance with provisional measures 
in the practice of the Court.  For example, in the Armed Activities case the Court found that 
Uganda had failed to comply with its provisional measure of 1 July 2000.
1085
  However since 
the Democratic Republic had only requested a declaration to this effect and had not sought 
damages the Court did not make an award of compensation for the breach that it had found to 
have taken place.  Similarly in the Bosnian Genocide case the Court found Serbia to have 
breached the provisional measures of 8 April 1993 and 13 September 1993.
1086
  And in this 
case Bosnian and Herzegovina did seek monetary compensation for Serbia’s failure to comply 
with the Court’s provisional measures.  However, ultimately the Court opted to make a 
declaratory statement to the effect that Serbia had breached its obligations rather than 
ordering monetary compensation.
1087
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Nevertheless, the Court’s reluctance to award monetary compensation is arguably 
inconsequential in the context of provisional measures relating to evidence.  In such cases, 
what is sought is not a declaratory statement or compensation but rather the production or 
protection of documents for instance (although admittedly it would in some cases be difficult 
to establish whether the evidence had been preserved, or in other words whether the measure 
had been complied with.
1088
)   In such cases where it could be established that the measure 
had not been complied with, it is suggested that a better course of action for the Court would 
be to draw adverse inferences from any failure of the parties to comply with (binding) 
provisional measures. Although the Court has not in the past shown a clear preference for 
drawing adverse inferences from refusals to providing requested information or to comply 
with provisional measures, it is argued that developing such a practice in the future could be a 
key part of the Court’s taking a more proactive approach to fact-finding in order to remedy the 
current weaknesses of its current practice. 
 
4.2.6. Failure to Comply with Provisional Measures & Duty of Collaboration Generally- 
Adverse Inferences 
 
 
As mentioned above, it has been suggested that the Court may be able to address the problems 
caused by its traditionally reactive approach to fact-finding through creative use of Article 49 
of its statute which enables it to take ‘formal note’ of any refusal to produce requested 
material (and subsequently draw adverse conclusions from any refusal to do so).
1089
  The 
practice of drawing adverse inferences is commonplace in the practice of both domestic and 
international judicial bodies.
1090
  As such, it has been suggested that it is an inherent judicial 
function.
1091
  However, despite some support for this position from the bench,
1092  
the Court 
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has never done so in practice.  Is it feasible to envisage that the Court could make greater use 
of adverse inferences to entice the parties to disclose the necessary information? 
 
An example of the Court’s historical reluctance to draw adverse inferences can be seen in the 
approach of the Court in the Corfu Channel case in which the United Kingdom refused to 
produce specific information requested by the Court- namely Admiralty orders.
1093
  However, 
the Court in this case declined to draw specific adverse inferences from the United Kingdom’s 
refusal to comply with the Court’s request.  Similarly in the Bosnian Genocide case, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina requested Serbia and Montenegro to produce documents under Article 49 of 
the Court’s Statute, however the Court did not accede to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
request,
1094
 merely stating that ‘it [had] not failed to note the Applicant’s suggestion that the 
Court may be free to draw its own conclusions’1095 but that ‘the Court observes that the 
Applicant has extensive documentation and other evidence available to it, especially readily 
accessibly ICTY records…’1096 
 
Judge Al-Khasawneh heavily criticised the Court for its reasoning in this respect, arguing that 
the documents would have in all likelihood ‘shed light on the central questions of intent and 
attributability’ in the case and that the Court’s reasoning behind not requesting the 
information ‘is worse than its failure to act’.1097  One commentator referred to the argument 
made by Judge Owada in the Oil Platforms case (see section 4.1.3. above) and stated that the 
Court found itself in a similar position in the Bosnian Genocide case – namely faced with a 
‘curable problem’ that could have been solved through a more proactive approach to the 
facts.
1098
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As such, it is argued that in such situations the Court can feasibly make greater use of its 
powers under Article 49 of its Statute to request the required information.  The fact that the 
request for information has come from the parties rather than from the Court proprio motu is 
not significant since neither Article 49 of the Court’s Statute nor Article 62 of its rules lay 
down any stipulation outlawing this practice.  In fact, Article 66 of the Court’s Rules states 
that the Court may at any time ‘either proprio motu or at the request of a party’ utilise its fact-
finding powers in the course of obtaining evidence – it is presumed that the same lack of 
distinction between requests from the parties and action proprio motu exists in relation to 
requests for information and the drawing of adverse inferences. 
 
Chapter 3 highlighted that adjudicative bodies of the WTO have drawn adverse inferences 
from the refusal of one party to provide information requested of it by the other party or Panel 
in a number of cases.
1099
  This is so despite the fact there is only one reference to adverse 
inferences in the WTO Agreements (namely Article 7(7) Annex 5 of the SCM Agreement).  It 
is suggested that, drawing on the case law of various international courts and tribunals, only 
unexplained refusals to cooperate can warrant the drawing of adverse inferences.
1100
  For 
example, in Argentina-Footwear the Panel drew an adverse inference from Argentina’s refusal 
to provide information requested by the United States, stating this this refusal taken together 
with the evidence presented by the US favoured their position.
1101
  Whilst the power to draw 
adverse inferences more generally flows from the duty of collaboration found in international 
adjudication, see section 4.2.6. above, it is argued that the ICJ has a much more explicit 
power to draw adverse inferences than the WTO adjudicative bodies and that, as such, it could 
make greater use of this power in order to bring before it information that it requires for the 
resolution of the case at hand.
1102
 
 
                                                 
1099
 See for example Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, Appellate Body Report, 
WT/DS70/AB/RW (2 August 1999) para 203 
1100
 Levitt v. Iran (1991) 27 Iran-US CTR 145 (Appendix BRA-II) at para 64 (‘the Respondents have failed to 
submit the majority of the documents requested and have so without adequate reasons for this failure’); In 
the Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 case Israel protested that the Bulgarian Government was deliberately 
withholding material facts requested of it by Israel during the course of proceedings.  Consequently Israel 
took the step of similarly withholding evidence in response, ‘reserving all its rights in the matter of evidence, 
including the right to make appropriate applications to the Court under Article 49 of the Statute.’ See Aerial 
Incident of 27 July 1955 Case, Pleadings, 98 
1101
 Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, Panel Report, 
WT/DS56/R, 25 November 1997, para 6.40 
1102
 Mavroidis, ‘Development of WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures’ 174; It has been argued that the practice 
of drawing adverse inferences more accurately squares with the good faith obligation to cooperate with the 
proceedings that is placed on all Members rather than imposing on them a binding duty to disclose 
information by construing ‘should’ and ‘shall’, see section 3.1.2.1. above; Kuyper 321 
  226 
As argued in Chapter 3, the practice of drawing adverse inferences is a potentially helpful tool 
that could be utilised by the Court to flush out the facts required to establish the factual 
foundations of the case that have not been placed before them by the parties themselves.
1103
 
As one commentator has pointed out, the real value of adverse inferences is not actually the 
inference itself but rather ‘its capacity to induce cooperation rather’ than the inference 
itself’.1104   
 
Crucially, it should be stressed that the drawing of adverse inferences does not shift the 
burden of proof from the claimant to the defendant state.  Rather, the drawing of adverse 
influences is a constituent part of the evaluation of the facts in the course of the judicial 
body’s important fact-assessment role.  Whilst a party may undoubtedly run the risk of an 
adverse inference being drawn as a result of it not providing evidence to counter claims made 
against it, ‘this is not a true burden of proof, and the use of an additional label to describe 
what is an ordinary step in the fact-finding process in unwarranted’.1105  As such, instead of 
conceiving of the burden of proof constantly shifting between one party and the other, it is 
argued that the burden remains on the party seeking to establish a claim (except where a party 
invokes a specific exception) and that matters such as the drawing of adverse inferences be 
left to the judicial body to mange in the course of their judicial function.
1106
   
 
Of course there are drawbacks to the practice of drawing adverse inferences such as the fact 
that where neither the Court nor the other party are aware of information that has been 
withheld the power is rendered useless.
1107
  Nonetheless, it is argued that if the Court is to 
take a more proactive approach to the facts that will involve the Court more often making 
requests for information and facilitating the production of evidence, the Court may encounter 
some resistance from some states.  In this regard, it is argued that despite the obvious 
difficulties, the practice of drawing adverse inferences when information that has been 
requested is willingly withheld without justification, could be one that is of great potential 
value for the Court.   
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Further, such blatant refusals to comply with requests directly from the Court were it to insist 
on its right that the information be produced are likely to be a generally rare occurrence.  It is 
argued that it is in the party’s best interest to cooperate with the Court and comply with what 
is asked of it in order to give itself the best chance of prevailing in the case at hand.  As 
Highet has stated: 
 
‘…if a state wishes to prevail in a litigation, it had better do what is asked of it by the 
tribunal, sovereignty or no sovereignty…Of course, states are always… free to 
conduct their cases as they see fit, but if they wish to win, they should…exercise that 
freedom consistent with any preferences indicated by the Court or chamber’. 1108 
 
And indeed it is suggested that Highet’s advice to states regarding their litigation strategy still 
rings true today.  Turning now from the duty of collaboration, the following section will 
examine the issue of expert evidence and propose a clear strategy for the use of expert 
evidence before the Court. 
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4.3. Developing a Clear Strategy for the Use of Experts before the Court 
 
 
A further way in which the Court could take a more proactive approach to the facts in cases 
that come before it is through better use of experts before the Court.  This is a possibility that 
has been explicitly advocated by a number of judges in the recent jurisprudence of the Court 
and by a number of voices in international legal scholarship.
1109
  For instance, in the Pulp 
Mills case Judge Yusuf made a plea to the Court to adapt the way it deals with factually 
complex cases and to develop ‘a clear strategy which would enable it to assess the need for an 
expert opinion at an early stage of its deliberations on a case’,  1110 arguing that such cases are 
increasingly going to come before the Court and, as such, states ‘will need to see that the facts 
related to their case are fully understood and appreciated by the Court’.1111   
 
In order to improve the Court’s fact-finding process it is argued that the Court must ‘display 
greater readiness to use, indeed exhaust, the possibilities granted by its Statute, in an open and 
fair way’.1112 In the words of Mbengue, the Court must ‘[interweave the] legal process with 
knowledge and expertise’1113 by playing a more active role in weighing scientific or uncertain 
facts in order to determine whether factual or scientific assertions are ‘sufficiently supported 
or reasonably warranted’ by scientific evidence, for instance.1114  It is argued that the Court, 
being ‘endowed with considerable discretion and two well-defined procedures to use outside 
sources of expertise’1115 is more than capable of developing such a clear strategy in relation to 
the consultation of experts in which both the bench and experts alike respect the functional 
autonomy of the other.
1116
  
 
The following subsection proposes such a clear strategy for the use of experts before the 
Court that comprises two main elements.  First of all, the thesis proposes an end to the use of 
experts fantômes and to the practice of presenting experts as counsel once and for all in order 
to foster a culture of examination and cross-examination of experts in open court.  Secondly it 
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is proposed that the Court appoint its own experts to assist it in cases in which the facts are of 
such a nature so as to be beyond what any judge could reasonably be expected to comprehend.  
It is argued that being armed with its own expert advice the Court will be better placed to play 
an active role in questioning and examining the experts put forward by the parties.  Each 
element of the strategy will be examined in turn. 
 
4.3.1. Expert Evidence Before the Court 
 
In developing a clear strategy for the use of expert evidence before the Court it is first of all 
argued that the use of experts fantômes as examined in Chapter 2 at 2.1.2. and the practice of 
experts appearing as counsel must be brought to an end once and for all in order to encourage 
a culture of examination and cross-examination of experts in open court. 
 
As argued in Chapter 2, the current practice of not informing the parties that the Court is 
seeking expert assistance whilst circumventing the procedure for doing so as set out in the 
Court’s Statute and Rules denies parties the right they would have otherwise had under Article 
67(2) of the Rules to comment on the expert evidence if such an expert had been properly 
appointed under Article 50 of the Court’s Statute.1117 This practice has been criticised in 
recent cases by members of the Court such as Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma who have 
argued that this practice is unacceptable in cases in which complex factual issues form part of 
the crux of the case.
1118
  Whilst these judges were correct to highlight the problem of informal 
resort to experts, it is argued that they did not go far enough in their assessment of the 
situation.  Owing to the fact the use of informal expert evidence is inherently problematic, the 
practice of the Court in seeking informal advice from experts should be brought to an 
immediate and final halt in the interests of the proper administration of justice.
1119
 
 
In addition to bringing an end to the practice of informal consultation of experts, it is argued 
that there is another practice which the Court ought to, and to some extent has already begun 
to, discontinue: that of parties presenting experts as counsel.  This practice, highlighted as a 
weakness of the Court’s fact-finding procedure in Chapter 2 at section 2.1.1., has been 
commonplace in the practice of the Court, despite being the subject of criticism in 
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international legal scholarship and posing problems for the Court in practice.
1120
   
 
For instance, in the ELSI case, Giuseppe Bisconti, a lawyer who had advised the US 
corporation at the heart of the case was included as a member of the United States team 
before the Court.  Problems arose in the course of his submission during the oral proceedings 
as it became clear that the lawyer was not only addressing the Court as counsel for the United 
States but also speaking to his own knowledge as legal advisor to the American corporation.  
President Ruda upheld Italy’s complaint that Bisconti was not only appearing as counsel but 
also as a witness and as such should be treated as a witness subject to cross-examination and 
ordered that such cross-examination take place.
1121
   
 
A similar issue arose before the ITLOS in the provisional measures stage of the Land 
Reclamation case.  Whilst Malaysia called one expert, Professor Falconer, who was 
subsequently cross-examined, another, geomorphologist Professor Sharifah, made a statement 
as a member of Malaysia’s defence team and as such could not be cross-examined.1122  
Ultimately the difficulty was overcome by ensuring that the expert made the solemn 
declaration required of experts under Article 79(b) of the Rules which meant that the expert 
could be examined as an expert by counsel of Singapore.
1123
  It should be noted, however, that 
Malaysia technically retained discretion over whether they wished to do so or not.  Had 
Malaysia preferred to keep Professor Sharifah as part of their delegation and not agreed to her 
subsequently making the declaration under Article 79(b), cross-examination could have been 
avoided.  Despite such academic criticism and practical issues, such practice has been 
common in the jurisprudence of the Court. 
 
This practice in the past left states with a decision to make – for whilst the state may benefit 
from avoiding having their expert subjected to awkward questions, there is no doubt that the 
perception of the individual as an independent expert is affected.
 1124
  As one commentator 
remarked: 
 
‘an advocate is clearly partisan, putting forward what are known to be not so much his 
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personal views as simply the best arguments he can think of in support of his client’s 
case, whereas an expert is known to be putting forward his own beliefs and opinions 
as to matters within his range of expertise, and is relying on his known authority in his 
own field.’1125 
 
Whilst states consider the tactical pros and cons of each option, the decision is more 
important for the Court in that the decision to retain experts as counsel rather than putting 
them forward as experts subject to cross-examination deprives the Court of an important 
means of drawing out the facts and circumvents the procedure laid down in Article 50 of the 
Statute and the Rules for the examination of experts.
1126
   The possibility of experts being 
cross-examined in the course of the oral proceedings is an essential part of the adjudicative 
process since, through the process of cross-examination, experts can be scrutinised in a way 
that is simply not possible when they appear as counsel.
1127
  Cross-examination facilitates 
examination of the three main issues in relation to expert evidence: its relevance, probative 
value, and the reliability of the expertise.
1128
  
 
To elaborate, in the absence of rules of admissibility and in light of the Court’s relaxed 
approach to qualifications (see sections 1.3.2. and 2.1.1.) much emphasis falls on fact-
assessment – the process through which the Court attributes probative weight to the evidence 
placed before it, including expert evidence.  In this respect, the examination of an expert 
witness and subsequent cross-examination regarding the expert’s methodology and supporting 
evidence can be extremely useful to the Court in determining the probative value and 
relevance of the evidence presented by one party.
1129
 
 
Further, the adversarial nature of the cross-examination process is particularly helpful in 
relation to the testimony of experts due to its ability to expose underlying assumptions and 
contingencies ‘thereby preventing an uncritical acceptance of alleged truths.’ 1130  Cross-
examination allows the Court to test experts and witnesses on evidence they have already 
given in written form to ask questions with regards to gaps in their testimony.  Furthermore, 
experts’ credentials, biases and scientific research are all likely to be called into question 
during cross-examination, with experts expected to answer immediately rather than given 
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time to prepare written statements away from the spotlight of cross-examination.
1131
   
 
Foster cites the example of Professor Vaughan Lowe’s cross-examination of the 
aforementioned Malaysian expert witness Professor Falconer before the ITLOS in the Land 
Reclamation case as a clear example of the value of cross-examination for the fact-finding 
process.
1132
  Lowe sought to call into question the testimony of Malaysia’s expert as a whole, 
arguing that his expertise as well as the scope of the report presented were limited.  Professor 
Lowe also forced the expert to confirm that he had been compensated for his services, calling 
his impartiality into question.
1133
  Professor James Crawford’s cross-examination and 
submissions to the Tribunal demonstrated a similar willingness and skill at dealing with 
complicated, technical and scientific issues.
1134
  A comparable (and particularly lengthy) 
discussion took place regarding the independence of the experts appearing on behalf of the 
parties in the Pulp Mills case.
1135
  Such developments, it is argued, are highly unlikely to 
occur where experts appear as counsel and are not subject to the scrutiny of the opposing 
party.  As such, it is argued that the Court’s fact-finding process is impoverished without 
cross-examination.
1136
 
 
On a positive note it would appear that there is already evidence of a shift away from the 
practice of experts appearing as counsel.  The strong words of the Court in the Pulp Mills 
would appear to indicate a shift in what the Court experts: 
 
‘those persons who provide evidence before the Court based on their scientific or 
technical knowledge and on their personal experience should testify before the Court 
as experts, witnesses or in some cases in both capacities, rather than as counsel, so that 
they may be submitted to questioning by the other party as well as the Court’.1137  
 
Judge Greenwood further stated that the Court had unequivocally indicated that this 
‘unhelpful’ and ‘unfair’ practice should not be repeated in future cases.1138  Judge Greenwood 
went on to emphatically state that ‘[t]he distinction between the evidence of a witness or 
expert and the advocacy of counsel is fundamental to the proper conduct of litigation before 
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the Court.’1139   
 
Bringing an end to the practice of presenting experts as counsel will not have seismic effects 
on the way that the Court operates and certainly does not require amendment of the Court’s 
Statute.  As a matter of fact, the Court would not need to change its current relaxed approach 
to qualifications of experts (see Chapter 2 at 2.1.1.) since any cross-examination would 
necessarily draw out any problematic issues with regards to the credentials of an expert.
1140
  
In fact, insisting that experts are put forward and examined in open Court is envisaged in the 
Court’s Statute and Rules and as such it is argued that states should merely consistently 
conform to the procedure for the examination of experts before the Court that exists but which 
has been underused to date.  It is necessary to briefly set out this practice.   
 
It should be made clear from the outset that the procedure for hearing party-appointed experts 
and party-appointed witnesses is the same and as such can be discussed together, owing to the 
fact that the procedure for both is set out in Articles 57, 58, 63, 66, 70 and 71 of the Rules of 
the Court which addresses procedural issues such as the timing and language of hearings.
1141
  
Witnesses have been heard in a number of cases before the Court,
1142
 although the Court’s 
experience with cross-examination has been much criticised in the past.  For instance, the 
process of examining witnesses in the South West Africa case involved the testimony of 14 
“witness-experts” produced by South Africa over the course of two months of hearings.  
However, Highet remarked that these witnesses ‘might as well have never come to The Hague’ 
as their testimony added so little to the case and delayed the proceedings to such an extent.
1143
  
Such criticism, it has been argued, may have dissuaded the Court from encouraging more 
widespread use of witness testimony.
1144 
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However, witnesses have been heard by the Court in subsequent cases and a number of 
witnesses have been put forward in the Croatian Genocide case currently before the Court.
1145
  
It is argued that the experience of international criminal tribunals provide a counter-example 
to the Court’s experience in South West Africa and demonstrate that a large number of 
witnesses can be heard without derailing the judicial process.  For instance in the Tadić case 
the ICTY heard 126 witnesses and examined over 461 exhibits.  Similarly large numbers of 
witnesses were heard in the Kupreškić case in which 157 witnesses were called and 700 
exhibits produced and in the Blaškič case in which 161 witnesses were called and 1,423 
exhibits produced.
1146
  Further, most recently before the ICC in the Lubanga case the 
Chamber heard 67 witnesses over several months, including four expert Chamber 
witnesses.
1147
 
 
In practice experts and witnesses have tended to testify between the first and second round of 
oral proceedings.  The Statute and the Rules ‘provide only very little information about the 
legal regime governing the examination of exerts and witnesses’1148 – there being only Article 
65 of the Rules which states:  
 
‘Witnesses and Experts shall be examined by the agents, counsel or advocates of the 
parties under the control of the President.  Questions may be put to them by the 
President and by the judges.  Before testifying, witnesses shall remain out of court’. 
 
 
However, although brief, this provision clarifies a number of important issues such as 
conveying that the examination of witnesses and experts will be primarily conducted by the 
parties themselves,
1149
 and overseen by the Court through the president, with the judges able 
to pose questions should they so wish.
 1150
  Although leaving many questions unanswered 
such as how long the period of examination should be, the Court has developed a ‘reasonably 
well established’ practice in the limited number of cases in which experts and witnesses have 
been presented by the parties.
 1151
  The approach taken by the Court in the very first case, 
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Corfu Channel, has been particularly influential in this regard.
1152
 
Commentators have noted the general features of examination of witnesses before the Court 
as: four phases of examination – examination of witnesses and experts undertaken primarily 
by the parties themselves in four phases in the mould of English common law: examination-
in-chief by the party calling the expert or witness, cross-examination by the other party, re-
examination by the original party then a round of questioning from the judges.
1153
  This has 
been the relatively uniform practice of the Court.
1154
  However, the approach of the Court is 
far more flexible than that of any domestic court, the: 
‘procedure is very liberal.  There is no limit to the number of questions that may be 
put.  The Court has one wish, and that is that as much light as possible should be case 
upon the matter discussed by the Court, and secondly the Court wishes to give the 
Parties every opportunity to defend their points of view’1155 
 
Following the Court’s remarks in the judgment in the Pulp Mills case commentators have 
argued that it is likely that cross-examination ‘can be expected to take on an increased 
importance and absorb a greater proportion of the Court’s time…’1156  And indeed this was 
the case, as the recent Whaling in the Antarctica case saw the examination and cross-
examination of party-appointed witnesses generally in line with the procedure for examining 
witnesses laid out above. The Whaling in the Antarctic case, it is submitted, represents an 
important post-Pulp Mills indication of how the Court will handle experts in cases that come 
before it in the future.  The case saw the submission of individual opinions by three party-
appointed experts at the written stage of proceedings, followed by cross-examination on the 
opinions expressed.
1157
  Australia called Professor Mangel and Dr Gales who were examined 
by Professor Philippe Sands QC and subsequently cross-examined by Professor Vaughan 
Lowe QC.  Presenting opposing expert evidence for Japan was Professor Walløe who was 
also cross-examined. 
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The cross-examination was overseen by the president who called counsel from each side to 
conduct the cross-examination.  The President set out the procedure for cross-examination.
1158
  
Each expert was first examined by an agent of the party calling him (the ‘examination-in-
chief’ lasting up to a maximum of thirty minutes), after taking the declaration under Article 
64(b) of the Court’s Rules.  The examination was to take the form of either answers in 
response to questions asked by agents or in the form of a prepared statement.  In fact, Japan’s 
expert Professor Walløe was asked by Professor Lowe to present a twenty minute statement to 
the Court rather than answering questions put to him by counsel, as Australia had done.
1159
  
The opposing party was then given the opportunity to cross-examine the expert for up to sixty 
minutes, confined to any statement already made either in written or oral form by the expert.  
The Party who called the witness was then asked if it wished to have the opportunity to re-
examine the expert for up to a further thirty minutes.  Afterwards, the judges put their own 
questions to the experts. 
 
The cross-examination carried out by Professors Sands and Lowe QC were extensive and the 
maximum time allotted for examination was utilised.
1160
  Subsequently the judges took 
advantage of their right to ask questions of the experts called by the parties and (at times 
multiple) questions were asked of Australia’s expert Professor Mangel by Judges Bennouna, 
Cançado Trindade, Greenwood, Donohue, Keith, and Owada.
1161
  A similarly large number of 
questions were asked of Japan’s expert, with Judges Greenwood, Cançado Trindade, Yusuf, 
Bennouna, Keith and Charlesworth all asking questions.
1162
  All except Charlesworth had 
back-and-forth exchanges evidencing some interaction with the proceedings. 
 
The case also evidences a number of judges engaging in proceedings, asking questions of the 
parties and seeking clarification.  For instance, Judge Greenwood asked a question of 
Australia,
1163
 Judge Donoghue asked two questions of Japan regarding technical sample size 
questions regarding Japan’s whaling programme.1164  The practice of the Court to date in 
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relation to the asking of questions from the bench generally accords with the Court’s reactive 
approach to fact-finding set out in Chapter 1.  The Court has on the whole limited itself to 
individual judges asking questions from the bench only occasionally during the oral 
proceedings.
1165
  Foster notes that practice before the ICJ differs substantially from that before 
the WTO adjudicative bodies which regularly put longer questions to the parties and are able 
for example ‘to pursue the development of a thorough understanding of all aspects of the case 
by means of specific, direct questions to the parties after each of the oral hearings, or 
substantive meetings with the parties’.1166 
 
Former Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui remarked upon the Court’s reluctance to engage with the 
proceedings in accordance with its reactive approach.  Judge Bedjaoui accurately describes 
the practice of the judges in not making regular use of their powers to ask questions or request 
information, but rather ‘for the most part those on the bench remain silent, like a jury listening 
to arguments in order to weigh their merits. Hence, their passivity during the hearings is 
combined with impassivity.”1167  In fact, Judge Bedjaoui has described the impact that the 
Court’s impassive approach induces in the judges when they are made to sit through long, 
detailed oral arguments being made by counsel of the parties: 
 
“Oh, those interminable speeches that fill a Judge, at times, with the unfulfillable 
longing to stretch his limbs; that prompt many a discreet rustle of black silk lest the 
bench too closely resemble that row of stuffed cats so unforgettably described by 
Pascal, Moliere and Lafontaine!”1168 
 
Whilst the Court through Articles 60 and 61 of its Rules has the power to direct the oral 
proceedings and indicate which points it believes it has heard enough, the Court has been 
reluctant to undertake this ‘exceedingly delicate’ task for fear of creation the ‘impression that 
it is inclined towards the party most sharing its view of that relevance.’1169 
 
However, it is argued that the ICJ is particularly well placed to question counsel and examine 
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witnesses and that it should do so more regularly.  This is so due to the fact that, compared to 
judges in some domestic legal systems, those sitting on the bench at the ICJ are well 
acquainted with the facts.  As Damaška states, ‘…the interrogation process - to be effective - 
requires the questioner to be familiar with the subject matter of inquiry’.1170  In this vein, ICJ 
judges, with consistently voluminous amounts of documentary evidence at their fingertips, 
can be said to be sufficiently informed to ask useful, probing questions of counsel and 
witnesses. 
 
Returning to the use of experts in the Whaling case, however, whilst proactively asking 
questions of the parties, the procedure for replying to such questions has not changed, with 
the party being given a substantial period of time to reply as opposed to having to reply to 
questions on the spot as would be the case in any common law judicial process.
1171
  Similarly, 
the Court chose to continue its practice of imposing time limits on examination and cross-
examination – a practice that is not often found in domestic legal systems where cross-
examination is commonplace.  As a result of the Court’s decision to retain such time limits, 
‘may impede a full exploration of the issues.’1172 
 
Admittedly, there are some practical difficulties with respect to greater use of cross-
examination during the oral proceedings before the Court including the fact that the Court 
consists of fifteen judges and that traditionally states have been reluctant to allow their 
representatives ‘full freedom to present their arguments in whatever way they think best’ and 
preferring to see the speeches of counsel before they are given before the Court.  In addition, 
interpreters prefer to have a copy of the text before they are read out in Court so as to ensure 
the most accurate translation possible.
1173
  Similarly, Boyle and Harrison have argued that the 
practice of experts appearing as counsel may not be inappropriate in all cases and point out 
that in the past there have been numerous cases in which this practice has gone unchallenged.  
They argue that in fact much depends on ‘whether the expert is giving evidence that is likely 
to be contested by the other side, or whether the role of the party’s expert is to assist the court 
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to understand the issues rather than to prove a case.’1174   
 
Nevertheless, it is argued that when it comes to cross-examination of experts before the Court, 
the main benefit far outweighs the costs, namely that compared to the practice prior written 
statements or of experts appearing as counsel and avoiding examination, cross-examination 
provides the Court with ‘a critical method of testing the truthfulness, accuracy and reliability’ 
of the expert’s evidence.1175   The Court is provided with the opportunity of seeing experts 
speaking to their opinions and defending them first hand, in their own words, and that counsel 
are more likely to clarify the disputed issues, avoiding the ‘merry contradiction’ that Judge 
Simma has spoken of in the past.
1176
 
 
Undoubtedly, one can afford to be somewhat optimistic with regard to the prospect of 
reforming the Court’s practice in relation to the examination of party-appointed experts, 
which could be easily reformed and regulated by a Practice Direction.
1177
  Ultimately, it can 
be hoped that, in light of the practice of other international courts and tribunals, a more active 
dialogue between the Court, the parties and the experts ‘would provide the opportunity for 
them to discover more about the essence of the issue under dispute and to help deal with 
issues requiring particular clarification.’1178 In sum, it argued that the practice of experts 
appearing as counsel should be halted once and for all and that experts and witnesses alike 
should be put forward in accordance with the procedure set out in the Court’s Statute and 
Rules and that these should be cross-examined owing to the fact that this process is a crucial 
part of the judicial process.   
 
The second necessary step in creating a clear strategy for the use of experts before the Court 
is for the Court to more regularly appoint its own experts to assist it in the handling of 
complex facts  - it is to this issue we turn our attention. 
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4.3.2. Court-Appointed Experts 
 
In addition to hearing party-appointed experts in open court subject to cross-examination it is 
argued that the appointment of the Court’s own experts would act as a failsafe regarding the 
comprehension of factually complex evidence.  The appointment of its own experts would 
assist the Court in situations where the parties have presented experts who have directly 
contradicted each other, leaving the Court no better informed.  An independent expert, 
appointed by the Court, in line with the practice of other international courts and tribunals as 
we saw in Chapter 3, could assist the Court in understanding technical issues of methodology 
and advise as to the important nuances that exist in the particular field to which the parties’ 
experts have spoken.
1179
   
 
This failsafe is important given the fact that the greater cross-examination of party-appointed 
experts will not be entirely unproblematic.  To elaborate, the adversarial process of cross-
examination, whilst helpful in testing the credibility of experts, testing bias, and drawing out 
information to fill gaps in the evidentiary record, is not conducive to achieving consensus 
between the experts appointed by the parties.  In fact it has been said that cross-examination 
‘...often undermines the commonly held assumptions upon which consensus is built and thus 
further promotes the impression that there is little about which the experts agree’ even if in 
fact there is very little disagreement between the parties’ experts.1180  As such, in emphasising 
the differences in opinions between experts, there is the danger that cross-examination has 
what has been termed a ‘neutralizing effect’ on expert testimony which is portrayed as being 
‘merrily contradictory’ and which, ultimately, does not assist the court.1181 
 
Of course, such issues are apparent in all domestic legal systems which make use of cross-
examination.  In the legal literature of such states a recurrent theme are the calls to move 
away from this adversarial procedure in order to counter some of the difficulties that cross-
examination causes.  Civil legal systems have a long tradition of making use of court-
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appointed experts to assist the court with complicated matters of evidence particularly in civil 
cases.
1182
    
 
Greater use of Court-appointed experts was described as the most compelling option open to 
the Court in the face of scientific or factual disagreement by a number of judges in the Pulp 
Mills case.
1183
  Judge Yusuf for instance was of the view in the Pulp Mills case that the Court 
should have sought expert assistance as provided in Article 50 of the Court’s Statute and is 
critical of the Court’s approach to the factual complexity of the case.1184  As we saw in 
Chapter 1, Article 50 of the Court’s Statute allows the Court to ‘at any time, entrust an 
individual, body, bureau, commission, or other organization that it may select, with the task of 
carrying out an enquiry or giving an expert opinion’.1185 
 
Whilst the states parties are not provided with the explicit right to cross-examine such an 
inquiry or expert opinion,
1186
 through Article 67 of the Rules of the Court parties are given the 
opportunity to express their opinion on the inquiry or expert opinion – granting them at least a 
voice on their findings.  Any expert appointed under Article 50 of the Court’s Statute can be 
perceived of as an ad hoc organ of the Court.   
 
This having been said, it is argued that drawing on the experience of the WTO adjudicative 
body (see chapter 3 at 3.1.2.5.) the best means of examining experts is on an individual basis 
as opposed to expert groups.
1187
  Whilst the WTO adjudicative bodies have the power to 
establish a so-called ‘expert review groups’ under Article 13 of the DSU it has never done so.  
It was argued that one of the reasons that an expert review group had not been established in 
the WTO context to date was due to the requirement in DSU App 4 paragraph 6 that such 
groups prepare a report of their findings and that such a report could be seen as ‘transforming 
the expert group into a form of a “tribunal within a tribunal”.1188  In other words, Panels have 
been reluctant to tie their hands, both in terms of the flexibility of the process and limiting 
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their discretion as to the ultimate factual determination.  And indeed this may also be the case 
with the ICJ who may have very real concerns of having the final factual determination taken 
out of its hands.  Whilst any commission of inquiry established under Article 50 of the Court’s 
Statute would not be able to formally bind the Court, the very production of a report of a 
number of experts, which would carry a great deal of epistemic weight, may be different to 
distinguish or depart from.
1189
  As such the Court’s position as the final arbiter of fact may be 
called into doubt. 
 
In addition, there is the suggestion that the production of a report by a group of experts could 
result in a ‘vague and monolithic consensus position’ – a common criticism of the collegiate 
process of adjudication.
1190
  Considerations of cost and time also play a role and it has been 
suggested that it may be easily to simply call upon one exert rather than establishing an expert 
review group given the time constraints imposed by the DSU.
1191
  For these reasons it is 
suggested that the appointment of an individual expert or a small number of experts may be 
preferable for the Court as opposed to a commission of inquiry. 
The use of independent experts also has potential drawbacks, however.  To elaborate, Court-
appointed experts must be sure not to disrupt the nature of the judicial process, since their 
own fact-finding may disproportionately aid the party bearing the burden of proof in the 
proceedings.  It is for these reasons that in the WTO context, where Panel-appointed experts 
are common, that the establishment of a prima facie case by the applicant state is a 
prerequisite for the appointment of experts.
1192
  Such concerns have also led to the 
development of the so-called ‘ultimate issue rule’ in other contexts in international 
adjudication as an attempt to ensure the integrity of adjudicators as final arbiters of fact and 
law. 
 
 
The ‘Ultimate Issue Rule’ 
 
The prospect of increased use of experts by the Court will undoubtedly raise concerns 
regarding whether the Court would be potentially delegating its judicial function to the 
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experts.  This issue has arisen in other contexts and sparked widespread academic debate.
1193
  
Ultimately, however, it can be said that such concerns are not sufficient reason to detract from 
the advantages that great use of experts would bring.  In other contexts the ‘ultimate issue rule’ 
has come to govern the relationship between the bench and experts.   
 
Essentially the ultimate issue in any case is the disputed legal issue which represents the very 
reason the tribunal was convened.  The rule holds that despite the fact an expert has been 
appointed and although their determinations may prove significant to the outcome of the case, 
an expert should never be the person left to make a final legal determination, such as whether 
a person is criminally responsible for committing a crime – that task remains with the 
adjudicator.
1194
 
 
For instance, the ICTY Trial Chamber upheld the objection of the defence and prevented 
reliance on an evidentiary report which related to the ultimate issue of the case – saying that 
this was the exclusive competence of the Trial Chamber.
1195
  Similarly the Prosecutor v. 
Brima et al case
1196
 before Trial Chamber II of the Special Court for Sierra Leone stated that 
whilst any information that was relevant was admissible under Rule 89(C), it would disregard 
any information presented by the experts which ‘draws any conclusions or inferences which 
the Trial Chamber will have to draw, or makes any judgments which the Trial Chamber will 
have to make.
1197
  
 
In the Pulp Mills case Judge Yusuf specifically addressed this issue, playing down concerns 
for two main reasons.  First of all, Judge Yusuf argued that it was for the expert merely to 
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elucidate and ‘clarify the scientific validity of the methods used to establish certain facts’, but 
importantly, it is not for the expert to weigh the probative value of the facts.
1198
  Secondly, the 
judge sought to assuage fears over the use of experts by highlighting that ‘the elucidation of 
facts by the experts is always subject to the assessment of such expertise and the 
determination of the facts underling it by the Court’. 1199  Judge Yusuf also provided guidance 
as to how the Court should utilise experts in such situations, namely not by entrusting the 
clarification of ‘all the facts submitted to it’ in a wholesale manner, but rather should identify 
specific areas in which the Court needs specific assistance or clarification before employing 
experts’.1200 
 
In the context of international criminal law commentators have argued that issues such as 
individual criminal responsibility should not be determined by expert witnesses and that they 
should not assist the tribunal in question in making such determinations which remain within 
the sole purview of the tribunal itself.
1201
  That the ultimate issue rule operates in this way it is 
argued is essential in safeguarding the rights of the accused and preventing extra-judicial 
bodies from having inappropriate influence over tribunals – ‘Of course, the key question is 
what the ultimate issue is.  This will inevitably call for a case-by-case approach based on an 
analysis of the indictment in each case’.1202  It is argued that such an approach could easily 
taken by the ICJ – relying only on expert evidence to assist in the course of proceedings but 
the crucial ultimate issues remaining with the sole competence of the bench.
 1203
 
 
Utilising the ultimate issue rule, it is argued that judges are capable of critically considering 
the assistance provided by the Court-appointed expert and taking this into account when 
making both factual and legal determinations.  As Moreno has stated;  
 
‘Judges do not need to become trained scientists to achieve accurate and consistent 
legal decision-making in cases involving scientific evidence. They need to become 
savvy consumers of the scientific evidence that comes before them.’1204 
 
Consequently, it is argued that through the appointment of experts to assist the Court judges 
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can become the aforementioned ‘savvy consumers of scientific evidence’ which has great 
potential to improve the Court’s handling of complex factual issues.  Being assisted by Court-
appointed experts, judges would be better-informed regarding the underlying complex factual 
issues in the case and would potentially have a better idea of which questions to ask in order 
to most efficiently get to the heart of the factual issues in the case.  As one commentator has 
stated, ‘[j]udges need to know what to listen and look for when expert evidence is presented 
and what they should be asking about when the information is not forthcoming.’1205   It is 
argued that relying on the assistance of the Court’s own experts is the best way to know 
exactly what to listen and to look for and brings us to the third and final element of the 
strategy for improving the use of expert evidence before the Court; the related issue of 
questions from the bench. 
 
4.3.4. Summary – A Clear Strategy for the Use of Experts Before the Court 
 
In short, it has been argued that the third option open to the Court is to develop a clear 
strategy for dealing with the use of experts before the Court.  This would potentially involve a 
more proactive approach to asking questions of parties from the bench and cross-examination 
of party-appointed witnesses to draw out the information needed to make solid factual 
determinations.  Further, the Court could make greater use of its powers to appoint its own 
experts under Article 50 of the Statute, however the practice of other Courts warns against 
appointing groups of experts.  In this vein the Court ought to ensure, in accordance with the 
‘ultimate issue rule’ that it retains the final determination of both law and facts.    
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4.4. Chapter 4 Summary – Realistic Measures to Achieve a More Proactive Approach to Fact-
Finding 
 
This chapter focussed on a small number of issues related to the Court’s procedural operation 
which realistically could be adapted should the Court so choose to in order to remedy some of 
the current weaknesses in its procedure.  It was argued that the Court could viably develop a 
power to compel the production of evidence through purposively interpreting its current fact-
finding powers and by relying on the duty of each party to collaborate in the production of 
evidence.  Similarly, it was argued that the Court could make greater use of provisional 
measures to giving binding force to its requests for information, subject to a number of 
conditions.  Further, a substantial part of the chapter focussed on the Court’s use of experts 
and set out a number of ways in which the Court could develop a clear strategy for better use 
of expert evidence in cases that come before it in order to remedy some of the weaknesses of 
its fact-finding procedure as set out in Chapter 2. 
 
This chapter has chosen to focus on a small number of changes that could realistically be 
made through orders or practice directions, crucially without amendment of the Court’s 
Statute, and that are based on the practice of other inter-state courts and tribunals.  The value 
of drawing on the comparative exercise undertaken in Chapter 3 is that all the suggestions 
made in this chapter are currently in operation with regards to a similar inter-state Court – 
lending additional realism and credibility to the suggestions.  Nevertheless, even if the Court 
were to decide to adopt a more proactive approach to the facts, perhaps through utilising one 
of the means proposed in this chapter, there are a number of potential obstacles and 
limitations facing the Court.  It is these obstacles and limitations that are the subject of the 
final Chapter. 
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Chapter 5 – A More Proactive Approach to Fact-Finding: Darien Scheme or Necessary 
Reform to Ensure a Court on which the Sun Never Sets? 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
In 1698 a number of ships carrying the hopes and the fortunes of a nation (literally as well as 
metaphorically) left Edinburgh bound for Darien, Panama.  Somewhere between a quarter and 
half of Scotland’s wealth had been invested in a scheme to establish a trading post in Panama 
which was to bring untold riches to Scotland and establish it as the newest European colonial 
power.
1206
  Yet only nine months after the expedition left Edinburgh more than two-thirds of 
the 1,200 original settlers were dead from tropical diseases or at the hands of Spain – the 
much larger and more dominant colonial power in the region.  When a second expedition 
arrived in Darien one year later they found that the settlement had been burned to the ground 
by the Spanish and abandoned by those Scots who had survived.   
 
Records show that the settlers were poorly prepared, both materially (bringing more 
ceremonial wigs and hats than building materials
1207
) and politically, as various Machiavellian 
machinations by both Spain and England left the Scots isolated and exposed.   The failure of 
the Darien Scheme as it was known was disastrous for the Scottish economy which was 
brought to the edge of collapse.  Less than ten years later the Treaty of Union of 1707 was 
signed with England – a treaty which included a clause specifically compensating those who 
had lost money in the Darien Scheme.  The question that we must ask ourselves is whether a 
more proactive approach to fact-finding, facilitated in the manner set out in the previous 
chapter, is a fool’s errand such as the Darien Scheme or whether it is in fact sensible, 
necessary reform required to ensure that the Court continues to be attractive in contemporary 
international law. 
 
In assessing the relative merits of a more proactive approach this final chapter first considers 
the merits of the Court’s current approach to fact-finding.  Whilst it is clear that the Court’s 
current approach is not without its merits, it is maintained that the criticisms of this approach 
explored in detail in Chapter 2 are justified.  As such, the chapter then moves on to consider a 
more proactive approach to fact-finding.  In doing so, Chapter 5 first of all addresses the 
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fundamentally important question of whether the Court has completely unconstrained 
discretion to take a more proactive approach to fact-finding or whether its discretion is 
somehow fettered by factual determinations made by other UN organs (in particular the 
Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter).  Ultimately it is argued that there is 
nothing in either the Court’s constitutive instruments or practice which would fetter the 
Court’s discretion and that accordingly the Court, as an independent international tribunal, 
possesses the discretion required in order to adopt a more proactive approach to fact-finding. 
 
Chapter 5 next illustrates in practical terms what the more proactive approach set out in 
Chapter 4 would look like.  Whilst a case was made for such reforms in the preceding chapter, 
Chapter 5 considers the limitations of the Court’s fact-finding powers that have been 
advocated and ruminates on the merits of the Court’s current reactive approach to fact-finding.  
Having considered the limitations of the Court’s fact-finding powers, it is clear that taking a 
more proactive approach to fact-finding is no panacea for the current problems that the Court 
faces.  Nevertheless, it is maintained that implementing the proposals set out in Chapter 4 
would ultimately leave the Court better placed to make accurate factual determinations upon 
which the law could be decided. 
 
5.2. Positive Aspects of the Court’s Current Reactive Approach 
 
At this stage it should be reiterated that it has not been argued that the Court has ever 
unjustifiably taken a position whereby it has avoided focussing on factual issues in favour of 
solely addressing the law.  As stated above, having not been in the Court’s position, it is often 
difficult to imagine how one could prove that a decision taken by the Court to focus on legal 
issues and not conduct further fact-finding was the wrong decision.   It may be that the Court 
had sound reasons for not conducting its own fact-finding such as considerations of judicial 
economy or due to the fact that resolution of those factual issues was not central to the 
resolution of the dispute at hand.
1208
  Rather, it was argued that instead of talking in terms of 
the Court using ‘avoidance techniques’ in order to negate the need to engage with the facts, 
the most that can be said is that the Court has very clearly displayed a number of tendencies 
which, taken together, demonstrate a consistently reactive approach to the facts in cases that 
have come before it. 
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In addition, it should be made clear that the reactive approach is not without its benefits.  For 
instance, it could be said that by focussing on the legal issues in a particular case the Court 
reduces the possibility of the case being distinguished on the facts in the future, therefore 
increasing the (already extremely significant) legal value of the Court’s pronouncements.1209  
In addition, there are a number of practical reasons why it may be sensible for the Court to 
place the emphasis on the parties in terms of fact-finding.  This is the case since the Court is 
often significantly removed from the facts of the dispute, both in terms of distance and time.  
Given that the highly political nature of cases before the Court means that it may take many 
years for the proceedings to begin, the value of ‘descending’ on the site to conduct its own 
fact-finding is somewhat dubious.  As such, it arguably makes more sense for the parties 
themselves, who are generally closer to the facts, to put such evidence before the Court, than 
for the Court (limited as its resources are) to embark on a fact-finding expedition from The 
Hague.  
 
Staying with the nature of the cases that come before the Court, the sheer breadth of legal and 
factual issues, number of witnesses and expanse of territory can often in some way justify the 
Court’s reactive position.  For instance, in cases such as Armed Activities, Bosnian Genocide 
and Croatian Genocide, the disputes in question involved a dizzying array of factual and legal 
issues which took place on the territory of a number of different states and over the course of 
many years.  In such circumstances the Court’s decision to rely on information submitted by 
the parties, established in cases before other international tribunals such as the ICTY or in UN 
commissions of inquiry is eminently understandable.   
 
Furthermore, as stated above, many states see it as part of their privilege as sovereign states to 
choose what evidence they put before the Court.  The traditional argument is that states prefer 
to retain as much control over the evidentiary process as possible and as such they would be 
hostile to the Court taking greater control over the process and becoming more actively 
involved.
1210
  For instance, Foster has argued that ‘international disputants will generally want 
to bear primary responsibility for mustering the evidence in support of their cases and 
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presenting it to an international court’.1211  It has been argued that the presentation of the case 
being left to the parties themselves is fundamentally important regarding the parties’ 
perception of the fairness of the procedure.
1212
  As such, it would appear to make little sense 
for the Court to duplicate the fact-finding efforts of the parties.  Ultimately, in such cases the 
Court’s decision to accept the evidence put before it by the parties and to concentrate on the 
points of contention as defined by the parties could in the circumstances turn out to be the 
most prudent option available to the Court. 
 
Indeed the thesis has not at any stage argued that the Court should completely disregard all 
evidence submitted to it by the parties in favour of undertaking wide-ranging fact-finding on 
its own accord – this is simply not practicable.  Rather, the thesis has argued that there are a 
number of deficiencies in the way the Court currently operates and that the practice of other 
international courts and tribunals in some way provides helpful reference points when 
considering reform in order to ensure that the Court makes factual determinations that are as 
accurate as they possibly can be. 
 
These deficiencies have presented the Court with real problems and as such, despite the 
positive aspects of the Court’s current approach to fact-finding (which undoubtedly exist), it 
is maintained that there is a pressing need for the Court to consider reform.  As chapter 2 set 
out in detail, the Court’s reactive approach to fact-finding can be a recipe for an unsure factual 
foundation upon which to make legal judgments.
1213
  The Court’s approach to expert evidence 
and use of experts fantômes, cross-examination, and over-reliance on UN Commissions of 
Inquiry all have problematic aspects which undermine the Court’s fact-finding process.  
Furthermore, in cases where a party fails to appear before the Court, its reactive approach to 
fact-finding is found wanting due to the fact it only has the evidence of one party upon which 
to make its findings of fact.  Without conducting its own investigations into the factual 
background of the case at hand the Court’s reactive approach, which makes the court 
dependent on states to submit the facts to it, is a handicap for the Court.  Drawing on the 
practice of other international courts and tribunals, Chapter 4 set out a number of proposals 
which, it was suggested, the Court could adopt in an attempt to remedy the current 
deficiencies of the Court’s current approach to the fact-finding process.  As such, it is useful at 
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this stage to consider how the Court’s approach to fact-finding would look if it were to adopt 
a more proactive approach to fact-finding. 
 
5.3. How to Deal With Factually Complex Cases Before The Court 
 
Early consultation between the parties regarding those factual issues upon which there is 
agreement and those which are likely to be contentious could help to focus the Court’s 
attention on the areas where it is most needed.
1214
  Rosenne’s suggestion that the Court’s 
procedure for pre-trial conferences set out in Article 40(1) of the Court’s rules be amended 
and updated to meet the current demands of contemporary adjudication is a good one in this 
regard.
1215
  At the moment pre-trial conferences are ‘limited to participation of the 
representatives of the parties and the President…’ and are ‘off the record’.1216  The suggestion 
that the Court make greater use of pre-hearing conferences is one that certainly could benefit 
the operation of the Court.
1217
  The reform of this process would not be problematic and could 
be achieved through an order under Article 48 of the Court’s Statute. 
 
Any party requiring access to information held by the other party (subject to the conditions of 
sole possession, previous attempts to obtain information and the establishment of a prima 
facie case
1218
) could make this known to the Court.
1219
  At this early stage the Court could 
consider utilising its provisional measures powers, which, it is argued, are broad enough to 
cover the proper conduct of the judicial process to ensure that the Court is able to render a 
judgment that is effective.
1220
  To this end, the preservation of evidence ‘without which a 
party might not be able to prove its claim and the tribunal might not be able to settle the 
dispute’ is a legitimate aim of provisional measures.1221  During the initial stages of the 
proceedings, however, the initiative for placing information before the Court would by and 
large remain with the parties.   
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In an ideal world, in cases of non-appearance the Court would take a more proactive approach 
to fact-finding and attempt to test the applicant states’ claims itself.1222  It is argued that being 
proactive in cases of non-appearance by employing ‘whatever means and resources may 
enable it to satisfy itself whether the submissions of the applicant State are well-founded in 
fact and law’1223 is the only way to properly ensure parties’ due process rights, for example by 
appointing its own expert under Article 50 of the Statute to assist it in assessing the evidence 
put forward by the appearing party.
1224
   Instances of non-appearance have occurred in some 
of the most politically significant cases in the history of the Court and as long as the Court’s 
jurisdiction operates on a consensual basis it can never be ruled out that at any time the Court 
may again be faced by the difficulties that non-appearance poses to its reactive approach to 
fact-finding.
1225
 
 
Should the parties wish to present expert evidence, such experts should be put before the 
Court subject to examination and cross-examination.  In no circumstances should experts 
appear as counsel.
1226
  It is argued that in doing so the Court will reap the benefits of cross-
examination of the expert evidence and avoid the ‘merry contradiction’ of two (equally well-
qualified) experts with opposing views.
1227
  Relatedly, in such situations the Court should 
seriously consider the appointment of its own expert to assist it in the evaluation of the 
technical or factually complex elements of the dispute.
1228
  At no time should the Court 
consult ‘phantom experts’ as this practice is contrary to due process.1229  During the cross-
examination of the parties’ experts, and with the assistance of the Court’s own expert, the 
Court, having access to copious amounts of documentary evidence, should be encouraged to 
put questions to the parties on issues on which it feels require further clarification or 
elaboration as the Court is entitled to do under Article 61 of the Court’s Rules. 
 
If at any time the Court encounters resistance from the parties it should display greater 
willingness to draw adverse inferences from this lack of cooperation.  Whether a party has 
refused to comply with a provisional measure indicated by the Court or an order for the 
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disclosure of information (this order being compulsory, in line with the interpretation of 
Article 49 ICJ Statute set out in Chapter 4 at 4.1.), the Court should utilise its Article 49 ICJ 
Statute power to draw adverse inferences in a way that it has hitherto been reluctant.  As 
stated above, the real utility of such action is in inducing disclosure rather than the actual 
inference itself.   
 
The thesis proposes these reforms which are relatively small in number and which could 
realistically be made through orders or practice directions, crucially without amendment of 
the Court’s Statute, and that are based on the practice of other inter-state courts and tribunals.  
It is argued that the value of drawing on the comparative exercise undertaken in Chapter 3 is 
that all the suggestions made in this thesis are currently in operation with regards to a similar 
inter-state Court – lending additional realism and credibility to the suggestions.  
 
However, it must be conceded that, even if the Court were to follow this exact procedure, a 
more proactive approach from the Court, which makes greater use of the Court’s fact-finding 
powers, is no panacea.  In relation to all of the avenues that it is suggested the Court could 
take in improving its fact-finding process, there are obstacles.  One particular obstacle that 
must be examined first of all is the issue of whether the Court has the discretion required to 
change its approach to fact-finding in order to become more proactive, or whether its position 
within the institutional machinery of the United Nations in any way fetters this discretion.  It 
is to this particular potential obstacle that we now turn before the limitations of the Court’s 
fact-finding powers are considered in the subsequent subsection.   
 
5.4. Does the Court have Unlimited Discretion to Pursue a More Proactive Approach to Fact-
Finding? 
 
This part seeks to examine whether the Court’s discretion to take a more proactive approach 
to fact-finding is in fact any way fettered by its position as part of the institutional framework 
of the United Nations.  Not every international court and tribunal may be completely free to 
adopt a proactive approach to fact-finding.  In fact, the institutional structure to which the 
court belongs may have a significant influence on how it approaches fact-finding.
1230
  For 
instance, Alvarez has argued that ‘whether a court’s assessment of the facts (or the law) is 
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likely to remain the last word within the specific legal regime in which it operates is likely to 
influence how (or even whether) it engages in fact-finding.’1231  Ultimately, any international 
court or tribunal’s factual determinations ‘may turn on whether the court thinks it can get 
away with such determinations, or whether it needs to pay heed to its own fragile legitimacy 
or jurisdiction’.1232  
 
There has been some suggestion that the Court might not be completely free to make factual 
determinations.  For instance, the Court in the Namibia advisory opinion stated that; 
A binding determination made by a competent organ of the United Nations to the 
effect that a situation is illegal cannot remain without consequence. Once the Court is 
faced with such a situation, it would be failing in the discharge of its judicial function 
if it did not declare that there is an obligation, especially upon Members of the United 
Nations, to bring that situation to an end...
1233
 
 
In a similar vein, in its written submissions in The Wall advisory opinion, Belgium argued that 
since General Assembly Resolution ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003 had already ‘identified the 
applicable law but also expressly declared the wall to be in contradiction to international 
law’1234 the Court’s legal opinion was not necessary, suggesting that when another organ of 
the United Nations has made a factual determination, the Court is precluded from examining 
the same factual issue.   
 
Relatedly, Germany argued that any opinion the Court would give would be ‘devoid of object 
and purpose’1235 since  
 
‘the question on which the opinion of the Court has been sought concerns issues 
where the Assembly has already taken a clear legal position.  In its resolution ES-
10113, the General Assembly not only identified the law that applies to the issue 
(International Humanitarian Law) but also already formally declared the wall to be in 
contradiction to international law. Thus, the General Assembly requires no guidance 
from the Court on the legality of the wall.’1236    
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Comparably, in the same case Jordan submitted that ‘[w]here the Security Council has 
decided or determined or declared that a situation is in violation of international law, and has 
thus considered it to be illegal, or where the General Assembly's consistent conduct over 
many years reflects an opinio juris to that effect, the Court cannot disregard such legal 
conclusions’.1237 
 
However, it is argued that this ought not to be the case with regards to the ICJ.  It is argued 
that the Court is not bound to accept findings-of-fact made by other UN Organs and that in 
fact it is not desirable for it to do so.  In examining more closely the Court's role as final 
arbiter of the facts, and following on from the examination of the principles that guide the 
Court in the course of fact-assessment, the following section will focus in greater detail on the 
Court’s freedom to depart from findings-of-fact made by other UN Organs. 
 
5.4.1. Gagged and Bound?  The International Court of Justice and its Relationship with other 
Principal Organs 
 
Factual determinations made in Security Council and General Assembly resolutions play a 
significant role in the Court’s assessment of the facts.1238  But how exactly is the Court 
affected by factual determinations made by other principal organs of the United Nations?  Is it 
formally bound to follow findings-of-fact as espoused by the General Assembly or the 
Security Council for example or is it free instead to determine and assess the facts for itself in 
its capacity as a judicial body?  In answering these questions it is suggested that conducting a 
static examination of the traditional roles of the principal organs based on the role envisaged 
for them in the UN Charter is a helpful starting point. 
5.4.2. A Static Examination of the Traditional Roles of the Principal Organs 
 
 
It is firstly important to note that the Court is just one of six principal organs of the United 
Nations.  All six principal organs of the Organisation are (at least) formally equal.
1239
  The 
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Court’s status as both principal organ and principal judicial organ is the basis for this formal 
equality.
1240
 
5.4.3. The Court: Principal Organ 
 
There are a number of important legal implications of the Court’s status as principal organ 
under Article 7(1) of the UN Charter.
1241
  For our purposes, however, it is first of all crucial to 
note that the principal organs of the UN are to a large extent interdependent and operate under 
a duty of co-operation with the other principal organs.
1242 
 Furthermore, there is no hierarchy 
between it and the other principal organs, (‘at least not between the ICJ and the Security 
Council and General Assembly’.1243)  As such, the Court’s status as principal organ ‘means 
that it exists on a par with the other principal organs’.1244  
 
5.4.4. The Court: Judicial Organ – Functional Distinction 
 
Further, despite the fact the Court’s status under Article 94 of the UN Charter as a judicial 
organ distinguishes it, and marks its independence from, the other principal organs,
1245
 this 
judicial status does not impact upon the relationship between it and the other principal organs 
which continues to be governed by the principal of equality.  As Gowlland-Debbas has stated;  
 
‘[a]s a “principal organ”, the ICJ is bound to cooperate with the other principal organs 
and to give effect to their decisions;  as a “judicial organ” it distinguishes itself from 
the other organs in its composition and functions which direct it to maintain its judicial 
integrity and its distance from the other, politically-oriented bodies’.1246   
                                                 
1240
 Article 7(1) UN Charter which marks the Court out as a principal organ of the Organization must be read in 
conjunction with Article 92 UN Charter which refers to the Court as the principal judicial organ of the UN 
and Article 1 of the Court’s Statute which refers to the Court has having been established by the Charter of 
the UN as the principal judicial organ of the UN 
1241
 Including the incorporation of the Court’s Statute into the UN Charter and that the Court is bound to the 
goals and principles expressed in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter, S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the 
International Court (2 edn, Martinus Nijhoff 1987) 64, A. Pellet, ‘Strenghtening the Role of the International 
Court of Justice as the Principal Organ of the United Nations’ 3 The Law and Practice of International Courts 
and Tribunals 159, 161 
1242
 V. Gowlland-Debbas, ‘Article 7’ in A. Zimmermann (ed), The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A 
Commentary (Oxford University Press 2006) 87; see also; Bedjaoui 13; Pellet 162 
1243
 The Secretary General has also referred to the ‘complementary relationship between the three concerned 
organs’ (1991 Report of the SG - UN Doc. A/46/1, 1991, p 4); 1243; see also; Bedjaoui 78; Gowlland-Debbas 
88; see also; Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court 71, T.D. Gill, ‘Legal and some 
political limitations on the power of the UN Security Council to exercise its enforcement powers under 
chapter VII of the Charter’ 26 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 33, 117 
1244
 T.D. Gill and S. Rosenne, The World Court: What it is and how it Works, vol 41 (United Nations Publications 
2003) 36 
1245
 Gowlland-Debbas 93 
1246
 Ibid (emphasis added). 
  257 
 
The functional distinction between the Court and the other principal organs can be seen in 
relation to its responsibilities, its composition and its method of operation.  The Court is an 
independent judicial body composed of impartial judges as opposed to appointed politicians 
or civil servants, and whilst it may share the ultimate goal of the maintenance of international 
peace and security and settlement of international disputes, the Court operates in accordance 
with its Statute in a legal manner in conducting purely legal proceedings.
1247
 
 
This functional distinction extends to the fact-finding and fact-assessment activities of the 
different UN organs.  As we have seen in Chapter 1, the Court possesses broad fact-finding 
powers which are judicial in character.  On the other hand the Security Council, as the 
executive arm of the UN, is political in terms of its composition and its fact-finding activities 
reflect this.
1248
   Information relied upon by the Council when passing resolutions would not 
necessarily be accorded any weight by the Court.
1249
 
 
The Court itself has considered the functional distinction between the UN organs, contrasting 
the Court’s legal methods of dispute settlement with the Council’s methods.1250  For instance, 
the Court has said that whilst Members of the Council are legally entitled to base their 
decisions on political considerations
1251
 the Court’s judicial function prohibits it from making 
decisions based on practicability or political expediency.
1252
  As such, in the words of Judge 
Weeramantry, the Court’s ‘…tests of validity and the bases of its decisions are naturally not 
the same as they would be before a political or executive organ of the United Nations.’1253  
The position of the Court as set out in the Charter is well summarised by Judge Schwebel in 
the Nicaragua case; 
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‘…[W]hile the Security Council is invested by the Charter with the authority to 
determine the existence of an act of aggression, it does not act as a court in making 
such a determination.  It may arrive at a determination of aggression – or, as more 
often is the case, fail to arrive at a determination of aggression – for political rather 
than legal reasons.  However, compelling the facts which could give rise to a 
determination of aggression, the Security Council acts within its rights when it decides 
that to make such a determination will set back the cause of peace rather than advance 
it.  In short, the Security Council is a political organ which acts for political reasons.  
It may take legal considerations into account but, unlike a court, it is not bound to 
apply them’.1254 
 
As such, the Court’s role as both principal and judicial organ puts it in a position of both 
interdependence and independence.  The records of the United Nations Conference on 
International Organization (UNCIO) confirm that the position of equality between organs 
created by Articles 7(1) and 94 UN Charter was envisaged of the drafters of the Charter.
1255
  
Despite the fact ‘there appears to have been no [explicit] discussion at San Francisco of the 
mutual relations of the different principal organs established by the Charter’1256 the protracted 
debate regarding the role that the principal organs should play in interpretation of the Charter 
provides valuable guidance as to the way in which the drafters envisaged the relationship 
between the principal organs and the Court.  
 
By way of illustration, a proposal that would have seen the inclusion of a provision explicitly 
addressing the issue of Charter interpretation in the body of the UN Charter itself was not 
adopted by the Subcommittee.
1257
  Rather, the Subcommittee favoured a decentralised 
approach whereby no single principal organ was given exclusive authority to interpret the 
Charter.
1258
  The Subcommittee Report stated that ‘in the course of the operations from day to 
day of the various organs of the Organization, it is inevitable that each organ will interpret 
such parts of the Charter as are applicable to its functions.’1259  The Subcommittee Report 
further stated that states and competent UN organs were free to interpret the Charter in a 
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whole number of ways ‘including by reference to the International Court of Justice’1260 in the 
course of contentious or advisory proceedings.
1261
  Consequently, whilst the Court has a role 
in Charter interpretation like all other principal organs, the role of the Court, or of any other 
principal organ for that matter, is not exclusive or definitive.
1262
 
 
In lieu of any principal organ having exclusive domain over interpretation of the Charter, the 
concept of ‘general acceptance’ plays a central role.  To elaborate, if any organ were to 
interpret the Charter in a way that was not conceived as of as being  ‘generally acceptable’ by 
the other organs, that particular interpretation would be rendered without binding force.
1263
  
This ensures that the equality of principal organs is respected and that the power of 
interpreting the Charter is dispersed.
1264
  Taken together, this results in a situation in which 
‘there is no institutional hierarchy as between these [principal] organs’1265 as ‘each of the 
principal organs possesses its own interpretation of certain elements of the Charter’.1266    
 
Furthermore, in interpreting the Charter each organ must balance its freedom to interpret the 
Charter with the principle of legality,
1267
 a general limitation on the power of UN organs,
1268
 
which essentially provides that UN organs must operate ‘in accordance with the present 
Charter’.1269  In the absence of judicial review of the acts of UN organs to determine their 
legality, this decentralized system for ensuring compliance with the law is the only one that is 
truly ‘compatible with the reality of the Charter as a treaty and with the consensual character 
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of the underlying relations’ at this stage of development in the international legal order.1270 
 
5.4.5. Functional Parallelism 
 
However, it is clear that the relationship of equality between principal organs brings with it 
considerable potential for conflict.  As Pellet has stated ‘[t]o be blind to the tensions which 
might arise from this requires a large amount of angelism or naïvité’.1271  In such cases the 
question arises as to whether, for example, in acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the 
Council can bind the Court.  As we have seen, however, a static examination of the Charter 
system reveals that this is not so and that in formal terms no organ is entitled to bind the other.  
Rather, the Charter envisages that the Court and the Council cooperate in matters that are of 
concern to both organs a relationship whereby the two organs operate in tandem.  The Court 
has echoed this sentiment, stating in the Nicaragua case: 
 
‘the Council has functions of a political nature assigned to it whereas the Court 
exercises purely judicial functions.  Both organs can therefore perform their separate 
but complementary functions with respect to the same events”’.1272  
 
Consequently the functional distinction between the organs is clear-cut - ‘“the function of the 
Court is to state the law”1273 and it can decide only on the basis of law’1274 meaning that ‘no 
objection of lis pendens or res judicata may be raised against the ICJ acting 
simultaneously…in a case pending before the SC’.1275 As a result, whilst the Court will 
always apply the law to the case at hand, ‘its power of action and decision is subject to no 
limitation deriving from the fact that the dispute before it might also be within the 
competence of some other organ.’1276   
 
Unlike the General Assembly, which under Article 12 UN Charter fetters the competence of 
the General Assembly to make recommendations on matters of international peace and 
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security when a particular situation is already before the Security Council,
1277
 ‘the ICJ has not 
generally considered itself to be similarly constrained.”1278  On the other hand, it is clear that 
just as the Council cannot bind the Court, the fact that a matter is before the Court does not 
prevent the Council from also dealing with the matter – ‘the ICJ does not benefit from any 
privilege of primacy in the exercise of its law-adjudicating function’1279  - consequently ‘the 
Court is not bound to defer to the Council in a particular case and vice versa’.1280  As Rosenne 
has famously stated, this ‘well illustrates the functional parallelism of two principal organs of 
the United nations, each of which has competence, under the combined Charter and Statute, to 
deal with the same ‘dispute’.1281 
 
Article 36(3) of the UN Charter provides another example of a clear functional distinction 
between the organs and again action by one organ does not preclude action by another: again 
we see functional parallelism.  Article 36(3) of the Charter sets out that the Security Council 
should take into account the fact that ‘legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by 
the parties to the Court’.1282  As the Court confirmed in the Tehran Hostages case,1283 whilst 
the Court ought not to be precluded from addressing the legal issues that arising in the 
settlement of an international dispute, and whilst the juxtaposition of Articles 36(1) and (3) 
hint at a distinction between legal and political disputes, any suggestion that the Council 
should be legally obliged to refrain from dealing with a dispute on the fact it is ‘purely legal’ 
is not feasible in practice.
1284
  The Court itself said as much in the Nicaragua case, 
questioning whether the Council should shy away from a case brought before it because it has 
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legal implications.
1285
  Indeed, nothing in the Charter imposes a binding obligation the 
Council to refer a dispute to the Court on the basis that it has legal implications, in all 
likelihood since it is almost impossible to imagine any international dispute that did not have 
legal implications.  At most it could be said that Article 36(3) obligates the Council to 
consider other procedures for settlement of the dispute.
1286
  It would appear that the only way 
in which the traditional distinction between the political and the legal have any relevance is in 
whether the Council, in exercising its considerable discretion (Article 36(3) uses ‘should’ 
rather than ‘shall’),1287 feels that the behaviour of the parties to any dispute would benefit 
from a legal judgment to settle their dispute through referral to the Court or whether the 
political powers of the Council itself would be better suited.
1288
 
 
5.4.6. Chapter VII Considerations & The Principle of Speciality 
 
A further argument based in the principle of speciality can be anticipated in which it is 
asserted that, as a result of the Council’s primary responsibility for international security 
under Article 24(1) UN Charter, the Council’s powers might supersede the principle of 
functional parallelism and mean that it is competent to usurp the Court on such matters.   
 
The principle of speciality was addressed by the Court in the WHO Advisory Opinion in 
which the Court stated that the principle governed international organisations as a result of the 
fact that they are ‘invested by the States which create them with powers, the limits of which 
are a function of the common interests whose promotion those states entrust to them’. 1289  
This principle can bee seen as a ‘basic and uncontroversial rule of the law of international 
organisations, namely the principle of enumerated powers or attributed competences.’ 1290  
Could it be said that matters of international peace and security are ‘pith and substance’ the 
domain of the Security Council as a result of the principle of speciality?  It is argued that in 
order to make this judgement two questions must be asked; (i) does there exist a situation of 
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mutually exclusive powers? And (ii) to which organ does this exclusive power belong?
1291
 
 
Whilst identifying the ‘pith and substance’ of a case is possible in order to determine which 
organ is most specialised to deal with it, it is much more difficult in practice.  As Bothe states 
‘…in any system of mutually exclusive powers, an attempt to bring a matter of overlapping 
jurisdiction into the jurisdiction of one sphere will pose serious difficulties’.1292  In addition, 
both international scholarship and the Court have always rejected this argument ‘both for the 
relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council and for the relationship 
between itself and the Council’.1293  Delbrück argues that such priority of the Council over the 
Court in relation to matters of international peace and security ‘can neither be deduced from 
the notion of the primary responsibility of the SC for the maintenance of peace, nor find 
support in any other Charter provisions or any general principles of law’.1294  Further, 
Gowlland-Debbas states that the Court itself has on several occasions underlined that ‘the 
term primary or principal responsibility in Art 24 UN charter, did not mean exclusive 
responsibility…’1295  In The Wall advisory opinion the Court reasserted this point, stating that 
‘Article 24 refers to a primary, but not necessarily exclusive, competence’.1296  Ultimately it is 
clear that the preceding static conceptualisation of the relationship between the principal 
organs of the UN as one of two essentially equal organs does not give a complete picture of 
the contemporary relationship between the two organs in practice.  As such, a closer 
examination of the contemporary relationship between the principal organs is required.  In the 
following section, it is suggested that instead of creating ‘watertight compartments of 
functions’ that draw discrete lines between the competences of the organs as the principle of 
speciality might suggest, the practice of the United Nations to date has been to accept the fact 
of overlapping competences and activities.
1297
  As Bothe has noted, the emphasis has fallen on 
‘concerted action between various agencies of the United Nations system.’ 1298  
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5.4.7. A Dynamic Examination of the Roles of the Principal Organs – The Contemporary 
Reality 
 
The significance of the practice of the Court and factual determinations made by it its 
resolutions lies in the fact that it is possible that through the acquiescence of states, a 
‘subsequent practice’ in terms of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties could be formed.
1299
  But is there a basis to the argument that the practice of the 
Council brings into question the formally equality of the two organs?  In other words; is there 
any evidence that the Court has considered its own discretion fettered by Security Council 
action?  In order to answer these questions, it is essential to consider a number of significant 
cases. 
 
5.4.8. Jurisprudence of the Court - Functional Parallelism 
 
The jurisprudence of the Court brings out very clearly the theme of the absence of any 
hierarchy between the principal organs (at least between the Court and the Council).  In the 
cases that have come before the court in which there have been issues of concurrent exercise 
of powers, there has never been any suggestion from either the Council or the Court that the 
simultaneous exercise of their respective functions would be problematic.
1300
  To give but one 
example, the Court in Certain Expenses stated that: 
 
‘It is not to be assumed that the General Assembly would…seek to fetter or hamper 
the Court in the discharge of its judicial functions; the Court must have full liberty to 
consider al1 relevant data available to it in forming an opinion on a question posed to 
it for an advisory opinion.’1301 
 
As such, it is argued that the position is that as stated by the United States during the Tehran 
Hostages crisis; ‘[t]here is absolutely nothing in the United Nations Charter or in this Court’s 
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Statute to suggest that action by the Security Council excludes action by the Court, even if the 
two actions might in some respects be parallel.’1302  But what of factual determinations more 
specifically? 
 
5.4.9. Jurisprudence of the Court - Factual Determinations 
 
Whilst the Court has considered factual determinations made by the Security Council and 
General Assembly on a number of occasions – its pronouncements could not accurately be 
described as particularly coherent or enlightening until relatively recently.  In the Northern 
Cameroons case the Court found that the case before it was non-justiciable since the legal 
issue in question, the legal status of the territory, had already been determined by the General 
Assembly.
1303
  In addition, at the merits stage of the Armed Activities case the Court held that 
the UPDF had violated territorial sovereignty ‘on the Security Council's determination that 
the conflict constituted a threat to peace, security and stability in the region and that the 
Security Council called for states concerned “to bring to an end the presence of these 
uninvited forces”’.1304  It has been said that the Court in Armed Activities ‘seemed to consider 
some of the Security Council Resolutions as providing a factual basis from which the Court 
could draw legal conclusions, almost as if a Security Council Resolution constituted fact-
findings of a lower court’.1305   
 
Similarly, in The Wall advisory opinion the Court’s argument that the territories in question 
remained occupied was based on Security Council Resolutions that condemned the 
occupation and action taken by Israel.
1306
  Further, in relation to the applicability of the 
Geneva Convention IV to the Occupied Territory the Court expressly referred to General 
Assembly and Security Council resolutions as authority.
1307
  The Court also employed, albeit 
as subsidiary authority, resolutions in relation to the right of the Palestine to self-
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determination
1308
 and that the settlements breach the Geneva Convention IV.
1309
  It was in 
relation to this last issue, the illegality of the settlements, however, that the Court was most 
heavily reliant on UN resolutions – referring exclusively to Security Council Resolutions 446 
(22 March 1979), 452 (20 July 1979) and 456 (1 March 1980) for legal justification.
1310
  
Criticism of The Wall advisory opinion for precluding itself from participating in any fact-
finding and accepting that the SG's Report mentioned in the question provided for a ‘given 
factual situation’.1311   Commentators at the time remarked upon the fact that it is surprising 
that the Court would rely so heavily on resolutions that were not technically binding under 
Chapter VII, and with no reference to the interpretation of this provision in state practice.
1312
 
 
The combination of Article 25 UNC and Article 103 UNC render Security Council resolutions 
binding on all Member States and create obligations that take precedence over all other legal 
norms (save, perhaps, for jus cogens norms).  Whilst clearly intended to cover inter-state 
relations, these fundamentally important provisions of the UN Charter nevertheless mean that 
is ‘difficult...for the Court to deviate from an assessment of fact by the Security Council that 
forms the basis of measures adopted by the Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter’.1313 
 
In addition, Pellet's suggestion that ‘the resolutions of other principal organs, whether of the 
General Assembly or the Security Council, are not relied on that much by the Court unless 
they have a compulsory nature’,1314 has been challenged.  For example, one commentator has 
pointed out that ‘the Court attributes weight to both binding and non-binding paragraphs of 
General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions’ citing the Court’s reliance on a 
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preambular paragraph of Security Council Resolution 1304 (2000) in aiding its determination 
that massive human rights violations and grave breaches of IHL had taken place
1315
 and the 
Court’s reliance on a preambular paragraph of a General Assembly Resolution which referred 
to the ‘abhorrent policy of ethnic cleansing being carried out in Bosnia-Herzegovina’ as 
examples.
1316
  Further, it has been shown that ‘the Court referred to and quoted from a 
number of preambular and operative paragraphs of Security Council and General Assembly 
resolutions that referred to sexual violence, and which were “based on reports before the 
General Assembly and Security Council, such as Reports of the Secretary-General, the 
Commission of Experts, the Special Rapporteur for Human Rights...and various United 
Nations agencies in the field”.1317 
 
Whilst the Court in the past has stated that any factual or legal determinations made by the 
Security Council ‘had the same legal force as the provision of the resolution in which it was 
contained’ until the recent Kosovo Advisory Opinion the Court had not squarely addressed the 
issue in any case that had come before it
 
.
1318
  The Court has on several occasions in the past 
made a distinction between resolutions that have binding legal effects known as decisions and 
resolutions that do not have such binding effect, known as recommendations.
1319
  As such, it 
could be said that any factual determination contained in a decision was legally binding on the 
addressee of the situation whilst a determination made in a recommendation would not have 
the same binding character, and so on.  However, the Court had never given any guidance on 
whether any factual determination made in a decision of the Council or the General Assembly 
would be binding on the Court.
1320
   
 
The closest that the Court has come to addressing the issue before the Kosovo opinion was in 
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its rejection of Portugal’s argument in the East Timor case that certain factual determinations 
contained within resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council should be taken 
as ‘givens’.1321  The Court highlighted conflicting state practice in coming to the conclusion 
that the resolutions in question could not be considered as factual ‘givens’ capable of settling 
the dispute.
1322
 
 
However the recent Kosovo Advisory Opinion is undoubtedly the Court’s most significant 
contribution to the Court’s jurisprudence in this regard, addressing the issue squarely for the 
first time.
1323
  In the Kosovo Advisory Opinion the Court rejected suggestions that it should 
not give an opinion because doing so would require interpreting or applying a number of 
decisions of the Security Council, saying that it has done so in the past in both advisory and 
contentious proceedings.
1324
  The relevance of the Kosovo opinion lies is in its reformulation 
of the scope of the question requested of the Court by the General Assembly.  In its request 
for the Kosovo advisory opinion, the General Assembly stated that the unilateral declaration 
of independence had been adopted by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of 
Kosovo.  However, the factual assertion that the declaration had been adopted by the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo was challenged by a number of 
parties.
1325
   
 
In doing so, the question arose as to whether, in formulating the question in the way it was, 
the General Assembly had already predetermined a particular factual element of the case – 
namely the identity of the authors of the declaration.
1326
  The Court itself noted that the 
factual issue of the identity of the authors of the declaration of independence could have an 
important effect on the answer to the question posed by the General Assembly.
 1327
  However, 
this did not deter the Court from exercising its inherent right to reformulate the question asked 
of it.  The Court explained its decision to do so, arguing that ‘[i]t would be incompatible with 
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the proper exercise of the judicial function for the Court to treat that matter as having been 
determined by the General Assembly.’1328  The Court went on to elaborate on its reasoning, 
stating that as an independent judicial organ ‘the Court must be free to examine the entire 
record and decide for itself whether that declaration was promulgated by the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government or some other entity.’1329  
 
In the course of the opinion the Court found that the General Assembly’s identification of the 
authors of the declaration of independence had been incorrect and made a contrasting factual 
finding. This factual finding has been described as constituting a crucial step in the Court’s 
reasoning on the way to the conclusion that Security Council Resolution 1244 did not bind the 
authors of the declaration.
1330
  This bold step from the Court, denying that factual 
determinations made in resolutions of the General Assembly has been praised for a number of 
reasons to which we will turn our attention presently.
1331
  However, a caveat must be added 
here in relation to the scope of the Court’s pronouncements.  It would seem unlikely that the 
Court would adopt a practice of making contradictory factual findings from its fellow organs.  
In fact, in the Kosovo opinion the Court qualified its reformulation of the facts of the case 
stating that the General Assembly had not intended to fetter the Court’s jurisdiction in this 
regard.
1332
  This begs the question as to whether the Court would take the same step of 
reformulations were the requesting organ to explicitly determine the facts in the question 
asked of the Court.
 1333
  
 
In addition, doubt remains surrounding the application of the Court’s pronouncements beyond 
the facts of the Kosovo case.  To elaborate, the factual determination overturned by the Court 
in the Kosovo case ‘was contained in an authorization rather than an obligation, and was 
made by the General Assembly rather than the Security Council (let alone under Chapter VII 
of the Charter).’1334  As such, doubt remains as to whether the Court would consider itself 
similarly unconstrained by a binding determination of a threat to the peace made by the 
Security Council under Article 39 of the UN Charter for instance.
1335
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Taken as a whole, where does this examination of the practice of the Court leave us?  The 
preceding section has sought to illustrate that the position taken by the Court on factual 
determinations made by other UN organs has not been unequivocal to date.  Nevertheless, it is 
argued that there is a sufficient suggestion in the pronouncements of the Court to suggest that 
the Court would not consider itself bound by such factual determinations in most cases.  As 
such, the concluding section of this chapter examines the policy implications of the Court 
taking this position and indeed, whilst it is not asserted that the Court is necessarily best 
placed to definitively determine the facts, it is nonetheless argued that as an independent 
judicial organ it should not be bound by other political organs for a number of reasons. 
 
5.4.10. The Policy Argument: Functional Parallelism & Functional Distinction 
 
In order to round off this examination of the issue of whether the Court’s discretion to take a 
more proactive approach to fact-finding is affected by its place as part of the institutional 
structure of the United Nations, it is argued that, in light of the preceding static and dynamic 
examination of the relationship between the Court and other principal organs that the Court 
should not consider itself bound by factual determinations made by them, in the words of 
Judge Bedjaoui, so long as no action taken by the Council under Chapter VII of the Charter 
‘sets aside, rules out or renders impossible the juridical solution expected of the Court.’1336 
 
As the preceding sections sought to illustrate, whilst nothing in the Charter precludes the 
functional parallelism of the Court and other principal organs, and whilst the Court has 
rejected any notion of litispendence in cases that have come before it, staunchly defending the 
Court’s ability to operate in tandem with the Council, it is unavoidable that the adoption of a 
decision under Chapter VII of the Charter by the Council may deprive the situation before the 
Court of all meaning.
1337
 
 
Whilst such a dose of realism is essential regarding the Chapter VII powers of the Council, it 
should nonetheless be emphasised that short of such frustration or material change in 
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circumstances with regard to a dispute before the Court, the Court should in no way consider 
itself bound by a factual determination made by the Council.
1338
  The Court should not 
consider itself unable to contradict the Council in relation to a factual determination for 
reasons of judicial propriety nor consider it an inherent limitation of the judicial function.
1339
  
In other words, it is argued that the relationship between the Court and other principal organs 
should be ‘one of coordination and functional cooperation in the attainment of the aims of the 
Organization, not one of competition or mutual exclusion…’1340 in all but the most extreme 
circumstances (those being the frustration of the case before the Court by the action of the 
Council under Chapter VII). 
 
That the principle of litispendence does not operate in relation to the principal organs is due to 
the fact that each organ does not try to avoid the duplication of proceedings as in domestic 
law but rather seeks to operate as different processes within the framework of an ‘integrated 
structure for the peaceful settlement of disputes on the international plane.’1341   
 
In addition, the fact-finding processes of the General Assembly and Court are substantially 
different and could in theory, and in fact have in practice, led to different results.  Such 
criticisms of the Council’s fact-finding have come up in cases before the Court.  For instance, 
Uganda challenged reliance on a factual determination made by the Security Council in 
Resolution 1304 in the course of the Armed Activities case contending that ‘it is evident that 
in reaching its conclusions about the law the Security Council has not acted in a way that 
would normally be recognised as judicial.  The Security Council emphasis is on political 
adhesion rather than impartial conclusions based on unbiased consideration of the facts and 
the objective examination of the law’.1342 
 
Furthermore, were the Court to consider its discretion fettered by other organs of the United 
Nations, it is argued that its judicial independence would be detrimentally affected.  The 
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principle of compétence de la compétence, that the Court ‘determines the limits of its own 
jurisdiction, and it decides on challenges to it’ is fundamentally important to the independence 
of international judicial organs.  Should an international court’s jurisdiction be defined by 
another organ, it is difficult to imagine how that court could be described as independent in 
any way.  The same might be said for factual determinations: if the Court’s ability to make 
such determinations was subject to those of another organ, that court’s judicial independence 
would be called into question, as Geroges Abi-Saab has stated ‘[i]f you are not the one who 
has the final word, it makes you always look behind your back, which greatly undermines 
independence.’1343 
 
And indeed it is clear the there are significant differences between the fact-finding procedures 
of the Court (as outlined in Chapter 1) and those of the Council, mainly due to the different 
goals that the two organs are seeking to achieve.  As a political organ the Council has 
different, more political, priorities and as a judicial organ, fact-finding lies at the heart of the 
judicial function.  On this, it should be noted that the Security Council has a history of making 
inaccurate factual findings, see for example Resolution 1530 of 2004 which incorrectly 
attributed the Madrid bombings to the ‘terrorist group ETA’ hastily after the incident, when in 
fact it emerged that the attacks were the doings of a cell of Al-Qaeda.
1344
   
 
As a result of such slackness it is argued that a more proactive judicial approach to the facts 
could be an advantage in this regard.  Of course in cases of functional parallelism it is not 
beyond the realms of possibility that, for example, the Court and the Council may come to 
conflicting factual determinations but such conflicts must be dealt with as they arise whilst all 
the while bearing in mind that both organs are ultimately operating as part of the same 
institutional apparatus and are seeking to achieve the same goals, albeit by different means.  
 
5.4.11. Summary – The Court’s Discretion Unfettered   
 
In sum, it can be argued that, to some extent, the principles of equality and functional 
parallelism would equally apply to findings-of-fact as to interpretation of the Charter.  Just as 
the Court does not have a Charter-based power to review the legality of acts of the Security 
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Council as a result of the functional parallelism envisaged by the drafters of the Charter, the 
corollary is that the Security Council cannot formally bind the Court in relation to 
determinations of fact made by it, for example, in resolutions.  As Pellet has stated, ‘[t]his 
constitutes the primary consequence of the institution of the Court as the principal judicial 
organ of the United Nations.’1345 
 
As such, it is argued that the Court is not formally bound by assertions of fact contained 
within resolutions of the General Assembly or Security Council, regardless of whether they 
are in relation to an issue being concurrently dealt with by the Council in the course of 
maintaining or restoring international peace and security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
(except from those cases in which the Council frustrates the action of the Court through 
materially affecting the dispute before the Court by means of a decision under Chapter 
VII).
1346
  Even in such circumstances the Court ‘must at all times preserve its independence in 
performing the functions which the Charter has committed to it as the United Nations’ 
principal judicial organ’.1347  This independence or autonomy is key – flowing from both the 
UN Charter and the Court’s Statute and from the very nature of the judicial function, the 
essence of any court.
1348
  The Court itself must at all times ensure the proper administration of 
justice, maintain its high juridical character and integrity
1349
 whilst safeguarding its judicial 
function.
1350
  The significance of the Court’s independence in relation to its assessment of the 
facts cannot be overstated.  As such, it is submitted that the Court should ensure on all 
occasions that it strictly evaluates the probity of evidence before it, whether emanating from a 
UN source or otherwise, and should not consider itself bound by determinations of fact made 
by other UN organs in ensuring the proper administration of justice.   
 
Ultimately, it is argued that we can answer the fundamentally important question posed at the 
start of this subsection, namely whether or not the Court’s discretion to take a more proactive 
approach to fact-finding is in any way fettered by its position within the institutional 
machinery of the United Nations, in the negative.  The foregoing examination has shown that 
there is nothing in either the Court’s constitutive instruments or practice which would fetter 
the Court’s discretion and that accordingly the Court, as an independent tribunal, possesses 
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the discretion required in order to adopt a more proactive approach to fact-finding, should it 
choose to do so.  Having shown that the Court is capable of taking a more proactive approach 
to fact-finding should it choose to do so, it is necessary to turn to the limits of the Court’s 
fact-finding powers before a position can be taken on the relative merits of adopting such an 
approach.  
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5.5. The Limits of the Court’s Fact-Finding Powers 
 
There are a number of significant limits to the proposals for a more proactive approach 
designed to improve the Court’s approach to fact-finding as set out in Chapter 4.  As such, it 
is important to emphasise that the proposals set out in Chapter 4 do not represent blind faith in 
the increased use of all of the Court’s fact-finding powers as the answer to those problems 
that it currently faces.  A number of examples serve to illustrate this point. 
 
First of all, although states have not voiced their opposition to the progressive interpretation 
of the equivalent fact-finding power in the context of the WTO, there of course remains the 
danger that states could reject similar moves by the ICJ in relation to interpreting Article 49 of 
its Statute to be binding on the parties as advocated in Chapter 4.
1351
  In such circumstances, 
owing to the consensual nature of the Court’s jurisdiction, it is likely that the threat of states 
‘taking their business elsewhere’ could influence the Court in future decisions as to whether to 
uphold this progressive interpretation of Article 49.   
 
Furthermore, even if the Court were to insist that its Article 49 power is compulsory, should 
any party refuse to cooperate (whether it be with a request for information contained in a 
provisional measure or under Article 49 specifically, or more general non-cooperation with 
the Court) it would appear that the only option left open to the Court is to draw adverse 
inferences.  However the power to draw adverse inferences is one that the Court explicitly 
possesses (again in Article 49 ICJ Statute) and as such the utility of insisting upon the 
compulsory nature of its power to order the production of evidence by the parties is open to 
question.
1352
   
 
In addition, it is unclear to what extent greater use of the Court’s fact-finding powers will help 
to remedy those problems the Court faces in cases of non-appearance as discussed in the 
second half of Chapter 2.  To elaborate, it was argued in Chapter 2 that in cases of non-
appearance the Court should be more proactive in utilising those fact-finding powers that it 
already possesses such as requesting information from an existing UN Commission of Inquiry 
or requesting the establishment of such an inquiry to assist it.
1353
  However, recent practice of 
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UN Commissions of Inquiry have illustrated that even where additional fact-finding is carried 
out, lack of consent from the state involved in the investigation can amount to a near-
insurmountable obstacle.   
 
A clear example of this can be seen in the experience of the UN Human Rights Council’s 
Gaza inquiry in 2009.  Israel’s refusal to cooperate with the Goldstone Inquiry is a clear 
example of how non-cooperation can present serious difficulties in terms of fact-finding.
1354
  
Goldstone himself has recently spoken of the difficulties presented by Israel’s non-
cooperation which he states, along with the emergence of further information subsequently, 
caused him many ‘sleepless nights’ and cast doubt upon a number of the factual 
determinations made in the Goldstone Inquiry which ultimately caused Goldstone to ‘row 
back’ on a number on some of the inquiry’s factual determinations in a now infamous 
Washington Post opinion-editorial.
1355
   Non-cooperation necessarily entails greater reliance 
on secondary sources such as press reports and interviews with individuals who claim to have 
witnessed certain events which, whilst still useful to some extent, are of less probative value 
than primary fact-finding.
1356
  It is suggested that such practice cautions against reliance on 
factual determinations made in fact-finding inquiries which were not granted consent to visit 
the area under investigation (and indeed in practice consent is denied on a regular basis.
1357
)  
As such, the extent to which increased use of the Court’s fact-finding powers will actually 
result in more information coming before the Court is unclear. 
 
Moreover, there are a number of the Court’s fact-finding powers which were not advocated in 
relation to the improvement of the Court’s fact-finding process.  For instance, as stated above, 
greater use of the Court’s power to conduct site visits under Article 44(2) of its Statute is not 
advocated.  In most instances such site visits appear to have a merely ‘illustrative function’, 
providing helpful background to the complex facts of a case rather than being a fact-finding 
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tool capable of bringing important new information before the Court.
1358
  Ultimately, the 
utility of a group of judges who are not experts making site visits under Article 44(2) ICJ 
Statue in cases involving particularly complex or technical facts is doubtful. 
 
Similarly, it should be noted that increased use of the Court’s competence to establish a 
commission of inquiry under Article 50 of the Court’s Statute as it did in the Corfu Channel 
case is not advocated in the thesis.  This reluctance can be attributed to the fact that other 
inter-state tribunals such as the WTO and inter-state arbitrations have displayed a preference 
for reliance on individual experts rather than commissions of inquiry or expert review groups.  
It is suggested that this can be attributed to a fear of creating a ‘tribunal within a tribunal’.1359  
As stated above, the Court may be loath to fetter its own discretion, both in terms of the 
flexibility of the fact-finding process and limiting its discretion as to the ultimate factual 
determination by establishing a commission of inquiry under Article 50 of its Statute.  On the 
other hand, individual experts offer the Court greater control over the fact-finding process and 
avoid the Court being presenting with a report representing the common findings of a group 
of experts which would carry great epistemic weight and would be extremely hard to 
contradict or nuance.  In addition, of course, this reluctance can also result from resource 
constraints which obviously limit the Court’s ability to establish a commission of inquiry 
under Article 50 of tis Statute.  Both financial and time restraints would appear to favour the 
appointment of an individual expert as opposed to a commission of inquiry under Article 50 
of the Court’s Statute.1360  Time and resource constraints are fundamentally important to the 
Court and must not be overlooked at any stage when considering reform of the Court’s 
procedure.   
 
The practice of other international courts and tribunals as examined in Chapter 3 also cautions 
against advocating greater resort to witness testimony.  The problematic handling of witnesses 
and the dubious value that such witnesses have brought to international proceedings to date, 
coupled with the fact that the Court has never called a witness proprio motu under Article 50 
of its Statute cautioned against advocating this particular reform.
1361
   In the same vein, the 
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WTO’s experience in utilising the burden of proof raises fears that manipulating the burden of 
proof before the ICJ would complicate rather than improve the Court’s fact-finding 
process.
1362
  To date the Court has somewhat shied away from making explicit statements on 
the burden and standard of proof in cases that have come before it.  Whilst increasingly 
complex cases coming before the Court may lead some to call for a clearer articulation of the 
burden of proof, it is suggested that the practice of the adjudicative bodies of the WTO should 
be a somewhat cautionary tale for the Court as attempts to utilise the burden of proof have 
brought an element of uncertainty to proceedings.
1363
 
  
The Court’s Article 30(2) ICJ Statute power to appoint assessors without the right to vote to 
assist the Court has been advocated by some commentators.
1364
  However such proposals are 
not taken up in the current thesis due to the fact that such provisions in the constitutive 
instruments and rules of procedure of other international courts and tribunals have never been 
utilised.
1365
   Similar reasoning has cautioned against proposals to the effect that, drawing on 
the experience of judges in the US Supreme Court, the Court could develop an open list of 
standard questions that it could utilise when examining complex or particularly scientific 
evidence.
1366
  Some commentators have argued that such questions could be structured in 
such a way as to methodically provide the Court with information on the hypothesis of the 
expert appearing before it and the methodology that the expert has used in reaching that 
hypothesis.
1367
  However, it can be anticipated would not consider such limits on its discretion 
by adopting a standard set of questions desirable and as such it is unlikely that the Court 
would adopt this proposal.   
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One proposal that deserves slightly closer attention is that of making more regular use of 
Article 34(2) of the Court’s Statute.  Article 34(2) provides that the Court may request of 
public international organizations information relevant to cases before it and represents 
another fact-finding tool for the Court.
1368
  Although the Court has not made significant use of 
this provision to date, greater use of this provision could provide the Court with additional 
information that would not have been put before the Court by the parties.
1369
  To elaborate, in 
taking a more proactive approach to the facts, under Article 34(2) the Court could request the 
Human Rights Council or the UN Secretary-General, for instance, to establish a commission 
of inquiry to provide it with more information in relation to factual issues that have arise in 
cases that come before the Court.   
 
Utilising Article 34(2) as such it could be foreseen that the Court could exert control over a 
number of procedural issues relating to the establishment of the fact-finding inquiry, including 
the specifying exactly what issues it requires further assistance on.  Furthermore, there is the 
addition benefit of being a relatively inexpensive way of bringing additional information 
before the Court due to the fact that the costs incurred would be borne by the General 
Assembly or Secretary-General.  This would be particularly advantageous given the fact that 
resource constraints have often been cited as a reason as to why the Court has more often 
made use of its Article 50 ICJ Statute powers to establish a commission of inquiry.   
 
However, whilst Article 34(2) of the Court’s Statute is, at least in theory, another means by 
which the Court can bring information not submitted by the parties before the Court, in reality 
jurisdictional constraints mean that Article 34(2) is unlikely to ever meaningfully alter the 
way in which information comes before the Court, as the following subsection demonstrates.  
Cases can be brought under the Court’s advisory jurisdiction under Article 96(1) of the UN 
Charter.
1370
  It can be envisaged that in the course of advisory proceedings before the Court a 
factual issue could arise for which the establishment of a fact-finding inquiry could be 
potentially useful.
 1371
  However, the issue of which entitles are competent to request an 
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advisory opinion has always limited the number of requests put to the Court.
1372
  Since states 
themselves are not competent to request an advisory opinion, any state wishing to do so must 
achieve the support of a majority of Security Council Members or secure sufficient support to 
achieve a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly – difficult tasks for any state and 
almost impossible for an unpopular or controversial state.
1373
  These strict jurisdictional 
constraints combined with the Council’s reluctance to seek guidance from the Court 
(something which the Court has only ever done once
1374
) explains both why there have not 
been more advisory proceedings before the Court and why Article 34(2) of the Court’s Statute 
is an unlikely means of brining additional information before the Court.
1375
   
 
Similarly, with regard to the Court’s contentious jurisdiction, jurisdictional constraints operate 
such as Article 34(1) of the Court’s Statute which provides that only states can be party to 
contentious proceedings before the Court, and as such excludes non-state actors.
1376
  Put 
simply, for the possibility of the Court making use of Article 34(2) to arise, an evidentiary gap 
capable of being remedied through resort to this provision must form part of the dispute 
between the (state) parties.
1377
  In the end the Court can only utilise UN fact-finding when it is 
given the chance of doing so, and as the previous subsection has attempted to demonstrate, 
the Court will only have the opportunity to do so in a limited range of circumstances owing to 
in-built jurisdictional constraints.   
 
In addition to such jurisdictional problems there are of course the dangers associated with 
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executive-administrative finality as discussed at length in Chapter 2.   The notion of 
executive-administrative finality, as demonstrated in the recent Armed Activities and Bosnian 
Genocide cases illustrates that the Court attributes ‘greater weight to UN reports than to other 
types of secondary evidence such as press reports’ ostensibly due to the presumption that such 
UN reports are based on solid, objective and impartial fact-finding.
1378
  In relation to the 
establishment of a commission of inquiry under Article 34(2) of the Court’s Statute, there if 
course always the possibility that the dangers associated with executive-administrative 
finality as outlined in Chapter 2 reoccur in a different form and pose the same problems to the 
proper administration of justice.  
 
Ultimately the preceding sections have sought to demonstrate two points.  First of all, not all 
of the Court’s fact-finding powers are advocated as ways in which the Court could address the 
weaknesses in its current fact-finding process.  Secondly, those reforms that are proposed 
which involve greater use of certain fact-finding powers are limited in nature and are not a 
perfect solution to the problems the Court currently faces.  In short, not only does the Court’s 
current reactive approach to fact-finding have its merits but the Court’s fact-finding powers 
are also limited in nature.  Nevertheless, it is maintained that the reforms proposed in Chapter 
4, were they to be adopted, have the potential to materially improve the fact-finding process 
before the International Court of Justice. 
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Epilogue  
 
This thesis has examined the ICJ’s approach to fact-finding, drawing on the practice of other 
inter-state tribunals including a number of recent arbitrations and the adjudicative bodies of 
the WTO.  Other inter-state tribunals such as ITLOS and the international criminal tribunals 
were referred to in a number of discrete areas, most often to provide context or a point of 
comparison in relation to the argument being made.  However, what is clear is that the issue 
of judicial fact-finding is equally in need of academic attention in other areas.  For instance, 
international investment law is one of the most exciting and active areas of international law 
at present.  Consideration of issues of evidence and fact-finding before investment tribunals 
would undoubtedly raise pertinent issues.  Similarly, whilst there has been some discussion of 
the use of evidence before international criminal tribunals,
1379
 further academic attention is 
merited, especially given the fact that individual liberty is at stake in such cases. 
 
The reforms proposed in this thesis are a select few and, it is argued, could realistically be 
adopted should the Court choose to do so.  The rationale behind the modest, realistic nature of 
the proposals is summed up well by former President of the Court Rosalyn Higgins, who has 
stated that ‘[o]ne hasn’t to be grandiose, but if we can help in particular cases, in coping with 
what otherwise could be disintegrating into violence, it’s very good.’ 1380  It should be made 
clear that the thesis has never at any stage proposed that the Court completely disregard the 
evidence put before it by the parties and undertake its own wide-ranging fact-finding.  Instead, 
the thesis has argued that the Court’s current reactive approach to fact-finding is at times 
problematic and that the practice of other inter-state tribunals provide inspiration as to how to 
reform the Court’s current approach in order to ensure that it can make factual determinations 
that are as accurate as they can possibly be. 
 
The reforms proposed would provide the Court with a power to compel the production of 
evidence through purposively interpreting its current fact-finding powers, relying on the duty 
of each party to collaborate in the production of evidence or by couching its requests within 
provisional measures which are binding on the parties (subject to a number of conditions).  
Furthermore, the reforms proposed in Chapter 4 would provide the Court with a clear strategy 
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for better use of expert evidence which would assist the Court in cases involving particularly 
complex or technical evidence, which Chapter 2 showed present the Court with very real 
difficulties and threaten the proper administration of justice.  This issue provides just one 
example of how fruitful the comparative exercise undertaken in Chapter 3 was in terms of 
providing models for reform of the Court’s problematic approach to fact-finding.  For 
instance, the Guyana/Suriname arbitration provided a clear example of the value of a tribunal-
appointed expert in cases where the discovery of certain information is disputed,
1381
 whilst the 
Kishenganga arbitration provided a useful alternative in this respect, demonstrating how 
discussions between the parties with the adjudicators in camera can similarly lead to 
satisfactory results in terms of the disclosure of contested information.
1382
 
 
As highlighted above, these select reforms would not require amendment of the Court’s 
Statute – a process that would be difficult if not impossible.  Rather, the proposed reforms 
could all be realistically made through increased use of fact-finding powers that the Court 
already possesses, orders or practice directions.  Furthermore, Chapter 5 showed that the 
Court’s discretion to take a more proactive approach to fact-finding is not fettered by its role 
within the institutional structure of the United Nations.   
 
Of course, the ultimate decision as to whether the Court reforms its fact-finding process lies 
with the Court itself.  Those who sit on the bench of the World Court may well decide to carry 
on regardless, dealing with cases that are consistently complex in terms of the facts, 
unconvinced of the benefits of taking a more proactive approach to fact-finding.  Or perhaps 
more likely, whilst there may be some within the Court who recognise a need for reform, the 
institutional culture of the Court may prove resistant to change.  Nevertheless, it is argued that, 
at the very least, serious reconsideration of how the Court deals with facts is warranted.  
Otherwise, in the words of the late Antonio Cassese ‘…there is a risk that more cases will go 
elsewhere (eg to arbitral courts or to specialized tribunals…) and the Court will become a less 
attractive institution.’1383 
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